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A brief study of democratic theory as it relates to public participation and 
government communications within a New Zealand con text. A 
literature review identifies the traditional communications conventions 
pre-state sector reform and a survey of state sector communications 
managers reveals the conflict between this traditional approach as it is 
articulated, and actual practice in the post-state sector reform 
environment. A new convention is presented based on three divisions 
within the core public service: primarily policy; primarily operational; 
and mixed objective. Communications conventions for state-owned 
enterprises, Crown entities and Crown research institutes are also 
identified. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Central to this thesis is the question: how should a democratic 
government communicate with its citizens? A study of democratic 
theory focusing on the normative principles of public participation in 
policy-making, provides some insights to this. Additional issues are 
raised, such as to what extent should a government communicate, what 
methods should it employ and to whom should it communicate? In 
order to address these further questions, this thesis explores the concept 
of 'the public interest', public opinion, the value of public education and 
the role of the various institutions of the state in communicating with 
the public. This theoretical discussion is found in Chapter Two. 
In Chapter Three New Zealand's democratic system of government and 
important constitutional conventions are briefly analysed in the light of 
the theoretical considerations discussed in the previous chapter. 
Particular attention is paid to the views of leading constitutional writers 
about the appropriate roles and relationships of the various participants 
in our democracy-these include ministers, officials, and the media. The 
key conventions of ministerial responsibility and public service 
anonymity are reviewed, as is the impact of the Official Information Act 
1982 on these conventions. A theoretical description of government 
communications conventions before state sector reform is presented on 
the basis of the literature. 
The major elements of New Zealand's 'bureaucratic revolution'l led by 
the fourth Labour Government (1984-90) are then considered, in 
particular the changes to the machinery of government, along with the 
impact of these changes on the conventions. The relationship between 
ministers and officials under the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public 
Finance Act 1989 is explored. A survey, conducted among 86 state sector 
communications managers is presented and the current communications 
conventions identified. The conclusion reached in Chapter Four is that 
the radical restructuring of government has created a reduced state sector 
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and reorganised the institutions of the public sector bureaucracy into 
three categories, each with different objectives: core policy agencies; core 
operational agencies; and a category in which agencies have mixed 
objectives. Overlapping all agency types are those agencies with 
statutorily defined functions. The literature review identifies an 
additional 'policy advocacy' agency type. The existence of such an agency 
type is tested against evidence obtained from the thesis survey which 
concludes with a rejection of this agency categorisation. New 
conventions for government communications which take into account 
the three categorisations outlined above, are presented. 
Tension results from the divergence between the conventions articulated 
by the traditional conventions and the new conventions as they are 
practised. Chapter Five identifies the following communications issues 
which arise out of this situation: confusion within the state sector on 
roles for officials; need for more specific guidelines; market failure and 
reliance on the media to communicate policy; need for funding of public 
awareness outputs; perceived reduction in public confidence of public 
sector independence and fears of politicization; and the impact of the 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system of representation. 
Chapter Six concludes by briefly drawing together the arguments of the 
thesis and presents a proposal designed to address further some of these 
issues. 
Endnotes 
1 Boston et a1 Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution 
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CHAPTER ONE 
-Democratic theory and government communication 
DEMOCRACY 
-What is it? 
Most New Zealanders would say that our country is a 'democracy', but 
might be divided in their reasons for saying so. What are the critical 
features a system of governance should posses in order to be called 
democratic? An influential writer on the subject, Barry Holden,l 
suggested that virtually everything political has been called 'democracy' 
or 'democratic', and that definitions will vary along with people's values. 
Holden described the two main bodies of democratic theory as 'empirical' 
and 'normative'. 
Empiricists concern themselves with how democratic systems actually 
operate and the distribution of power within them. Four branches can be 
identified: pluralist (Bentley, Dahl, Truman); elitist (Hunter, Michels, 
CW Mills); neo-pluralist (Bell, Etzioni, Galbraith, Sartori); and Marxist 
(Habermas, Miliband, O'Connor).2 
Holden was critical of the empiricists and claimed that a common fallacy 
occurred among those who defined democracy. This is the belief that the 
meaning of 'democracy' can be, "...found simply by examining the 
systems commonly called democracies."3 Holden's view was that a 
democracy is, "...a political system of which it can be said that the whole 
people, positively or negatively, make, and are entitled to make, the basic 
determining decisions on important matters of public policy."4 It is 
significant that this definition includes the concept of public participation 
in determining public policy. Participation is a key concept in normative 
democratic theory and is discussed on page 11. 
Normative democratic theory is concerned with the role the public 
should play in the political process, and is most clearly defined by 
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Benjamin Barber as either radical ('strong') democracy, or liberal ('thin') 
democracy.5 Under 'thin' democracy, the public merely choose their 
leaders during elections, and play little part in agenda setting or public 
policy-making . 
Representative or 'thin' democracy, according to Barber, is incompatible 
with freedom, equality and justice-political values which depend on 
self-government and citizenship.6 Under such regimes, citizens: 
... become subject to laws they did not truly participate in 
making; they become the passive constituents of 
representatives who, far from reconstituting the citizens' aims 
and interests, usurp their civic functions and deflect their civic 
energies.7 
Barber concluded that 'thin' democracy is not, in fact, very democratic and 
advocates 'strong' (participatory) democracy. 
In 'strong' democracies politics is not something done to the public by 
elites, but something done by the public as a whole. It literally involves 
self-government by the people instead of representative government. 
Consultation and active public participation in public policy-making is a 
feature of 'strong' democracies. 
Illuminating Barber's analysis within a New Zealand context political 
commentator Colin James8 has argued that the policy changes 
undertaken by the fourth Labour government (1984-1990) and the 
successor National government were undemocratic. He stated that the 
true democrat in government will only do what the people ask to be 
done: 
Very few people 'voted' in any sense for the 1984-92 
programme of radical change. Instead, a bunch of elite radicals 
went their own way unasked, using the cloak of democratic 
formality-their election to office in an antiquated and 
unrepresentative winner-take-all system-to claim they were 
acting legitimately.9 
James suggested that democrats would argue that the architects of New 
Zealand's policy changes should have been honest about their intentions 
and, "...ought to have proceeded with more sensitivity to public 
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opinion."lO Public opinion is a critical element to consider in the 
democratic process and is discussed more fully on page 22. 
Another New Zealand political commentator, Richard Mulgan, 
attempted to define 'the people' within a bicultural context of Maori and 
Pakeha.11 He advocated a pluralist view of society, in which 'the people' 
is defined differently for different issues. In many cases, interest groups 
(and/or pressure groups) may be the appropriate grouping to decide 
democratically on any issue. Mulgan assumed the 'best judge' principle, 
whereby the individual is deemed to be the best judge of her or his own 
interests. The question of the public interest is discussed further on page 
17. 
Democratic debate in New Zealand appears to largely favour the 
normative ideal of strong democracy, although in reality the nature and 
extent of public participation varies. 
-Public participation 
Empirical democratic theory rejects the notions that participation is 
logically or empirically necessary to democracy, and finds that something 
akin to the law of diminishing returns applies-excessive public 
participation can even be harmful to democracy. 
The elite empiricists represented by such writers as Joseph Schumpeter, 
claim that the people are capable of nothing but choosing leaders, and 
that most people lack the competence or desire to participate in 
government. In this analysis, elites govern, but do not dominate, being 
ultimately controlled by elections-a constitutional safeguard. Philip 
Green describes the act of voting as, "...an act of system affirmation rather 
than significant participation in the political realm."l2 
Normative theories of public participation do not generally disagree on 
its value to democracy, but they do differ in terms of justification and the 
degree of participation required. 
Writing in 1987, USA political science academic Jack Nagel separated the 
benefits of public participation as developed in normative democratic 
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theory, into three types: instrumental (utilitarian); developmental 
(educative); and intrinsic.l3 
The instrumental argument suggests that participation is a means to 
achieve other goals-not an end in itself. It is a form of communication 
from the public to its leaders. 
Educational or developmental effects of participation mean the 
individual can develop new values, attitudes, skills, knowledge and 
beliefs. Nagel claimed that theorists who believed in this 'character- 
forming' effect, "...tend to be dissatisfied with people as they are but 
optimistic about the possibilities for their improvement."l4 The benefit 
of educative effects is that they can enhance administrative efficiency. 
Individual gratification, according to Nagel, is an intrinsic effect of 
participation, and a measure of the special benefits to the individual, 
whereas developmental effects are largely a measure of the benefit to 
society. 
Geraint Parry et al, writing about a British study in 1992, provided four 
justifications for participation: instrumental; communitarian; 
educative; and expressive.15 Commu nitarian theory suggests that 
participation is motivated by a concern for the community. Expressive 
participation is an explanation of why people may participate without an 
expectation of directly achieving a goal (instrumental), or out of 
community concern (communitarianism). Their actions are an 
expression of their feelings or a display about their stance on particular 
issues, such as attending a rally or saluting a flag. Parry's definition of 
public participation was: " . . .taking part in the process of formulation, 
passage and implementation of public policies."16 
The radical ('strong') and liberal ('thin') split in normative democratic 
theory suggests different justifications for public participation. 
Rousseau and JS Mill embody the normative principles of radical 
democratic theory. Radical democratic theory, as explained by Holdenl7, 
requires the individual to actively engage in policy formulation. 
Rousseau held that participation is valued for its own sake, because it 
allows the individual to fully develop, and strengthens the bonds to the 
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community. Disagreeing on the degree of participation required in a 
democracy, Rousseau and Mill emphasised the benefits of participation in 
contributing towards the development of a responsible and moral 
personality.18 
Liberal democratic theory is more concerned with individual rights and 
freedoms and protection against the power of the state and is best 
articulated by Schumpeter and Friedrick Hayek. 
According to Barber, in a 'strong' democracy individuals are linked, 
" . ..less by homogeneous interests than by civic education."l9 Barber 
expressed the educative justification that community grows out of 
participation, while at the same time making it possible: ". . .civic activity 
educates individuals how to think publicly as citizens even as citizenship 
informs civic activity with the required sense of publicness and justice."20 
According to Barber, numerous surveys and polls in the USA, "...suggest 
over and over again that while citizens distrust politics in the abstract, 
they desire concrete participation and work to enlarge the scope of that 
participation when they have once experienced it."21 New Zealand's vote 
to change the electoral system from First-Past-The-Post (FPP) to Mixed 
Member Proportional (MMP) representation in 1993 and the advent of 
Citizens' Initiated Referenda could be interpreted in support of this 
argument. 
Criticisms of participatory democracy presume that the masses will 
pursue private interests (utility-maximising behaviour) once 
empowered: the 'tyranny of the majority'. This presumption works 
against the Rousseauistic concept of 'the general will', whereby 
individuals can identify and pursue collective interests that may not in 
the short-term be in the individual's best interests. Brian Barry 
convincingly argued that Rousseau's 'general will' was in fact the 'public 
interesV.22 The pursuit of community goals or the public interest can be 
analysed in terms of individuals seeking to maximise their long-term 
welfare through stable government and the provision of public goods. 
The existence of 'free-riders' works against this theory. Barber postulated 
that free-riders can only exist in a 'thin' democracy, "...where obligation is 
the provisional consequence of a bargain."23 In a strong democracy 
citizens understand their freedom as a consequence of their participation 
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in decision-making: "To ride for free is to betray not others or an abstract 
promise but themselves."24 
The philosophical discussion of the radical participatory democratic 
theorists provides a picture of an ideal state of affairs. There are 
individual and community advantages in having a democratic system 
which encourages public participation in policy-making. Given the 
nature of individuals and the trade-offs they must invariably make each 
day, such an ideal state of full public participation as the radical 
democratic theorists suggest, is probably not achievable-it may not even 
be desirable, given the empirical theorists' view that instability may be a 
consequence. Certainly technical efficiency may not be achievable. 
Holden's personal view was a pragmatic one-that, "...most people 
simply do not have the time, energy and knowledge necessary for a 
detailed and continuous concern with politics. And it is unreasonable to 
suppose that they should have."25 He also considered the undesirable 
instability that would occur with intensive participation, as an important 
argument against it. Holden concluded, in a liberal mode, that there 
should be more provision for small-scale partial participation, 
consultation and institutionalised forms of protest.26 Such provisions, 
coupled with constitutional safeguards, would protect the public from the 
'tyranny of the majority'. 
Holden's analysis simply accepted that people do not have the time, 
energy and knowledge to participate. He did not question whether there 
was a role for government in creating time, providing incentives to 
participate, or in providing knowledge in appropriate formats. He fell 
into the same sort of definitional fallacy in this regard as the theorists he 
criticises. By pointing out the existence of these behaviours, he accepted 
them as evidence of the ways things are and had to be. 
New Zealand political philosophers tend to support the radical 
democratic theorists in their quest for strong democracy. Perhaps there is 
a cultural element at work here-what may be accepted as the norm, or a 
minimum standard in New Zealand, may not be directly translated into 
other societies' legitimate expectations. The size of New Zealand may 
also be a factor in determining any generally accepted cultural beliefs, 
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although the desire for 'strong' democracy may simply be yet another 
myth, ingrained into the New Zealand literature. 
Without falling into the definitional fallacy, it is pertinent to note that 
several political writers accept the principle of increased public 
participation as a legitimate goal for governments to pursue. New 
Zealand public policy academic Bob Gregory stated: "Calls for wider 
participation in the decision-making process and for greater 
accountability ... are appeals which can be denied only by those who lack 
any hint of democratic sensibility."27 And while a Member of 
Parliament, Gary Knapp stated: "To maintain even a semblance of 
democracy we have to encourage more active participation by the people 
in their political system."28 
Arguing in 1994 that New Zealanders want the state back in their control, 
Andrew Sharp, a political scientist, contends that picturing people simply 
as consumers and not as citizens is a mistake.29 He challenges public 
choice30 theory by saying that people do not regard themselves as simply, 
". . .utility-maximising individuals but as irreducibly members of real 
collective bodies: of families, of trades and professions and of ethnic 
groups.. . "31 This leads to the pursuit of collective as well as individual 
interests and to a perception of their role as members of the collectivity- 
the state. Sharp argues that by virtue of this membership, New 
Zealanders are entitled to participate in the state's decisions. Without 
providing evidence of this claim, he says the public want a return to 
deciding what the state should do. 
Mulgan's view of participation in 1989, was predicated on letting 
individuals decide which issues they were interested in pursuing. 
Provided the political system allowed equality of political opportunity, 
the appropriate constituency for each issue would always emerge.32 This 
concept raises some issues canvassed by Mulgan, such as individuals with 
psychological disorders, or strong emotional reactions to issues. In 
resolving these, Mulgan proposed that legitimacy of interest be tested. 
Legitimacy would include the individual having a material or financial 
interest at stake, or the issue having an effect on their quality of life. 
Mulgan failed to cover the question of how to ensure that all individuals 
with potential legitimate interests are aware of, or informed about, 
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particular issues likely to affect them. Participation cannot take place if 
individuals remain ignorant of policy proposals. Mulgan also suggested 
that where a number of different groups of people have different degrees 
of interest in an issue, the degree of power exercised by each group should 
vary accordingly.33 The public participate. in policy-making in a variety of 
ways, including representations to their MPs, through their involvement 
in political parties, or through established or ad hoc interest/pressure 
groups. 
In an extension of arguments in favour of each individual determining 
their own existence in the fullest way possible, Mulgan suggested that 
people who are politically active may be, "...living a fuller or more 
admirable type of life than those who are quite content to be passive and 
let others make decisions for themeU34 Mulgan countered the liberal 
argument that people are essentially apathetic and not interested in 
politics, by pointing out that participation in politics is in practice a trade- 
off among other activities an individual may value, such as family life, 
hobbies or interests. In essence, for some individuals, the marginal 
benefit of participation is not equal to the marginal cost of giving up 
some other activity. The key concept here is that individuals at least 
have the opportunity to choose to make these trade-offs, and that lack of 
participation per se is not indicative of lack of interest, or apathy. 
There is a pragmatic view that participation facilitates conditions for 
technical and cost efficiency in government administration, as well as 
enhances supportive relationships between citizens and the state. 
William Robson, in a much-quoted 1964 essay, perhaps summed it up 
most succinctly in his rejection of liberal democratic theory, where 
citizens are represented in the legislature and administered by the 
executive: 
We now realise that this is insufficient in a democracy to 
ensure mutual understanding between the governors and 
governed; and that without such understanding a high degree 
of popular participation is difficult to achieve. A widespread 
knowledge of the aims and purposes of government is 
necessary to secure consciousness of consent and popular 
support. Moreover, knowledge by the people of what the 
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government wants them to do is essential for the success of 
much public administration.35 
He also advocated extensive public participation as a safeguard against 
manipulation by political leaders using techniques of mass media 
advertising and propaganda.36 
Sir Frank Holmes (Chairman of the Planning Council) and John Martin 
(senior public servant) touched on this point in their 1981 essay, 
describing it as the tension, "...between efficient government, which 
makes decisions quickly, and public participation."37 
In the New Zealand context, the key democratic aspect of public 
participation is that it should be informed participation. Very few 
democratic theorists draw any distinction between the value and purpose 
of public participation per se and that which is informed. This thesis 
accepts the validity of public participation in the pragmatic approach 
asserted by WA Robson, and as appropriate to the New Zealand context 
and cultural expectations of government as articulated by Mulgan, 
Gregory, and Holmes and Martin. Accepting the essentially radical 
approach for increased public participation and 'strong' democracy does 
not exclude the application of a liberal ('thin') democratic approach to 
particular issues. There is no evidence to suggest that there is an accepted 
New Zealand convention that government can only operate in a strong 
democratic mode. Whatever the level of desired public participation, it 
leads to the question of the role of the state in facilitating an informed 
public. This question is discussed on page 29. 
-The public interest 
Writing in 1960, Glendon Schubert explained that the, "...concept of the 
public interest lies at the heart of democratic theories of government."38 
He described the theorists as being either universalists or particularists, 
noting the need for a middle-level theory. He outlined three theories: 
rationalist, idealist, and realist: "The Rationalists are propublic, proparty, 
and anti-interest group. They postulate a common good ... the common 
obligation of all public officials is faithfully to execute the popular wi11."39 
There are two divisions within the rationalist theory: party rationalists, 
who see a two-party system as expressing the public will; and popular 
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rationalists, who would consult public opinion directly in order to 
discover the people's will. 
According to Schubert: "Idealists are propublic, antiparty, and anti- 
interest group."40 Idealists do not support the public's perception of their 
interests, but their own perception of the public's interest based on a 
higher, moral, natural law. Schubert summed up this theory: "The 
public interest, of course, is what the elite thinks is good for the masses. 
Idealist dogma, as dogma, is basically antithetical to democratic theories of 
governance."41 Such theory appears to have its origins in the Platonic 
notion of a guardian class which is better able to perceive and act on such 
higher moral values. 
Realists are, "...pro-interest group. It is not accurate to say that they are 
antiparty or antipublic."42 This is because political parties and the 
various constituent parts which make up the public become defined as 
interest groups. Realists define the public interest as the political 
compromise reached between these various competing and conflicting 
interest groups (similar to Charles E Lindblom's notion of 'partisan 
mutual adjustmentt43). They advocate an essentially incrementalist 
approach to change using a process of full consideration to ensure that 
decisions made are most likely to be in the public interest.44 
Schubert's criticisms of public-interest theory were two-fold: that no 
theory described the relationship between the public interest and official 
behaviour in a way that could be empirically validated; and that no 
theory offered an operational guide for public officials in decision- 
making. Schubert stated, "...that there is no public-interest theory worthy 
of the name and that the concept itself is significant primarily as a datum 
of politics."45 He also found that there was 'no operational sense' to the 
concept .46 
Despite Schubert's analysis, politicians and political commentators 
continue to make reference to 'the public interest' with very little 
definition as to what definition they favour, as if it were some 
universally-accepted principle everyone is familiar with. For example 
Barry, in discussing models of constitutional choice, described the 
electorate choosing representatives on the basis of their presumed 
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devotion to the public interest47 and in his criticism contended that 
neither electors, politicians or experts, "...have the postulated 
combination of the desire to pursue the public interest and the 
knowledge of the policies necessary to attain it."48 Despite his familiarity 
with Schubert's work, Barry still made the assumption that the public 
interest is universally defined.49 
The public interest has been incorporated into the New Zealand legal 
system in specific statute (such as section 4(c) of the Official Information 
Act 1982) and in case law such as a defence to breach of confidenceso, 
contempt of court51 and defamation52. Defining the public interest has 
been no easier for the judiciary. Lord Denning has provided this 
definition: 
Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that 
they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is 
going on; or what may happen to them or to others; then it is a 
matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make 
fair comment .53 
This is an operational definition and one which provides rights to the 
public (and in particular to the news media). It does not offer an 
explanation as to the type of subject matter that may or may not be in the 
public interest, merely the effect of such matters on the 'people at large'. 
Distilling this into more general principles, it would appear that in order 
to uphold such a concept as the public interest, there is a positive duty on 
the part of decision-makers to inform the public at large on matters likely 
to affect them. In this way, the entitlement of each individual to make 
fair comment can be given effect. 
The practice of judicial review (Judicature Act 1908) which focuses on 
official decision-making, has at its core the principles of natural justice. 
This requires fair consultation with the affected public and implies 
imparting of sufficient information in order to enable such consultation 
to be well-informed. These principles are also established within specific 
statute such as the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (s.27(1)), which 
also provides for fundamental justice (s.8), and in such legislation as the 
Resource Management Act 1991. 
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In his view of the New Zealand constitution, KJ Scott placed a more 
active role on the obligation of government: "A government's duty is to 
do what it conceives will promote the public welfare, not to ease its 
conscience by putting into practice ideas that it has 0utgrown."5~ 
Various New Zealand commentators have cited the public interest 
within their discussions of the New Zealand political culture. Mulgan 
claimed that an area of inequality occurs, "...in the balance of power 
between the general or common interest and sectional interests."55 He 
ascribed responsibility to the government for upholding the public 
interest when it clashes with sectional ones. The incentive for politicians 
to do so is their desire for re-election. Voters are not always motivated by 
the general interest, being concerned with their own individual or 
regional interests as well. Mulgan stated that there is a weakness in 
government acting on behalf of the public interest, "...not so much due to 
any lack of legal or physical power; it is rather a question of the values 
which determine what is politically acceptable or unacceptable."56 Given 
contemporary economic values in New Zealand, "...the public interest is 
best served by competition and entrepreneurial initiative unhampered by 
misguided government attempts to 'pick winners1."57 
John Roberts suggested in 1987 that state servants and their ministers 
operated, "...in conditions of constant apprehension about the next crisis 
of confidence [which compels them] ... to reach decisions and to take 
actions which may be defended and justified in the public interest."58 
Presumably they were all assumed to share a universal appreciation of 
the public interest. 
Dr Probine, then Chairman of the State Services Commission (SSC), in 
submission to the Standing Orders Committee of Parliament in 1984, 
made a connection between the disinterested role of public servants and 
the public interest: "Any procedure which may cause public servants in 
future difficult situations to look primarily at self protection is, I suggest, 
damaging to the broader public interest."59 In his 1983 leaflet issued to 
public servants, Dr Probine made it clear that public servants were not the 
best-judge of the public interest. This essentially dispelled, within the 
New Zealand context, the idealist view of the public interest as some 
universal truth or higher law. Instead, a more pragmatic approach was 
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taken and one which fits into the constitutional framework, "...because 
they derive authority from the minister, public servants cannot take 
upon themselves the duty of deciding that the public interest is 
something other than the Government sees it to be."60 The State Sector 
Act 1988 can be viewed as reinforcing this relationship. 
In 1988 Martin outlined the history of the previously-held view of the 
public servant as guardian of the public interest. He explained that in 
most of post-war New Zealand the public interest could have been 
defined in these terms, as well as by political consensus, "...in welfare 
state terms featuring equality of access to public services, full 
employment, fair pay and a premium on stability."61 Discussing the 
break-up of this post-war consensus, Martin commented that: "The 
language of the public interest remains."62 He found that public servants 
subscribed to a view of the public interest being above sectional interests. 
In his 1991 work, Martin found that public servants could incorrectly 
believe that they had a higher duty other than to government, and that 
they could determine the definitional boundaries. Martin disagreed with 
this perception and concluded that in cases of concern, rather than act of 
their own volition, it was the duty of public servants to remind the 
minister of the public interest.63 In his 1994 analysis of state sector 
reforms, Martin also claims that the widespread adoption of public choice 
theory and principal agency64 theory denigrates notions of the public 
interest and trust as the basis of governmental relationships.65 
In his 1987 memoirs, John Robson (not to be confused with WA Robson 
cited earlier), previously a New Zealand permanent head, linked another 
important doctrine to the public interest: "Presumably the central 
justification for ministerial responsibility must be the public interest ..."66 
Chapters Three and Four discuss this concept of ministerial 
responsibility. 
The Royal Commission on Social Policy, reporting in 1988, considered it 
was part of the media's role to serve the public interest. It concluded its 
discussion of deregulation and market forces by claiming: "...a 
commercial broadcasting market will neither produce socially equitable 
ends, nor the broadest set of conditions for the public interest."67 An 
Government communication in New Zealand: changing roles and conventions 2 1 
CHAPTER TWO 
editorial in the Evening Post commenting on the launch of the 
Newspaper Publishers' Association's book -, 
presented the media's (in my view outdated) interpretation of its role in 
protecting the public interest against the government: 
By publishing the book the NPA has shown it has the nous to 
represent public interest and advance the fragile status of the 
information industry when it could just as easily take an 
accommodatory line with governments and palatable-news 
theorists.68 
Further analysis of the media's role in New Zealand is found in Chapters 
Three and Four. 
-Public opinion 
All governments, according to American political scientist VO Key@, 
concern themselves with public opinion. The linkage between the two is 
primarily the electoral process. 
In differentiating between public and private opinion in 1961, Key 
favoured, for public opinion, the working definition of, "...those opinions 
held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed."70 
This opinion may be shared by a small or large grouping of people and 
government may or may not act on it. The public is further subdivided 
into the mass (or latent) public, and the attentive public. The 
composition of the public will vary according to the public policy issue 
under consideration. 
Key placed emphasis on freedom of speech and discussion in formulating 
public opinion and, "...the free availability of information about public 
issues and public questions"71. In a democracy, according to Key, private 
opinion may have an impact on most major public actions and the 
principle of enhanced participation was advocated: "For the maximum 
participation of the public (or the publics) a practice of disclosure or notice 
of prospective actions and of announcement of the considerations 
underlying actions must be followed."72 
Latent opinion is extremely difficult to judge and is often only aroused by 
a particular action of government. This may be why one of the 
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techniques of politics, the 'calculated leak' or 'trial balloon' is used so 
frequently by governments to test public opinion before committing 
publicly to a particular policy. Key cited reaction to speeches as another 
method that politicians use to gauge public opinion. This is less of an 
occurrence in the telecommunications age of the 1990s, than at the time 
of Key's writing in 1961. Politicians now use mass media exposure to 
present their messages to the public and do not generally expect feedback 
from the audience except second-hand through subsequent media 
coverage and discussion by elites. 
Preoccupation with opinion polling by politicians can lead to 
misunderstanding public opinion, especially when survey design and 
analysis is easily biased. WA Robson suggested that surveying is a 
valuable device for bringing the citizens and their government into a 
closer and more harmonious relationship. However, he cautioned that 
the methods employed should be impartial and disinterested, citing an 
example of a survey being used, "...to confuse the public in order to serve 
sectional interests."73 In New Zealand, nationwide surveys of the general 
public conducted by public sector agencies must comply with the Statistics 
Act 1975 if the results are to be published. In the 1991 health reforms 
survey it appears the Act was not followed, because according to Joe 
Atkinson, a political scientist operating in media studies, "...the 
Government Statistician later raised doubts about the methodological 
probity of the Heylen survey.. ."74 In general, the Statistics Act 1975 is a 
useful check on the public sector's inappropriate use of nationwide 
surveys, provided they are aware of its provisions. 
An additional method of assessing public opinion, apart from the 
number of letters received each day from constituents, is the reaction 
from pressure and interest groups to media releases, and the reaction of 
the media themselves. These are essentially 'reactive' methods of 
identifying public opinion. 
Holden cited the Greek viewpoint that the power of a community resides 
with the common 'man' and his opinions. Democracy becomes possible 
through majority rule expressed by these opinions. With wisdom spread 
throughout the community, wise policies can be obtained by involving 
everyone in the decision-making process.75 Holden's own view of 
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democracy was that, "...genuine decision-making by the people entails 
genuine choice, which in turn entails the existence of opportunities for 
the advocacy and effective presentation of different viewpoints."76 
In evaluating a national referenda programme, Barber identified 
resistance resulting from fear of 'popular rule' and in particular, fear of 
elites who may influence public opinion with money and other forms of 
economic power and social control.77 The New Zealand experience with 
two powerful lobby groups in the 1992 indicative and 1993 binding 
referenda on electoral reform could be analysed as examples of this. The 
distrust of referenda and the public opinion so exposed is also possibly 
demonstrated in the 1993 legislation which allows for citizens' initiated 
referenda, the results of which are not binding on government. 
WA Robson also touched on the power of elites in controlling opinion 
polls discussing: 
... the dangers of allowing the voters to become befuddled with 
pseudo-scientific statements about public opinion based on 
highly tendentious questions designed to evoke prejudice on 
the part of the elector in order to serve the purposes of business 
interests.78 
Barry outlined two models of government: power-diffusing, whereby 
information is increased by ad hoc bargaining with interest groups on 
most issues; and power-concentrating systems, where information is 
economised and citizens' efforts are concentrated around elections. He 
provided justification for the latter by identifying the public's ability to 
vote for outcomes as opposed to outputs: 
... more importantly perhaps, a power-concentrating system 
economizes on information and effort by enabling people to 
use their influence not for or against certain policies but for or 
against certain states of affairs.79 
An emphasis on seeking public opinion and/or consultation on 
individual policy questions is therefore not required. 
In a New Zealand context, KJ Scott identified three periods in which the 
authority of public opinion was very different,80 and a fourth has now 
become apparent. Until about 1890, the dominant view was that public 
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opinion was entitled to consideration, but should not fetter the legislative 
discretion of Parliament. In a second period from about 1891 to 1912, the 
government claimed a broad right to legislate in accordance with the 
general policy approved by electors. A third period from 1912 until the 
time of Scott's writing in 1962, was that the electoral platform and 
legislation enacted should closely correspond-the main difference being 
in the interpretation of electoral results. An earlier writer on the subject, 
Polaschek, supported this view by linking the retention of electoral 
support to the government's ability to stay in step with public opinion.81 
A fourth period commencing with the fourth Labour government in 
1984 can be said to have altered this perception of the value placed on the 
influence of public opinion on the legislative process. 
In his 1989 analysis of political power, Mulgan identified the motivations 
behind politicians responding to public opinion. He found that, 
"...electoral defeat is a constant and powerful motive in politicians' minds 
and they are continually modifying their behaviour for fear of adverse 
public reaction and eventual loss of votes at the next election ..."8* He 
also stated that the authority of public opinion had an impact. Mulgan 
did not question the quality or validity of such public views, or whether 
they were based on full and accurate information. Although he claimed 
that within the New Zealand context this dynamic was taking place and 
that public policy was being affected by public opinion, Mulgan did not 
question whether the electorate was well-informed. The role of the state 
in providing an opportunity for public education must be analysed, if the 
cause-and-effect nature of public opinion on public policy is accepted. 
Commenting on the very current low measures of public confidence in 
Parliament and the major political parties, James quoted from former 
Cabinet Minister Hon. David Caygill, who confirmed that a political price 
was paid by the Labour Government in the 1980s for going beyond the 
limits of public acceptance in some reforms.83 James identified the over- 
riding issue for the 1990s, as mending the rift between the public and 
policy-makers. He found that the public, "...remain to a large extent 
disconnected from the policy-makers."84 This implies that the value of 
public opinion has lost its currency and supports the claim of a fourth era 
(post-1984) in political response to public opinion in New Zealand. 
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Les Cleveland, writing in 1972, claimed that in New Zealand, 
"...government is largely carried on by means of the persuasion and 
manipulation of public opinion or whatever its convenient substitutes 
might be."85 He detailed the role of pressure groups in providing a 
channel for public opinion to be heard. 
In 1978 Mike Minogue, then a Member of Parliament, suggested that 
public opinion was a check on the executive's power. High-pressure 
legislation designed to maintain Parliament in a subservient role, "...is a 
formality only to be prevented by the strength of interested public 
opinion and not by parliamentary opposition."86 He differentiated 
between public opinion per se and informed opinion. Informed opinion 
can be the only real check on power because, "...if the public or the 
opposition is not well-informed or has little time to become well- 
informed and to evaluate proposals, it is unlikely to offer serious 
resistance."87 
In 1984 Knapp picked up the theme that Parliament should reflect the 
will of the people and be more responsive to public opinion. He asserted 
that: "Parliamentary democracy can function adequately only if the 
people and their elected representatives are fully informed."88 An 
advocate of public participation, Knapp believed this would only happen 
if people were, "...able to formulate educated opinions on vital 
questions."89 
In 1987 while also a politician, constitutional lawyer Geoffrey Palmer 
listed one of the main checks on the decision-making power of New 
Zealand governments as the political requirement that: "Government 
must take into account public opinion."90 He also later stated that the 
public have a direct relationship with the executive because public 
opinion was a significant factor taken into account by the executive when 
decision-making91 
Martin similarly pointed out in 1988, that it was good administrative 
practice for public servants to be aware of public opinion and to consult 
with groups affected by their activities.92 
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GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION 
P u b l i c  education 
Public ignorance of both the political process and specific public policy 
proposals is a significant concern in democracies with a strong focus on 
public participation. Holden pointed out that statistical studies of voting 
behaviour have apparently overwhelmingly shown that, "...electors are 
largely ignorant of, and uninterested in, the issues at an election and the 
policies put forward by the parties ... and ... they participate little in 
politics."93 Voting behaviour is largely irrational, as it is not motivated 
by concern with, and knowledge about, the issues and policies. On this 
basis it could be concluded that the outcome of elections, and therefore 
the broad determination of public policy, is determined by floating voters 
who vote rationally. Rejecting this argument, Holden cited a study 
which found floating voters to be less rational than other voters.94 
Holden showed that these studies did not support the radical democratic 
view that public policy is determined by the broad mass of people at 
elections. Instead public policy is determined through participation of 
specific interest groups. Given this, those likely to be affected by, or 
interested in, each issue should be identified and informed in order to 
ensure that rational democratic decision-making does occur. 
Key described Walter Lippmann's analysis of the 'phantom public' as 
demolishing any illusion that the public could be regarded, "...as an 
omnicompetent and omniscient collectivity equipped to decide the affairs 
of state."95 Even if an individual were willing to devote spare time to 
considering public policy questions, ". . .the information available to him 
was both inadequate and unenlightening."96 Key outlined the denial of 
public information as denying the opportunity for meaningful criticism 
of public policy.97 
Green contended it would be excessive to say that citizens make irrational 
voting choices, suggesting the business cycle-sensitive model as the best 
predictive tool for national elections-a view rational-choice theorists are 
likely to agree with. He also stated that the mass market imposed by 
television is central to the field of information and education, and Dahl's 
central rule about the equal citizen opportunity to be informed between 
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elections.98 Dahl added, as a third criterion to the democratic process, 
'enlightened understanding': 
Each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities 
for discovering and validating (within the time permitted by 
the need for a decision) the choice on the matter to be decided 
that would best serve the citizen's interests.99 
The principle of the individual as the best-judge of their own interests 
underlies this criterion, as does the concept of utility-maximising 
behaviour, and the value of public participation in the policy-making 
process. 
Barber criticized the liberal proponents of 'thin' democracy who believe 
that public participation is inefficient, and that representatives are the 
best-judge of the public's interests. He claimed that this merely provided 
the insignia, but not the tools of citizenship and convicted the public of 
incompetence: 
Social scientists and political elites have all too often indulged 
themselves in this form of hypocrisy. They throw referenda at 
the people without providing adequate information, full 
debate, or prudent insulation from money and media pressures 
and then pillory them for their lack of judgement.100 
He later commented that: "Referendum and initiative processes 
divorced from innovative programmes for public talk and deliberation 
fall easy victims to plebiscitary abuses and to the manipulation of money 
and elites of popular prejudice."lOl Clearly Barber was suggesting that in 
a 'strong' democracy, it is government's responsibility during referenda to 
provide adequate information, conditions conducive to full debate and 
some form of control over powerful elites and incorrect reportage.102 
WA Robson explained that communication between the governors and 
the governed was not about simply promulgating a new law or 
publishing regulations: 
... but of securing widespread knowledge of, and participation 
in, elaborate measures affecting agriculture, industry and trade; 
research programmes; health campaigns, town and country 
planning schemes; educational programmes; highway and 
traffic improvements, and many other governmental 
activities.103 
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The task of officials to inform the bureaucracy, politicians and the public 
is carried out through intelligence, information and public relations 
services, according to Robson.104 The information required is two-way, 
with an increasing need for knowledge about the people in such things as 
demographics, family structures, mortality rates, age distributions, 
employment, savings and incomes, insurance etcetera. Intelligence on 
foreign experience was seen as vital by Robson, as well as the funding of 
research projects. 
Government information services use all communications media, 
including the press, broadcasters, films, exhibitions, pamphlets, books, 
reports, lectures, advertising and so on. Robson related successful 
external communications to successful internal communications. He 
defined public relations as moving away from the realm of factual 
material to persuasion, propaganda and a conscious attempt to influence. 
Examples provided included: encouraging pregnant women to make use 
of maternity benefits; warnings against cigarette smoking; anti drink- 
drive campaigns; anti-litter projects; immunization campaigns; and so 
on.105 He found the use of public relations to be one of the most effective 
methods of bringing public authorities into closer touch with citizens and 
that two-way channels of communication should be established to enable 
the public to feed back into the policy process. 
-Role of the state 
There are many formulations of the notion of the state. One that is 
considered useful within this context is that of Fried, viz., "...the complex 
of institutions by means of which the power of the society is 
organised."l06 The question for this thesis is: how is the power of society 
organised to provide public education and generally to communicate 
between the organs of the state and its citizens? 
Arguments for a state role in providing public education on policy 
options and general communication about the business of government 
centre on the principle of increased public participation in the democratic 
process. WA Robson believed that the state was one of the contributors, 
"...to the sense of insignificance and impotence which afflicts many 
individuals in many modern societies."l07 As a consequence, he 
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identified a need to enlarge the freedom of the individual and increase 
their participation in order to enhance democracy. Robson did not 
provide any empirical evidence to support these claims. He did state that 
part of the task of a government was to enlighten the people about its 
purposes and programmes, so that it could be fairly judged. Without 
informed judgement, quality of government is unlikely to be high.108 
The role of officials in communicating with the public is to communicate 
simply and clearly what they are trying to do and why: "They should 
explain and justify their methods. They should be frank about difficulties 
and shortcomings."l09 In this way, prejudice and ill-informed criticism 
may be avoided and a discriminating body of public opinion established 
and maintained. 
Holden stated that in order to encourage public participation it was, 
"...arguable that decision-making should be 'opened up' more, and that 
mass education ... should be further emphasized."llO 
Key explained that conditions specified by democratic theorists, under 
which public opinion can be a force in government, include freedom of 
speech and discussion, and, "...the free availability of information about 
public issues and public questions ..."ill His view of popular government 
involved a two-way flow of information between the public and 
government.112 To a certain degree this involves anticipation of the 
public's reaction. Key did not offer any empirical evidence to justify this 
model, but he did qualify it with four areas of deviation. However, as 
evidenced in the USA by Protess et alll3, this traditional model does not 
work in practice, where the public are often by-passed by the media who 
directly influence public policy. 
There is clearly a strong tradition that government should at least 
provide access to information about its activities. This can be viewed as a 
reactive measure of opening the books, if the public ask. New Zealand's 
Official Information Act 1982 has increasingly come to be used in this 
manner by some state sector agencies, despite the principles upon which 
it was established emphasising the need for proactive information to be 
provided to the public. A discussion on the Act is found in Chapter 
Three and a recent experience outlined in Chapter Four. 
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In support of the New Zealand principle of enhanced public participation, 
in 1981 Holmes & Martin linked the practical achievement of policy 
implementation to an informed public, and outlined a policy advocacy 
role for government: "...the pragmatic justification for this is that ... the 
Executive may well find its wishes frustrated unless it makes the effort to 
explain its policies and persuade its constituency."ll4 Holmes & Martin 
also claimed that the exercise of government power could be restricted, 
fundamentally because of the failure of public policy and: "To a not 
inconsiderable extent this arises from failures of explanation ..."I15 
Governments then, in this analysis, have a practical incentive to inform 
the public adequately on public policy matters, in order to facilitate their 
own constitutional role of democratic governance. 
Practical evidence of the benefit of informed and therefore increased 
public participation in a New Zealand context was outlined by JL Robson 
in 1976. He saw increased public participation in penal policy as one way 
to bring about needed change and improved services for clients. 
However, in the absence of quality information, this increased public 
participation has the potential to do more damage than good: "If a well- 
intentioned but inadequately informed public presses for radical 
change ... it might contribute ... to worsen rather than improve the lot of the 
prisoner."ll6 
Cleveland's description of decision-making in New Zealand in 1972 gives 
weight to the, "...free, vigorous, informed exchange of information and 
ideas"ll7, with its fundamental importance to the democratic political 
system cited. 
WA Robson has noted that as the scale and scope of state action increases, 
the importance of communication becomes greater.118 While the New 
Zealand state sector reforms post-1984 were designed to give less 
government, public policy academic Jonathan Boston has demonstrated 
that in one sense at least we in fact actually have more because of the 
increase in the number and types of state sector agencies.llg Following 
Robson's thesis, this would indicate a need to increase the quality and 
quantity of communication between the state and the public. Even if 
these arguments are not accepted, in times of great change the public's 
collective memory and knowledge about their entitlements and 
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government processes becomes largely redundant and a significant 
knowledge gap emerges. It is clearly no one else's duty but the 
government's, to communicate the extent and content of such changes in 
ways appropriate to affected groups. 
Answering the question in 1992, do we need government information 
services? Mike Devereau, Chief Executive of the UK Central Office of 
Information and Head of the Government Information Services, said: 
"Yes, now more than ever, because today both government and media 
are increasing in complexity."l20 He cited the need arising from the 
dramatic changes to the machinery of government and the increasing 
complexity of messages which need to be communicated. His view was 
that communication between government and citizen is an essential part 
of the democratic process.121 
The two concepts: increased public participation, and informed public 
participation, appear to be critical and inseparable principles within the 
New Zealand democratic context. This concern is perhaps reflected in the 
choice of quotation from Thomas Jefferson at the beginning of the 
Directorv of Official Information 1993-95: 
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate power of the 
society but the people themselves and if we think them not 
enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome 
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to 
inform their discretion.122 
-Propaganda and po liticization 
In his descriptive history of public opinion, Key suggested that following 
World War I, a belief in the ability of propaganda to shape public opinion 
grew. The study of psychology, the impact of radio and later television all 
contributed to the, "...belief that the people could readily be manipulated 
by the mass media ..."I23 By the time of his writing in 1961, Key believed 
that governments attempted to mould public opinion toward support of 
their programmes and policies. He suggested that, "...a perfect 
congruence between public policy and public opinion could be 
government of public opinion rather than government by public 
0pinion."l2~ This shaping of public attitudes towards acceptance of 
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government policies is not justified on any philosophical basis. Key 
implied that government is merely another pressure group, competing 
against opposition parties and private lobby groups. He did not discuss 
why government, with all its resources and power, has a legitimate role 
in attempting to alter public opinion, or what checks and balances should 
apply. 
John Keane found the 'self-promotion of state power' in Britain to be an 
annual budget of nearly £200 million. The state, in 1990, was the second 
largest advertiser, "...covering 'campaigns' on every conceivable policy 
matter."l25 His conclusion was that the, "...steady growth of state 
advertising gives all democratically elected governments enormous 
power of blackmail."l26 His subsequent discussion on United Kingdom 
political reporting suggested that there is a pact between politicians and 
the media whereby overall control is in the hands of the politicians, who 
utilize various coercive techniques. Tabloid journalism, with its obvious 
commercial incentive for sensationalism, would most likely be exempt 
from this analysis. 
WA Robson found that while public relations was a legitimate 
government activity, there was a danger of undermining independent 
criticism of government if undue influence over the news media were 
exerted. This influence could be obtained by discriminating between 
those media outlets with a sympathetic editorial line and those 
without.127 He suggested that presentation of partial or incomplete 
information by public authorities can operate to bias public opinion. 
The United Kingdom justifies the role of its Government Information 
Services as being: 
... to create and maintain an informed opinion about the 
subjects with which each department deals; to use all methods 
of publicity where suitable to help the department to achieve 
its purpose; to assist and advise in all matters bearing on 
relations between the department and its public; and to advise 
the department on the public's reaction to the policies and 
actions of the departrnent.128 
Devereau explained its role as being to inform and not to image build for 
the government or ministers. 
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In the UK, the extreme concern that government publicity does not stray 
into propaganda is expressed by the scrutiny applied to government 
communications. Since 1946 more than 50 enquiries have been 
conducted into government communications activities.129 Devereau 
explained that communicating with the public can provide political credit 
to the party in government. However, the search for such credit cannot 
be, or be seen to be, the primary purpose or primary incidental of their 
work. He claimed it was vital to keep separate legitimate public 
communications which are taxpayer funded, from party political issues 
concerned with image or electability.130 Devereau did not precisely 
define which matters were appropriate to spend taxpayers' funds on. In 
New Zealand, the Audit Office issued guidelines for government 
advertising in 1989, which were subsequently partially endorsed by 
Cabinet Office. These are discussed more fully in Chapters Four and Five. 
The benefits of government communication in a democracy appear to be 
outweighed by the dangers of propaganda or politicization of the 
messages. There is a borderline between legitimate communication and 
that which is designed to promote support for political parties or electoral 
success. The question of where this borderline lies in regard to New 
Zealand's constitutional arrangements is discussed in Chapters Three and 
Four. The evidence presented in Chapter Four suggests that support for 
existing government policy or policy proposals is a legitimate 
communications activity of most public and state sector agency types. 
Specific checks and balances are required in any jurisdiction in order to 
ensure that abuse of resources by government does not take place. 
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-New Zealand government communications: 
pre-state sector reform conventions 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
New Zealand's legal tradition largely comes from the United Kingdom. 
The constitution 
... reflects and establishes that New Zealand is a monarchy, that 
it has a parliamentary system of government, and that it is a 
democracy. It increasingly reflects the fact that the Treaty of 
Waitangi is regarded as a founding document of government 
in New Zealand.1 
The rule of law is paramount. One of the foundation cases came about in 
17652. Governments have to ensure that where officials are required to 
act or behave in certain ways, that the freedoms of citizens are not 
infringed unless a specific law sanctions such behaviour. Even actions of 
the Sovereign in the exercise of the royal prerogative are not above 
judicial review.3 
New Zealand is governed by three branches: legislature, executive and 
judiciary. Over time, powers have overlapped and amalgamated. The 
government in power, through Cabinet, controls both the executive and 
legislature (although in respect of the latter, the advent of MMP is already 
reducing the dominance of Cabinet). The Constitution Act 1986 abolished 
the United Kingdom Parliament's power to legislate for New Zealand, 
and outlines the roles of the Sovereign, executive, legislature and 
judiciary. 
Parliament is the highest law-making body in New Zealand and the right 
to legislate is not questioned by the courts.4 The Bill of Rights 1688 states 
the legal principle in section 1: "That the pretended power of suspending 
of laws or the execution of laws by regal1 authority without consent of 
Parlyament is illegal" - a principle upheld in New Zealand in 1976.5 
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Anyone acting on behalf of the Crown needs to be aware that any of their 
work can be subject to a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal by any Maori. 
The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 as amended in 1985 allows for claims 
dating back to 1840 to be heard. Section 6 is extremely broad and covers 
just about any action governments may be involved in. While the 
Tribunal's role is recommendatory only, its work has been referred to by 
the courts and a great deal of publicity generally surrounds its findings. 
Additionally, the obligations implicit in the fiduciary relationship 
between the Crown and Maori include active protection and 
consultation. 
The Governor-General, Prime Minister, Cabinet and Caucus operate in 
accordance with convention. Constitutional conventions: 
... regulate, control and in some cases transform the use of the 
legal powers arising from the prerogative or conferred by 
statute. The most important conventions arise from the 
democratic character of our constitution.6 
Even though conventions are not enforceable by the courts, together with 
constitutional statute they make up the entire constitution. KJ Scott 
stated that a practice becomes a convention, "...when it is recognised as 
such by the politicians who operate the Constitution and the scholars 
who write about it."7 The changing status of the convention of 
ministerial responsibility is discussed on pages 43-54. 
Many constitutional statutes impact on government communications: 
key among these include the Ombudsmen Act 1975, the Official 
Information Act 1982, the Judicature Act 1908, and the Privacy Act 1993. 
-Ombudsmen Act 1975 
Acting as a check on the power of government, the Ombudsmen concept 
was imported from Scandinavia in 1962. Professor Larry Hill, an 
American political scientist writing about New Zealand's Office of the 
Ombudsman in 1976, explained four views about why bureaucracy was a 
threat to individuals: its growth and size; its lack of responsiveness and 
inefficiency; the inherent dehumanizing in its relationships; and the 
strategic power advantages over other government controls.8 The 
Ombudsman was described as the cure for these maladies. 
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The Ombudsmen Act 1975 outlines the roles and responsibilities of the 
Ombudsmen, who are Officers of Parliament. Individual citizens can 
take their grievances about matters of administration to the Ombudsman. 
While there is no power to alter government decisions, the Ombudsman 
can investigate and report on them. In practice, the knowledge that 
recommendations can be tabled in Parliament and the ensuing publicity, 
act as an inducement to government agencies to comply with any 
recommendations made. In effect, any decision or action made by any 
staff member of any of the organisations listed in the Act, can be 
investigated and reviewed. Any communications initiative, or absence 
of communications can be complained about and reviewed. This is 
separate from requests for information made under the Official 
Information Act 1982. The Ombudsman cannot investigate where there 
is a right of review by a court on any decisions made. In such cases the 
Judicature Act 1908 may apply. 
-Official Information Act 1982 
In New Zealand the Official Secrets Act 1951, modelled on the British 
statute of 1911, governed the non-disclosure of government information 
until 1982. In 1981 the Committee on Official Information (the Danks 
Committee), reported on its examination of the availability of public 
information. Growing calls for freedom of information had led to its 
establishment. For example Keith Ovenden, a political scientist calling 
for more open government in 1980, cited the public's right to sharing in 
the government of their own affairs: "This means being involved in the 
policy process ... and involvement here is impossible without 
information. "9 The Danks Committee acknowledged that the 
Government had recognised that it needed to take the public into its 
confidence, given its changing role and deeper involvement in people's 
lives.10 The Official Information Act 1982 is a direct result of the 
Committee's deliberations. The Committee said the essential purpose of 
the new Act would be, "...to improve communication between the people 
of New Zealand and their government."ll They found that a new 
emphasis would be needed from both Ministers and officials on the 
'positive information functions' of government. 
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In justifying the need for more open communication, the Committee 
stated that this rested on the democratic principles of encouraging public 
participation in public affairs, ensuring the accountability of those in 
office, and the pursuit of public understanding and support in order for 
government policy to be carried out. It concluded that this could only be 
achieved with an informed public.12 These three principles appear to be 
well established in the New Zealand democratic culture (see pages 14-17 
and 30-32). The Danks Committee envisaged an outflow of information 
which, while related to public demands (reactive), also corresponded to 
the, "...positive requirements of participation, accountability and effective 
government. "13 
One of the by-products of the Official Information Act 1982 has been a 
reliance on it as the vehicle for information release. The Act is frequently 
used in a reactive sense, that is, it compels government agencies to 
provide information requested by the public. There is no corresponding 
legislative requirement for government agencies to release information 
prior to anyone requesting it. It was clearly the intent of the Danks 
Committee that government should be proactive in its 
communications.l4 This intent was not embraced within the legislation, 
nor would it have necessarily been desirable to do so. Nevertheless, there 
is no clear directive for a government agency to behave in a proactive 
manner with its communications, unless required to by statute. This, it 
can be argued, is a deficiency within our democratic system, given the 
principles outlined above. Where government agencies have taken a 
proactive role in providing public information, there has sometimes 
been a conflict with the convention which dictates a low profile for 
government agencies. Additionally, output class funding (post-Public 
Finance Act 1989) can work against the achievement of sustainable public 
awareness campaigns if public awareness is not in its own output class. 
Chapters Four and Five discuss these issues in more detail. 
Palmer found that even the reactive requirements of the Official 
Information Act 1982 were onerous for some participants. It is, 
"...particularly unpopular with ministers and ministerial staff."l5 
However, he conceded-indeed promoted-the case for proactive 
communication when making unpopular policy decisions: "...it is better 
to choose the best time to announce them rather than have someone else 
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half announcing them as a result of information they have obtained 
under the Official Information Act."l6 
In his 1988 essays, Martin suggested that the reform towards open 
government had probably been a disappointment to its proponents. He 
cited, as evidence, his impression that, "...in many cases information is 
made available in an unauthorised manner through leaks and 'whistle 
blowing', and not through the invocation of the procedures of the 1982 
Act."17 Certainly in terms of the reactive component of the Act, Martin 
believed it had gone as far as was necessary. 
Indicating a break from convention, two Crown Health Enterprises have 
refused to comply with the Ombudsman's ruling on release of 
information. According to the Dominion, Sir Brian Elwood, ". . .said only 
a handful of organisations had continued to refuse to make public 
information after an ombudsman's ruling that they The Law 
Commission is expected to report to Government in 1995 on its review of 
the Act. 
-Privacy Act 1993 
The Privacy Act 1993 outlines 12 principles in accordance with which 
personal information should be treated. It also takes over provisions 
from the Official Information Act 1982 which previously dealt with the 
management and disclosure of personal information. The implications 
for government communications primarily concerns those activities 
where inappropriate release of information to third parties may take 
place. Clearly this is contrary to the Act and the prevailing cultural belief 
that ordinary citizens have a right to privacy.19 The media are exempt 
from the Act's provisions, which also apply to the private sector. 
-Judicature Act 1908 
Judicial review is undertaken by the courts to ensure that administrative 
action is within the bounds of authority and not outside the law (ul tra 
vires) .  Key considerations are that any decisions are: not biased or pre- 
determined; consistent with the rules of natural justice; reasonable; and 
don't take irrelevant considerations into account.20 Just about any 
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decision can be affected by judicial review, and government 
communications are no exception. For this reason careful records of 
decisions taken and their justification should be kept. A prominent case 
of a government communications campaign subject to judicial review is 
the Maori electoral option conducted in 1994, where the Minister of 
Justice, the Hon. Douglas Graham had to account to the High Court 
which upheld the government's actions. Any subsequent appeal to the 
Privy Council by the Maori appellants may have significant 
constitutional implications by delaying the introduction of the MMP 
electoral system until after the 1996 general election. 
ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS 
Palmer outlines the reality of the constitutional system as consisting of an 
interaction between the executive, caucus, Parliament, the Courts, 
political parties, pressure groups, the media, lawyers and the public.21 
Alan Robinson, writing in 1978, distinguished three New Zealand power 
structures engaged in continuous interaction. These include: 
... the party system, consisting of two major and several minor 
parties; the bureaucratic system, consisting of some 70 or 80 
government departments and corporations; and the pressure 
group system, consisting of about 500 national pressure 
groups.. .with the news media playing a vital servicing role in 
communicating information between the structures and 
between them and the general public.22 
Cleveland also misses out the courts in his 1972 analysis of New 
Zealand's democracy, which includes public opinion, political 
representatives, political opposition, senior public servants, the news 
media, and pressure groups.23 
-Ministers and officials 
In order to identify the New Zealand communications conventions with 
regard to ministers, it is pertinent to look at their broader responsibility. 
Ministerial responsibility is concerned with personal responsibility for 
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actions taken by a minister in a personal capacity (which is not discussed 
further in this thesis); primary responsibility where ministers are 
responsible for and answerable to Parliament and the public for policy or 
actions taken by the bureaucracy and sanctioned by the minister; and 
vicarious responsibility, where the minister is responsible and 
answerable for acts or omissions of the bureaucracy that the minister had 
no specific knowledge or involvement with. Three key events can be 
identified as significantly altering the traditional New Zealand 
conventions of primary and vicarious ministerial responsibility: the 
creation of the Ombudsman in 1962; the enactment of the Official 
Information Act 1982; and the combined effects of the state sector reforms 
including the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the State Sector Act 1988 
and the Public Finance Act 1989. A review of the New Zealand literature 
shows how these changes have gradually modified the convention. 
Recognition of this modification has been slow to develop in the post- 
state sector reform environment. Current communications practice 
recognises this change, but conflict has developed between practice and 
the theoretical conventions, which have not yet caught up with these 
changes. This is discussed further in Chapters Four and Five. 
D PRE-OMBUDSMAN (1962) 
In his analysis of ministerial responsibility, Polaschek distinguished 
between public corporations and departments.24 Where the former are 
concerned, ministers are required to accept responsibility only for general 
policy and not for day-to-day administration. In the case of the latter, 
Parliament holds ministers accountable for the actions of the department, 
with the exception of Cabinet policy decisions where collective 
responsibility exists. 
The minister owes the permanent public servant protection from public 
criticism, according to Polaschek. As a statement of principle, Polaschek 
believed this was accepted in New Zealand in 1958, but he cited examples 
where ministers had not always found it, "...expedient to adopt in 
practice."25 He also stated that there: 
... has not been a single case of a minister resigning because of 
the misdeeds of his subordinates. If a mistake occurs, the 
minister accepts technical responsibility, and then proceeds to 
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point out that the fault was not his but that of a public 
servant .26 
Contradicting this principle of protection, Polaschek stated that there is a, 
". . .New Zealand tradition of exposing identifiable officials to public 
criticism."27 He cited the case of the escape of a convicted murderer, Mr 
Edward Raymond Horton, and the Minister's public response as a case 
where this 'tradition' was carried on28. Polaschek's contradiction reflects 
the difficulties in trying to reconcile the concept of a unified public or 
state service, with the fact that varying objectives and operational 
practices existed. Polaschek's final view was that: "No minister should 
blame his subordinates publicly unless the dereliction of duty is very 
grave. It is not necessary for him to resign when an error about which he 
could not possibly have known is uncovered."29 
In discussing ministerial responsibility in 1962, KJ Scott stated that: 
Probably the majority of electors think that convention still 
requires a minister to resign when serious mistakes in his 
department are brought to light even when they arise from 
actions that he was not party to, would not have approved of, 
and could not reasonably have been expected to prevent; but 
this convention has never operated in New Zealand.30 
Scott claimed that ministers had primary responsibility for their own 
actions, as well as vicarious responsibility for subordinates' actions. If 
department officials have acted on the minister's bidding, the minister is 
primarily and vicariously responsible.31 
He also stated that ministers were accountable to Parliament, and officials 
may be implicated when reporting to Parliament. He suggested that 
when a serious error was uncovered the best course of action was for a 
minister to appoint an independent committee and table its report in the 
House.32 
At the time of Scott's writing, many ministers issued policy statements 
personally, although there was no convention dictating the practice. The 
previous convention whereby public servants issuing policy statements 
claimed it was at the direction of the minister, had by that time been 
abandoned.33 Scott found the practice of department statements issued 
anonymously, or in the name of the permanent head or other official to 
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be, "...unexceptional so long as there is no implication that the credit is 
due to anybody other than the minister."34 It was not considered 
appropriate for a department to suggest the government had 'acceded' to a 
policy or that the department had 'approved' it. Scott found that a 
narrow line divided explanation from defence. This implies defence of 
policy was not an appropriate role for the official, although he did not 
discuss this further. 
The Royal Commission on State Services explained, in its 1962 report, 
that the changing dynamics of the state services had led to a new type of 
official being required. The new role was described as predominantly a 
managerial one, distinguishable from the administrator of the past. In 
the traditional regime, the administrator was the anonymous servant of 
the minister, accepting and putting into effect the minister's decisions. 
For these decisions, "...and for the manner of their execution, the 
Minister takes the responsibility, and hence any public credit or blame."35 
However, because of the volume and complexity of business, the 
administrator: 
. . .is sometimes required to defend in public the decisions which 
the Minister has taken. The public may jump to the 
conclusion that he is defending his own policies rather than 
those of the Minister, especially when it is suspected that he 
took the initiative in proposing those policies to the Minister. 
He therefore needs to acquire enough political acumen to 
combine frank discussion with his Minister in private with 
complete loyalty to his Minister in public.36 
This reference is significant in terms of analysing the post-state sector 
reforms of the 1980s, discussed in Chapter Four. The justification for the 
Royal Commission's apparent departure from precedent, is the changing 
environment in which state servants were operating in by 1962 and their 
changing role. It may be that the practice of defending policy was well- 
established in practice, at least for some agency types, but not previously 
acknowledged in the literature. However, such investigation is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, which can merely note this departure from stated 
convention. 
The Royal Commission linked the concepts of defence of policy and 
loyalty. There was no analysis of the types of public agency where it may 
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have been appropriate or inappropriate for state servants to engage in this 
type of behaviour. The assumption made was that all state agencies 
shared the same role and function with regard to ministers. The 
Commission's definition of state services included the departments 
covered under the Public Service Act 1912 (the public service whose staff 
were called public servants), as well as the Post Office, Railways and 
Legislative Department. All staff of these agencies were termed state 
servants, except for members of the armed services and police, who were 
not called public servants either.37 Therefore, the preceding comments 
can be taken to refer to all state employees except the armed forces and 
police. 
The Royal Commission stated that, constitutionally, ministers were 
accountable to Parliament for the administration of their departments, 
including efficiency and economy. Employees of the department were 
agents of the minister and: "In the eyes of the law, the permanent official 
is an anonymous instrument of the Minister."38 However, the 
Commission concluded that, "...it is unreal to expect Ministers in mid- 
twentieth century New Zealand to be able to oversee the day-to-day detail 
of their department's work."39 
D PRE-OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT 1982 
The greater scrutiny applied to the bureaucracy by the creation of the 
Ombudsman altered the traditional convention of public sector 
anonymity. While there was no formal recognition of this change, it is 
clear that various writers were unable to reflect the traditional 
convention in their descriptions of the state sector post-1962. For 
example, Cleveland noted in 1972 that officials were informally able to: 
... influence other officials, cabinet ministers, members of 
parliament, the political parties, pressure groups and the public 
by a variety of means including personal advocacy as well as 
inspired leaks and anonymous handouts to the press.40 
He linked the behaviour of some government agencies to that of pressure 
groups. This 'informal' advocacy does not fit the traditional convention 
which relies on a lack of transparency in an agency's actions. 
JL Robson supported Cleveland's claim that officials can act as covert 
policy advocates. In discussing the relationship between the media and 
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criminal justice in 1976, he suggested that it was important for the 
administrator to use the media more effectively, ". ..to promote necessary 
change and to create a climate of opinion which was more 
supportive.. ."41 He also stated that: 
The administrator might attempt to help shape social policy.. . to 
promote the enactment of the laws required to implement 
such policy, to seek with determination the resources to carry it 
out, and to provide the public with the knowledge and 
information essential to the understanding of the issues 
involved .4* 
Later in his memoirs, Robson described the policy struggle to abolish 
capital punishment, which was achieved despite less than one-third of 
the public supporting the change. He outlined his personal commitment 
to advocating this policy with successive ministers, and his use of both 
the media and pressure groups to bring about the policy outcome.43 
State broadcasting appeared to fall into its own category when it came to 
determining accountability. Gregory, writing in 1978, found the greatest 
problem in freeing programming from partisan political direction or 
influence was, " . . .the ministerial imperative of matching responsibility 
with power."44 As a public corporation, Gregory claimed that the New 
Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (NZBC) should be responsible to 
Parliament with regard to technical and financial matters. To a certain 
extent, the changes to the NZBC by successive governments 
demonstrated a desire to determine the question of accountability. 
David Lange while a Member of Palriament, accurately predicted in 1980, 
the removal of public service functions to special purpose corporations 
and other government agencies, citing the political advantages of such a 
move. The Minister of Broadcasting would no longer become, "...a 
defender of policy decisions which he has not made."45 This comment 
reflected the political assumption made, that for all public and state 
services regardless of agency type, the minister was the appropriate 
defender of policy. The stance taken by the 1962 Royal Commission that 
officials can defend policy, is therefore unsupported by these later 
comments. 
Government communication in New Zealand: changing roles and conventions 
CHAPTER THREE 
A report on a pilot research project carried out in 1978 at Victoria 
University stated that in some departments the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility, while taken seriously, was interpreted with discretion by 
officials in contact with journalists. The report did not go on to detail the 
parameters of that discretion or analyse the types of information 
considered appropriate for dissemination by officials.46 
Many leading writers, while demonstrating their awareness that 
conventions were altering, refused to accept such changes as appropriate. 
Sir Frank Holmes and Ken Piddington (Chairman and Director of the 
Planning Council respectively) argued in 
relationships between government, public 
centred, " . ..on the concept of ministerial 
administration, combined with loyalty on 
public servants."47 Commenting on the 
1978 that the constitutional 
service and the public were 
responsibility for all acts of 
the part of the anonymous 
Royal Commission's report, 
Holmes and Piddington found it significant that freedom of information 
was not discussed. They found it unsurprising that the lines had blurred 
to the point where: 
... it is increasingly common to see a public servant taking 
public responsibility for something which is presented as an 
administrative decision, but which is in essence political .... It is 
not uncommon to hear Ministers now blaming public servants 
and their advice as an excuse for something that has gone 
wrong.48 
They concluded that this was 'not cricket', but had become part of the 
normal conduct of public affairs. 
This use of the term 'public responsibility' by Holmes and Piddington is 
undefined and it is unclear whether this includes defence of policy or 
actions, or what its parameters are. There is also no analysis as to which 
agency types this conduct was 'normal' to. Their comments appear to be 
based on a concept of a unified public service with similar objectives and 
operating environments. 
Also writing in 1980, Sir John Marshall, a former Prime Minister, 
explained that ministerial responsibility was well-established and acted as 
a curb on the abuse of power. He used the term 'answerability' to define 
the minister's role in answering to Parliament, the news media, 
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constituents and pressure groups, for acts or omissions by a department. 
This also involved supporting and justifying the administration of 
policy. However, Marshall stated that a minister never has been, 
"...personally responsible for matters of administration in which he was 
not personally involved."49 He explained that with the extension of 
government functions, ministers could not be held responsible for any 
administrative faults or shortcomings of a department, "...because no 
Minister has ever been concerned to supervise the day-to-day actions of 
his department in that way."50 
Responsibility for a department enabled a minister to be accountable, 
according to Marshall. This was because a department was entitled to 
protection because it, "...cannot answer in Parliament or in public for 
itself.. . "51 The belief that a government department could not defend its 
actions in public was supported by exponents of the view of public service 
anonymity, but not by those writing about existing practice post-1962. 
The issue of defence of policy by the public sector continued to develop. 
Citing as support for his view that following the cessation of ministerial 
responsibility, the public sector had become an adjunct to partisan and 
sectional interests, Ovenden found that anonymity was not practised: 
We have also seen the development whereby senior officials 
now appear on television to defend policies which are really 
those of the government of the day, but which, by being 
defended in this way, are increasingly seen by the public as 
policies of the department itself.52 
This supports the Royal Commission's (and possibly Holmes and 
Piddington's) finding of the practice of officials defending policy. 
In the same publication, Ovenden argued against Marshall's analysis, by 
stating that the convention of ministerial responsibility had been allowed 
to die. Without providing any evidence, but claiming that it is 
empirically verifiable, he outlined the public sector's response to this 
death of the convention: fear among public servants that their ministers 
would not protect them; growth of the bureaucratic career structure; and a 
new doctrine of ministerial authority whereby the minister's orders, no 
matter how undemocratic or constitutionally improper, were carried 
out.53 
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In 1981 Holmes and Martin made a distinction between policy and 
administration. For the former, ministers should be accountable for 
ensuring agencies implement government policies; and in regards the 
latter, a responsibility for oversight, but not for particular decisions.54 
In the same publication, JL Roberts suggested that control of information 
was the essence of the Westminster system which focused responsibility 
on the minister. The official administrator still talked publicly, but could 
hide behind, "...the unanswerable excuse of his duty to the Minister and 
the inviolability, under the Official Secrets Act, of the departmental 
records."55 In considering a system of open government, Roberts 
suggested that the, "...first casualty would be Ministerial responsibility."56 
Evaluating a move towards more open government in 1981, the Danks 
Committee considered the argument that as ministers were accountable 
for their decisions, so should officials be obliged to reveal their part in, 
and share the consequences of, such decisions. They concluded with a 
recommendation to protect, at least in the short term, the free and frank 
exchange of views between ministers, their colleagues and officials. The 
Committee also found that this, "...should not preclude sensible steps to 
involve public servants in public debate about policy options and 
national choices before decisions are taken."57 They also found that this 
should not prevent background information being released once policies 
had been adopted. The Committee did not envisage a public sector which 
retained permanent anonymity. The Act, in section 9 (2)(f)(ii) offers as a 
reason (but not conclusive) for withholding information, the need to 
maintain the constitutional conventions for the time being which protect 
collective and individual ministerial responsibility. 
D PRE-STATE SECTOR REFORMS 
The primary problem with accountability was identified in 1986 by the 
Chairman of the State Services Commission, Dr Roderick Deane, as the 
dispersion of accountability across the control agencies, department head 
offices, on-site managers, and the relationship between the minister and 
permanent head and other senior officials.58 
In 1987 JL Roberts found that post-State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, 
changes within the public sector such as greater management 
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responsibility for performance measurement standards, created problems 
for both the conventions of ministerial responsibility and the career 
service. He stated that as long ago as 1962, the strict rules of 
confidentiality and ministerial responsibility were relaxed when powers 
were conferred upon the Ombudsman.59 Commenting on the Official 
Information Act 1982, Roberts also suggested that over time, the opening 
up of departments to direct investigation by the public should, "...change 
the rules of accountability and weaken the obligation on the minister to 
defend the advice and actions of his officers."60 This thesis argues that 
such a situation has occurred and should be reflected in the post-reform 
communications conventions. This is discussed in Chapter Four. 
In accord with Polaschek, Roberts noted that the levels of responsibility 
assumed by ministers would differ according to the specific form of the 
agency: 
In the case of departments, ministers assume responsibility for 
all aspects of the administration and by convention are 
required to account for the statements and actions of 
administrators. If the agency has been constituted as a public 
corporation under statute, the minister is responsible for such 
duties as the relevant Act may impose or for the exercise of 
power to direct the affairs of the corporation as the Act may 
permit. As with all legislation, the relevant minister is 
responsible for the operation of any statute establishing public 
corporate bodies and must account to Parliament for the 
operation of the Act. Where government has possession of 
some or all of the assets of a non-statutory institution ... the 
relevant minister must be prepared to explain how the public 
interest is protected by supervision of company management.61 
Roberts had the advantage of writing in 1987 at a time of state sector 
reform, when it was clear that the creation of state-owned enterprises had 
altered the conventions forever in respect of a large part of state activity. 
He concluded that: 
... the old rules are tending to slide and that it would be wise not 
to rely too heavily upon the convention of vicarious 
responsibility for the acts of departmental officers when 
contemplating organisational or administrative 
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accountabili ty.... but it is too early to say that there is no force 
left in the duty to account for the actions of the departrnent.62 
Palmer, also writing in 1987, claimed that ministerial responsibility was 
unreasonably and impracticably wide.63 Describing the doctrine as a 
'moderately useful tool' for holding the government to account, Palmer 
supported the concept of primary responsibility: "Ministers should be 
plainly and clearly accountable and responsible for what they do and what 
they decide. But it is unrealistic to say they must take the rap for things 
they do not know about and did not authorise."64 
The impact of Keynesian economics on the public sector was described by 
Roberts as bringing forward bureaucrats: 
... from their traditional passive and anonymous role into the 
policy-making front-line.. . .One consequence is that the 
constitutional process comes under strain, another is that the 
bureaucrats are exposed to public criticism.65 
Palmer acknowledged the changes wrought by the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986, and suggested a development in the convention so 
public servants could be held directly to account for their actions. He 
acknowledged the role played by the Official Information Act 1982 in 
requiring such change where it's enactment, " . . .has lifted the veil-but 
we need some new theories to replace the enveloping haze of ministerial 
responsibility."66 
In his discussion on state-owned enterprises, Palmer's view was that it 
didn't 'make much sense' for a minister in charge of a trading department 
to be held responsible and accountable for everything done by employees. 
He did not provide any detail except to explain that such responsibility 
was 'impractical'.67 
The process of 'decoupling' (removing politicians from close political 
direction of government agencies and creating a market relationship), 
which began to emerge in the 1980s, essentially removed the politician 
from close control and therefore, it was argued, responsibility for various 
state agencies. Ministerial responsibility, which requires close, 
interdependent and confidential relationships between ministers and 
departments is therefore incompatible in this schema. 
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Treasury's ministerial briefing papers following the 1987 general election 
challenged the doctrine of ministerial responsibility by declaring it 
belonged to a century ago, when ministers made all significant decisions. 
Treasury linked the lack of personal accountability of officials with poor 
management performance. Among proposals for reform, Treasury 
advocated an increase in personal accountability for officials and removal 
of anonymity.68 To some extent the proposals found expression in the 
regime governed by the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 
1989, for example in the performance contracts for chief executives. 
Illuminating the pre-state sector reform conventions, Roberts revealed 
the lack of transparency which accompanied the convention of public 
service anonymity. He disregarded the assumption that the state services 
do not advocate policy: 
But in all other respects the state services are political services 
dedicated to the success of the government's policies and, in 
pursuit of that success, acting as advocates and administrators 
of the policy. To suggest that this may be described as a 
'neutral' position is a contradiction tolerated over the years in 
the interests of a harmonious relationship between officials 
and politicians.@ 
N e w s  media 
The changing demands of other constitutional players means that 
conventions, once established, can never remain static, despite the best 
attempts of some writers to avoid acknowledging such changes or, where 
they do, discounting them as wrong or inappropriate. The relationship 
between government, the bureaucracy and the news media is a significant 
one and subject to changing conventions. 
For example, in discussing the weakening convention of public officials' 
anonymity in the post-war period, Polaschek explained: "Newspapers 
prefer to attribute an announcement to a named official because it has 
more personal appeal and human interest than one made by an 'official 
spokesman of the department'."70 His view was that publicity put a 
spotlight on the officials' relationships with ministers, although he did 
not question whether this was right or proper. 
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Cleveland was more explicit when he linked the success of democratic 
N government in New Zealand as being reliant, among other things, ... on 
the capabilities as watchdogs and critics shown by journalists in the 
newspapers and electronic media."71 Pre-Official Information Act 1982, 
Cleveland suggested that the media provided machinery for the inter- 
communication between the various components of the political system, 
especially for the information exchange between government and the 
people.72 According to Cleveland, the success of pressure groups in 
influencing political or public opinion was related to their success in 
obtaining media access: 
Without news media support, some pressure groups may 
languish and perish while others may experience such fatal 
difficulties in recruiting sufficient public support for the 
policies they advocate that they can scarcely achieve 
significance as anything but historical c~riosities.~3 
While the media must be courted by pressure groups, Cleveland claimed 
that media attention was not impartially showered upon all groups: 
"The relative newsworthiness of a group's activities can often determine 
the amount of publicity it receives. .."74 
JL Robson, in his 1976 work on the media and criminal justice, claimed 
recall of, "...outstanding illustrations when newspapers within New 
Zealand have taken the initiative on important social questions."75 His 
best illustration was the abolition of capital punishment and he claimed 
that specific newspaper articles had a direct bearing on the ultimate 
decision to abolish the penalty, despite a survey at the time revealing 
more than two-thirds of New Zealanders supporting its retention. This 
role played by the media is contradicted in Robson's later memoirs, where 
he revealed his own policy advocacy role and skilled use of the media to 
achieve his policy goals.76 Why he credited the initiative to the media in 
1976, can only be explained as being made for an astute political reason, 
where it was not appropriate at the time to reveal his own role, 
considering the prevailing convention of public service anonymityn. 
The Parliamentary Press Gallery is the traditional news source of 
Parliamentary and political reporting. Jack Hodder, in 1981, stated that: 
"Members of Parliament are among the most avid consumers of the 
news media's fare."78 He also found that citizens and organised groups, 
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"...are becoming more skilful in using the media to influence (in the 
sense of changing) policy."79 
The development of broadcasting in New Zealand, according to Gregory, 
was controlled by government in order to: 
... counteract the conservative bias of the country's newspapers. 
By bringing the broadcasting service under direct ministerial 
control, the Government would have at its disposal a means of 
keeping the people informed about its policies.80 
Gregory explained that throughout the 26 years of direct government 
control over broadcasting, political controversy was avoided: 
"Parliament was seen to be virtually the sole political arena, and it was 
broadcasting's job simply to give New Zealanders a ring-side seat."sl 
During World War 11, radio was used to provide government 
propaganda, ". . .designed to uplift the nation's war-time spirit.. . "82 A 1986 
Royal Commission of Inquiry rejected a Treasury submission to open up 
broadcasting to market forces.83 The structure of broadcasting was 
subsequently swept up in the fourth Labour Government's state sector 
reforms to reflect a system closer to the Treasury view. 
Martin also commented that in the twenty years after World War 11, 
". . .given the absence of a fourth estate,. . .public servants played major 
roles in forming opinion."84 
Commenting on the media in 1987, Palmer stated that it enables public 
opinion to act as a check on government: "The ways in which news is 
reported, editorial opinion is expressed, television and radio current 
affairs programmes are handled all affect the capacity of the public to 
probe and question the decisions of Government."85 Palmer rejected the 
notion that the New Zealand media act as the 'fourth estate', checking the 
power of government. Instead, he described the relationship between 
politicians and the media as a 'love-hate' one, which is reciprocal and 
where each needs the other.86 He likened political reporting to a game, 
where trivia and posturing attract attention: "Matters of substance are too 
often ignored by the media."87 
This point was backed up in a book by another politician, Roger Douglas, 
where the media were listed as another guilty party to the economy's 
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poor performance: "The media has dwelt on trivia while neglecting 
serious investigation of the really big issues that confront us."88 
To a certain extent such changes to perceptions of the media's role and 
the tension between their role as watchdogs and what is actually 
achievable have been a direct consequence of government action. This is 
discussed further in Chapter Four. What isn't in dispute is that the 
Official Information Act 1982 changed the way the media could gather 
information. Instead of the suspicious, inquisitorial high ground a 
'fourth estate' could command, the increasing transparency of 
government enabled a more co-operative approach to media relations to 
be taken. Prior to the Act, 'off-the-record' chats with officials, paid 
informants, and nurturing of close personal contacts with senior officials 
enabled journalists to remain well-informed with favours conducted 
from both sides. After the Act, the relationship became more 'arms- 
length' and professional, whereby officials could be treated impartially 
without a significant impact on the availability of information. 
TRADITIONAL COMMUiVICATIONS CONVENTIONS 
In summary, the New Zealand literature is full of contradiction and 
opposing viewpoints as to whether there is or isn't an active convention 
of ministerial responsibility; what the proper roles of minsters and 
officials are; and what actual practice is. This is revealed most clearly in 
the discussion on whether it is appropriate for officials to defend policy or 
actions, or whether they advocate policy (transparently or not). Authors 
writing prior to the enactment of the Official Information Act 1982 reflect 
a very cloistered view of the public sector and ministers, where public 
service anonymity was tied into the requirements of the Official Secrets 
Act 1951; and those writing prior to the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 
can generally appreciate the shift from the traditional ministerial role 
following the impact of open government. The real flaw in most of the 
various descriptions and prescriptions presented, is that the authors treat 
the public sector as one homogeneous whole. The assumption that all 
agencies have similar objectives and operating environments means that 
only one form of appropriate behaviour is ever identified, and perhaps it 
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is the agency type which is uppermost in the author's mind that is 
reflected in their view. 
There were a few lone voices and moments of insight which 
commentators did not follow-up on. As long ago as 1958, Polaschek 
identified two agency types within the state sector: the department and 
the public corporation.89 Holmes and Martin identified five agency types 
as they made an early contribution to the corporatisation debate in 1981. 
These included: what were later to become state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs); 'commercial' institutions most of which have now been 
privatised or listed for sale; the core public sector focused on 
administration; those with statutory responsibilities; and policy advisory 
agencies.90 
Despite contradictions in the literature, traditional communications 
conventions generally relied on the concepts of: a unified public sector 
with similar objectives and operating environments; primary and 
vicarious ministerial responsibility; public sector anonymity; and 
restrictions for officials on policy advocacy and defence. 
The role of the media post-Official Information Act 1982 and 
consequently the expectations of the public, were more intrusive and 
demanding, but are not reflected in the traditional conventions, which 
are summarised on the following page. 
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GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS CONVENTIONS: 
PRE-STATE SECTOR REFORM 
L 
State Sector Agencies 
Ombudsmen A d  1975 Official Information Act 1982 Judicature Act 1908 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 sub-judice provisions 
Consultation with interest groups about government policy proposals, and 
to meet legislative requirements 
Explanation of existing government policy not promotion or criticism 
(should not have the appearance of defence) 
Explain agency's actions (should not have the appearance of defence) 
Informal covert policy advocacy role not transparent 
Available to the media when directed to promote public confidence not 
for protection of minister 
All credit for department achievements to minister 
Anonymity of public servants except those with statutory functions (some 
notable exceptions) 
I Ministers of State Sector Agencies I 
Promote/ defend / explain/ attack party, government and /or opposition 
policy or proposals 
Defend agency's actions 
Blame officials for unknown administrative errors 
Primary and vicarious Ministerial responsibility 
Self-promotion and self-defence 
Answerable in Parliament 
Credit for department achievements 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
-Government structure and communications: 
post-state sector reform conventions 
NEW ZEALAND'S BUREAUCRATIC REVOLUTION 
-Operational/ policy split 
The 1980s can be characterised by the profound changes to the operations 
of the state sector which radically altered the conventions under which 
government communications operated. The Official Information Act 
1982 was just a beginning. During the term of the fourth Labour 
Government the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 was enacted. This 
confirmed official recognition of the differences in agency type 
throughout the state sector, and of the need to 'de-unify' the conventions 
which applied. 
Palmer noted that confusion between social and commercial roles led to 
the enactment of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, where the trading 
operations of several government departments were transformed into 
nine SOEs.1 There are now 14 SOEs covered by the Act. The Act purports 
to change the nature of ministerial responsibility in respect of SOEs, with 
the powers of ministers defined in statute. 
Earlier in 1986, Deane had identified a variety of problems with the 
traditional approach to the public sector, including the confusion which 
arose from a lack of clear objectives and the, "...mixture of commercial, 
social, regulatory, and policy advisory roles which many Government 
departments experienced.. . "2 
The corporatisation of government trading activities was designed to 
provide greater public control through the operations of the market. 
According to Mulgan: 
If a service is to be provided to the consumer, the best means of 
democratic accountability, it is argued, is through the decisions 
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of individual consumers conveyed directly through the market 
rather than through electoral influence relayed indirectly and 
ineffectively by politicians.3 
Following on from the reshaping of state trading activities, Treasury 
reported to the 1987 incoming government that in order to improve 
management in the 'core' public service, greater clarity of objectives 
would be required. They proposed separating into different agencies, 
"...responsibility for the provision of policy advice, regulatory and 
funding activities, and operational activity."4 The creation of policy 
ministries was designed to avoid 'producer capture'. 
This position was reflected in the enactment of the State Sector Act 1988, 
which was, "...directed to the improvement of accountability, 
responsiveness, and efficiency in the Public Service."5 The Act led to the 
emergence of 'departmentalism' where each government agency became 
an employing authority in its own right. The concept of a unified career 
service was effectively ended, with the only elements of unification 
remaining consisting of the common Act, the role of the control agencies 
and, to a limited extent, the senior executive service. Nonetheless, the 
collective character of the executive epitomised by the central role of the 
Cabinet remained. Reconciliation of what the incoming Prime Minister, 
Hon. Jim Bolger referred to in 1991 as the 'little islands culture' with the 
'whole of government approach' has concerned successive 
governments.6 The relationship of the chief executive and the minister 
reflected principal-agency theory7, and accountability for performance by 
the official was prescribed. Such accountability was to be achieved using a 
system of performance contracts between ministers and chief executives. 
Fixed terms for periods of up to five years replaced the previous system of 
permanent tenure. 
The process of greater clarification of agency types and objectives, and the 
resultant de-unification of the public service were not effected overnight. 
It took time to work the state sector reforms into the public sector, despite 
the radical policy shift. Understandably, inconsistencies arose. 
Commenting in 1990, Martin advanced the view that, "...it is very 
difficult to discern a clear functional pattern in the present departmental 
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structure.. . "8 As state sector reform was still in its infancy at the time, this 
comment is likely to be a fair reflection of the 1990 status quo. 
This differentiation of agency types led to the identification, within the 
literature, of a new role for certain core public sector agencies: policy 
advocacy. This role is not necessarily acknowledged by the agencies 
themselves and the distinction may be contentious.9 Martin first 
identified this advocacy role in 1988 as, ". . .the institutionalisation within 
the machinery of government of advocacy groups."lo He cited the 
ministries of Women's Affairs and Consumer Affairs and the 
departments of Maori Affairs, Environment, and Conservation, claiming 
that before their creation, these views were under-represented within the 
bureaucracy. Martin added the ministries of Youth Affairs and Pacific 
Island Affairs to this list in 199011 and restated some in 199L12 
Professor Claudia Scott, in her article on the SSC's review of purchasing 
policy advice, also outlined the policy advocacy distinction and provides 
examples previously proposed by Martin.13 
In 1994, in its ethics paper on senior public servants, the SSC also stated 
that there are several ministries and departments that, "...are seen to 
advocate for particular interests."l4 It lists, as examples, some of those 
previously noted. Interestingly, there is no formal definition of what 
constitutes a policy advocacy agency, nor is there a comprehensive list in 
existence.15 
Boston, in his 1991 work, initially steers clear of the 'policy advocacy' 
label, describing Women's Affairs, Consumer Affairs, Youth Affairs, and 
Pacific Island Affairs as 'client-oriented ministries'.l6 In his description of 
their activities, he does not use the terms 'advocacy' or 'promotion', 
instead referring to 'advice' and 'liaison'. However, Boston later describes 
the achievement of Women's Affairs in the area of, "...advocacy work on 
behalf of women ...".17 He also provides as examples of small, single- 
purpose agencies whose staff have a 'missionary zeal', Environment, 
Maori Affairs and Women's Affairs ministries.18 Boston concludes that 
additional 'client-oriented' ministries are unlikely to be established.19 
Despite his definition of, and attention to, 'client-oriented ministries', 
Boston does not list this as one of the six core public sector agency types in 
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his post-state sector reform 'new order'. His analysis includes the 
categories of: central agencies; mainly policy advice functions; taxing 
functions; review and audit functions; mainly delivery and transfer 
functions; and mainly trading operations.20 It is assumed that in 
Boston's analysis, 'client-oriented ministries' form a sub-set of 'mainly 
policy advice functions' agencies. In addition to his six categories and the 
'client-oriented ministries' Boston also discusses the existence of, ". . .two 
departments with mixed responsibilities (the Department of 
Conservation and the Department of Survey and Land Information). . . "21 
This thesis considers the distinction of policy advocacy agencies in its 
survey analysis presented on pages 84-108. 
Prior to the reforms of the 1980s, the state sector was considered to consist 
of the core public service, surrounded by various state trading activities, 
the armed forces and police. Post-1988, Martin has suggested that there 
are at least two (maybe more) public services at the core: policy agencies, 
where the 'public service ethic' may still be relevant; and service 
deliverers, where he states there may be a strong case for a managerialist 
approach.22 He makes a strong statement that, "...to attempt to redefine 
the ethical norms of the New Zealand Public service in 1994 without 
making this distinction is likely to be an exercise in frustration if not 
obfuscation."23 
This thesis avoids such criticism by identifying three core public sector 
agency types: primarily policy agencies; primarily operational agencies; 
and mixed policy/operational agencies (referred to as mixed objective). 
Within each agency type can be found agencies with defined statutorily 
independent functions. Additionally, if the policy advocacy agency role 
based on the literature were accepted these would be found in both policy 
and mixed objective agency categories, but not in the primarily 
operational grouping. 
Overleaf are presented two options for the model. Evidence presented 
further in this chapter favours the adoption of Diagram 11: 
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Diagram I: Core public service model post-state sector reform 
Diagram 11: Core public service model post-state sector reform 
In a survey sent to 49 core public sector agencies,24 which did not list 
options D) or E), but which provided 'other', 'SOE' and 'Crown entity' 
categories, 14 identified themselves as A), 13 were identified as B)25, and 
20 identified themselves as C). Two non-returns could be categorised as 
belonging to B.26 If these figures were accepted, it could be said that of the 
agencies within the core public sector with distinct identities, 
approximately 30% are primarily policy agencies, 30% primarily 
operational agencies, and 40% mixed objective. 
The survey respondents are listed overleaf. Examples of core agencies 
which may fit into the D) category of possessing statutorily independent 
functions are highlighted with an asterisk (*); and those which the 
literature suggests may have a policy advocacy role as represented in the 
E) category from Diagram I, are highlighted with a hash mark (#). In 
addition, those respondents which represent divisions of larger 
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departments which have established their own separate public identity 
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For the purposes of establishing the communications conventions that 
are practised within the core public sector, this thesis makes use of the 
distinctions primarily policy, primarily operational, and mixed objective, 
except where the existence of 'policy advocacy' agencies is investigated. 
Surrounding the redefined 'core' public sector is the enlarged state sector, 
which is also the focus of this study. In analysing government 
communications, this thesis surveyed those organisations whose 
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activities formed part of the core public sector prior to the state sector 
reforms of the 1980s and which are still in public ownership and subject 
to the Ombudsmen Act 1975 and Official Information Act 1982-state- 
owned enterprises, Crown research institutes (CRIs) and other Crown 
entities27. Other state sector organisations which may be covered by the 
Official Information Act 1982, but which did not form part of the core 
public sector pre-1988 were not included (i.e. producer boards, statutory 
authorities, regional health authorities, Crown health enterprises, 
educational institutions, publicly-owned companies). While Crown 
research institutes are Crown entities, for the purposes of the survey 
analysis they were separately grouped in order to determine whether they 
possessed different characteristics from other ex-core public sector Crown 
entities. 
-EfSect on conventions 
One of the key commentators post-state sector reforms is academic John 
Martin. His work has been influential in understanding the emerging 
conventions of the post-reform era as officials struggle to come to grips 
with the meaning of the changes. His work, developed while a senior 
public servant has been extensively utilised by the SSC in its attempts to 
redefine and articulate the public sector conventions post-reform period. 
The relevant communications conventions discussed by Martin are 
explained below. These are: the impact on ministerial responsibility; 
anonymity of public servants; and the role of officials in defending policy 
and actions, and policy advocacy. Martin's work shows a developing 
appreciation of the impact of the 1980s reforms on the public servant's 
role and also reflects the gradual, but permanent, nature of the reform's 
impact. 
Writing in 1990, Martin suggested the State Sector Act 1988 cleared away 
Palmer's 'enveloping haze1 over ministerial responsibility, with section 
32 establishing, " . . .beyond doubt the managerial subordination of the 
chief executive to the Minister.. . "28 Martin contended that ministerial 
responsibility had developed in two directions since the Act. Under one 
model, chief executives publicly defended actions which would 
previously have been defended by ministers, who began to take on a 
relatively low profile. Martin did not explain which agency types this 
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new practice had developed in, and did not reconcile the earlier claims of 
both the Royal Commission and Ovenden, that a practice of defending 
policy was already in place, at least in some (undefined) parts of the state 
sector. 
The second model Martin outlined was a tightly controlled, 'hands-on' 
approach by ministers, reflecting an instrumental view of the senior 
public servant's role. Martin claimed this second model reflected the 
relationship between chief executives and ministers pre-State Sector Act 
1988, although he acknowledged that the impact of the Official 
Information Act 1982 coupled with changes in managerial systems had, 
"...made irrelevant the strict canons of anonymity and confidentiality 
which applied in the past."29 He also cites, in 1994, the Public Finance 
Act 1989 as changing ministerial responsibility to a focus on outcomes 
only.30 
Describing the changes in New Zealand since 1984, Martin now suggests 
that: "The picture which emerges is one in which power and 
responsibility for the actions of the state is diffused and distanced from 
ministers."31 Questioning the new machinery of government outlined 
by Birch as a framework for enhanced responsibility, Martin suggests that 
contract specification is not a sufficient substitute for ministerial 
responsibility: "In my view a network of contractual arrangements ... at 
best attenuates and at worst suborns, ministerial responsibility."32 Martin 
also takes issue with other commentators and claims that: 
... citizens have a common-sense and constitutionally correct 
understanding of the responsibility of ministers. Their 
expectation is that ministers will answer in Parliament (or on 
the Holmes programme) for any action that comes within the 
ambit of their portfolios.33 
By 1994 Martin does not suggest that the public desire is for ministerial 
responsibility exclusively and that public service anonymity is a 
prerequisite. 
Martin takes issue with Scott, Bushnell & Sallee's view34 that despite the 
reforms of the Public Finance Act 1989, the constitutional position has 
not changed. Martin explains that whether or not this is so, "...the 
perception of the relationship by the principal parties-ministers and 
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chief executives-has changed."35 Perception quickly becomes the reality 
in the development of constitutional conventions. Despite Scott, 
Bushnell & Sallee's assurances, Martin's analysis is probably more 
accurate. Indeed it is unrealistic to suggest that any major structural 
change affecting the public sector would leave the conventions, 
developed in part to make sense of the previous structure, intact. 
One of the first conventions to alter post-State Sector Act 1988 was that of 
anonymity of officials and Martin supported this view. In 1991 he again 
cited the Official Information Act 1982 as being a key factor in this change, 
along with the Ombudsman Act 1975, and the changing role of Select 
Committees.36 Martin also notes, in 1994, that the new accountability 
arrangements post-State Sector Act 1988, "...coupled with the provisions 
of the Official Information Act 1982 (NZ), made inroads into the 
anonymity of public servants."37 He further explains that the Official 
Information Act 1982 had, "...an effect on the ethos of the public service 
hardly less remarkable than the radical restructuring of the Fourth 
Labour Government."38 
Martin's view on the role of officials in defending policy was initially 
related to the retention of the convention of anonymity. In 1990 his view 
was that officials could be expected to explain, but not defend the policies 
of ministers: "Officials should recede into relative anonymity but 
continue to contribute their departmental and personal experience and 
wisdom to policy while managing their departments efficiently and 
economically."39 Martin did not clarify what he meant by 'policies of the 
ministert-whether this referred to proposed policy, party policy or 
government policy, in which case the tradition of collective responsibility 
also applies. Martin also stated that: "It is not the role of highly visible 
public servants to act as lightening conductors diverting public fire from 
Ministers."40 However, from a practical point of view, the demands of 
the media, the requirements of the Official Information Act 1982 and the 
expectations of the public for officials to 'front-up', make such anonymity 
impossible for the official, in any agency type, in the 1990s. The actual 
experiences of state sector communications managers affirm this view on 
pages 84-108 where the existing practices are presented. 
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In a 1991 work, Martin acknowledged that although tied to the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility, anonymity of public officials had never been 
consistently applied. He provided historical examples of 'high profile' 
public servants and explained this departure from precedent as being 
partly due to, ". . .the 'technical' nature of the department's activities and 
the absence of informed public debate."41 The term 'technical' was not 
defined, but Martin's recognition of the different nature of these 
departments' activities was a precursor of his later work in defining 
different agency types within the public sector. Significantly, Martin 
linked the concept of market failure in terms of 'informed public debate' 
to justify officials' role in public communications. This is an important 
development in the literature and this concept of market failure is 
discussed further in Chapter Five. At the time, Martin did not follow 
these exceptions through into a new rule formulation. His view 
remained that a proper role existed for all public servants (regardless of 
agency type), "...to be found in the distinction between explaining 
governmental policy or actions (an acceptable position), and defending 
them (the Minister's responsibility)."42 Martin followed this concept 
through into the role of officials appearing before Select Committees, 
where, he claimed, it would be better if they explained rather than 
defended the implications of a course of action.43 
Martin articulates what many senior public servants would not wish to 
hear-that de-unification is here to stay. He argues that the reforms have 
resulted in: the fragmentation of the public sector across different agency 
types; a consequential diffusion of ministerial responsibility and the 
increased managerial accountability of chief executives; widespread 
adoption of private sector management practices; and the spectacular 
reduction in size of the public sector. The new environment has taken 
fragmentation of the state sector beyond the point of no return: "In my 
judgement the fragmentation of the state sector in New Zealand has gone 
too far to think that a common ethos exists or can be (re)created."44 Using 
survey data, this thesis demonstrates that the core public service consists 
of distinct agency types, and lends support for Martin's assertion that a 
common ethos no longer exists across the state sector or the public sector. 
The Cabinet Office Manual reflects pre-reform conventions in its view of 
the relationship between ministers and officials. It makes it clear that 
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ministers are accountable to Parliament for the proper and efficient 
functioning of their departments, even when errors are made of which a 
minister had no knowledge. It also states that in general terms ministers, 
"...determine policy and defend policy decisions; it is the responsibility of 
officials to advise Ministers and to implement Government policy."45 
The meaning of 'in general terms' is, of course, open to wide 
interpretation. 
The SSC has a leadership role within the state sector generally. Therefore 
its views are of considerable weight and importance. Its most recent 
publication has made a considerable contribution to the debate on 
changing conventions. 
Without undertaking an analysis of agency types within the public sector, 
in 1993 the SSC stated that where an issue is publicly profiled as a matter 
of circumstance, rather than choice (reactive rather than proactive?), 
officials and departments, "...will not usually respond directly to a public 
attack made on them ..."46 What the exceptions may have been, the SSC 
did not detail, although where a minister fails to defend an official, 
"...then the chief executive (or the SSC) might be expected to request to 
discuss the matter with the MP/Minister concerned, or even the Prime 
Minister."47 The SSC distinguished between the responsibility of the 
chief executive, as employer, in making public comment on the conduct 
of employees, and the minister's vicarious responsibility concerning 
policy or administrative failure. Less than a year later the SSC notes, 
under the heading 'Ambiguity and Tension', the requirement for senior 
public servants to accept, "...public, personal and organisational 
responsibility for actions and performance."48 The SSC also identifies 
modification to the convention of anonymity through the more 
contractually explicit relationship that now exists between ministers and 
chief executives. It claims this has led to greater public visibility and 
exposure for senior officials and greater use of the media to, "...explain 
the activities and performance of their departments."49 This assumption 
held across the public sector that the media provides the primary 
communications vehicle is discussed further in Chapter Five. The SSC 
further comments that the Public Finance Act 1989 encourages such 
public accountability in relation to the production of outputs. 
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The SSC's most recent view also states that it is not appropriate for public 
servants to be involved or seem to be involved in undermining 
ministerial policy decisions, or appearing to criticise the minister or 
government.50 This concern with appearance as well as reality is 
repeated in terms of 'preserving integrity': "In the Public Service, 
perception is very important .... a high standard of ethical and appropriate 
behaviour must be seen to be maintained."51 According to the SSC, in 
determining an appropriate course of action, appearance overrides other 
considerations such as the need to justify or defend an individual or 
department. Criticism of government policy or any activities or actions 
that might diminish the political neutrality of the public service are also 
to be avoided.52 
In 1994 the SSC does finally address the issue of the existence of different 
agency types, but in a piecemeal fashion. As a result, the discussion is too 
loose to be of any real guidance. For example, it states that: "The degree 
of Ministerial involvement in departmental activities varies from 
department to department depending on their nature."53 Whatever 
'nature' means is undefined, although the SSC does go on to suggest that 
the distinction can be found in the ministers' designations-Minister of 
something (presumably representing the homogeneous core public 
sector), versus Minister in charge of something (mostly Crown entities 
we are told). The SSC does recognise that the public sector is not 
homogeneous by distinguishing the statutorily independent agency type 
and provides some useful comment on the need for such agencies to 
keep ministers informed.54 Additionally, its discussion on the special 
advocacy role of several ministries and departments recognises the 'policy 
advocacy' agency type. This may be a contentious distinction and SSC 
fails to provide guidance as to the parameters of the, "...clear 
understandings and ground rules.. . "55 that should be established. SSC 
does suggest that there is a distinction between 'advocacy' and 
'representation', but does not offer any explanation as to what this may 
be, nor what is meant by the two terms. 
Contributing to the policy advocacy/ defence debate, in 1993 the SSC 
clearly stated that officials can explain policies, but, "...it is for Ministers 
alone to advocate or defend them."56 Part of the justification for this 
stance was that: 
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... a clear line must be drawn between an enthusiastic 
administration and/or explanation of government policies by 
public servants and activities that might suggest the partisan 
advocacy of particular policies, thus undermining perceptions 
of the political neutrality and impartiality of officials.57 
The SSC did not explain what types of activities might be best avoided by 
'enthusiastic' officials who did not wish to tread over the line, nor where 
the line actually was with regard to each agency type. Given the SSC's 
1994 identification of policy advocacy ministries, if such a convention 
were to be applied across the public sector it would only enhance existing 
to role confusion. The SSC's stance on this point is an echo of KJ Scott's 
earlier work which claims: "A narrow line divides explanation from 
defence"58 and is very much pre-state sector reform in perspective. 
In a very useful discussion regarding explaining policy versus advocacy, 
the SSC, in 1994, claims the distinction may not always be sustainable. It 
suggests that a lack of enthusiasm for a policy can be just as telling as 
criticism, whereas obvious personal enthusiasm for particular 
government policies can be just as inappropriate.59 This suggests that 
advocacy consists of a personal contribution, as opposed to an official 
merely efficiently and effectively carrying out their job and supporting 
the minister. Enthusiasm per se is not advocacy. General department 
enthusiasm (willingness and motivation) to implement a policy, explain 
it and defend its implementation can be separated from an individual 
official's personal crusade. The debate about policy advocacy may be 
merely semantics when the practical implications of administrative 
efficiency, achievement of outputs and loyalty to the government of the 
day are considered. 
Other key commentators have advocated a need to change the post-state 
sector reforms communications conventions. In an interview with the 
author, Rt Hon. Sir Geoffrey Palmer expresses his view that it is an 
essential role of government departments to provide timely information 
and background to policies: 
... and explain them and give the rationale for them and to 
promote them. That's not the same thing as influencing public 
opinion. Influencing public opinion requires making editorial 
judgements about the adequacy of the policy-now that's not a 
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role for the government departments. But in the end, it is the 
promotion of what the policy is and the background to it, and 
why that is the policy ... it's the provision of public information 
which is in fact at the heart of this.60 
Palmer also goes on to detail the practical limitations to the minister 
retaining the role of defending policy: 
... the minister can't do it, the minister is very busy, the 
minister is minister of something else and there's only 24 
hours in one day. The old view has changed .... I do think that 
the departments have to be much more sophisticated in the 
use of the media and the old ideas about it are simply not 
apposite. They have to promote policy-the idea that it's the 
minister and it's only him, and we're the government service, 
is nonsense. Most of the policy comes from the department 
anyway, not all of it, but much of it.61 
This point is backed up by Mulgan who, commenting post-state sector 
reforms, claimed that: 
On more substantial matters of public policy, public servants 
are often responsible for the determination of policy as well as 
its administration. The major source of policy initiatives is not 
politicians, political parties, interest groups or other concerned 
members of the public, but government departments.@ 
Mulgan also suggested that the doctrine of ministerial responsibility had 
discouraged public servants from openly speaking about department 
policies and the reasons behind them. He found it paradoxical that while 
the doctrine was intended to protect a minister's authority, "...the less 
publicity an issue has, the harder it may be for ministers to impose their 
will on public servants."63 He found that public acknowledgment of each 
department's view allowed for broader public debate, which led to a more 
informed public and, by implication, better democracy. Mulgan explained 
that this change within the public sector: 
... reflects an evolution in conventions of ministerial 
responsibility. Greater publicity for departmental views opens 
a public gap between politicians and officials. Ministers are less 
constrained from publicly criticising public servants.64 
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-News media 
The media had a lot of catching up to do following the changes in 
convention which were developing post-Official Information Act 1982, 
and which were heightened by the state sector reforms later in the decade. 
As well as grappling with these changes, the media had challenges of its 
own to face including: deregulation and increased competition; a new 
role for state broadcasters; and the influence of Treaty of Waitangi 
obligations on reporting standards. 
Atkinson identifies ten developments which have affected the New 
Zealand news media over the past decade many of which are a result of 
state action and not of the media's own making. They are: the demise of 
metropolitan evening newspapers (Wellington's Evenin? Post being the 
last in Australasia), and duopoly ownership covering 90.5 percent of 
metropolitan circulation and 65 percent of provincial circulation; the 
dramatic decline in daily newspaper readership which more than 
doubled during the decade; the increase in magazine titles without a 
consequent increase in ownership or ideological viewpoints; the 
proliferation of commercial radio stations; Radio New Zealand and 
TVNZ's transformation into SOEs; the increase in advertising on 
television from a maximum of five days a week, seven minutes per hour 
in 1977, to seven days a week, twelve minutes per hour in 1993 (not 
including in-house promotions and programme advertisements); the 
sale of radio frequency rights; the separation of public ownership from 
public funding with the abolition of the Broadcasting Tribunal and 
establishment of the Broadcasting Standards Authority and New Zealand 
on Air; the establishment of TV3, Sky TV and regional television; and 
the abolition of restrictions on foreign ownership.65 
On 1 July 1989 the Broadcasting Act 1989 came into effect. It reflected a 
market model while allowing for the maintenance of broadcasting 
standards. It abolished the Broadcasting Tribunal and removed all 
advertising restrictions except for Sunday morning television and 
specified public holidays. Restrictions on new services such as cable 
television and direct satellite broadcasting were also removed. The new 
Act also separated social, regulatory and policy advice functions from 
commercial activities. A further amendment in 1991 removed all 
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barriers to foreign ownership. A Broadcasting Commission (NZ On Air) 
and the Broadcasting Standards Authority were established as 
independent bodies to ensure government's social objectives were met. 
Two state-owned enterprises were created: Television New Zealand 
Limited (TVNZ) and Radio New Zealand Limited. 
In November 1989 a third privately-owned national television network 
began broadcasting in competition to the two networks operated by 
TVNZ. By 1993, TV3 covered 85% of the population.66 Sky Television, a 
pay-TV system was also broadcasting on three channels in Auckland, Bay 
of Plenty, Wellington and Christchurch by this time. Regional ultra high 
frequency (UHF) services broadcast in Christchurch, Rotorua and 
Queenstown, as well as a free-to-air racing channel. 
The number of radio stations also increased and in 1990, frequencies were 
reserved throughout the country for the promotion of Maori language 
and culture. There are now 16 Maori radio stations broadcasting 
compared with one in 1989.67 
New Zealand has 28 daily newspapers: the largest is The New Zealand 
Herald, with a circulation of 250,814 copies. Competition and other 
factors forced the closure, after 120 years, of The Auckland Star in August 
1991. A few weeks later The National Business Review reverted to a 
weekly format after four years as a daily and merged with the weekly 
Examiner. In November that year The Christchurch Star ceased daily 
publication after 123 years and continues as a free broadsheet twice 
weekly. Ownership is concentrated in two major companies: 
Independent Newspapers Limited, and Wilson and Horton Limited, 
which together account for 80 percent of daily circulation. 
Suburban newspapers have grown steadily in popularity since the early 
1980s, issuing 1.8 million copies each week. Over 2,300 magazines are 
available in New Zealand, with 58 being New Zealand editions, or 
published in New Zealand.68 
This plethora of media activities is supported largely by the advertising 
industry, with $1,169 million spent on television, radio, newspapers, 
magazines, direct mail, cinema and outdoor advertising in the year ended 
March 1992.69 The media is big business in New Zealand. Atkinson 
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contended in 1989 that advertising was the key influence on media 
standards: "Advertisers narrow whatever mass medium they subscribe 
because the editor has to serve the already identified and paid for 
audience."70 
Writing in 1994, Sharp also claims that the media, "...are not an 
independent estate. They serve a constituency of consumers and 
advertisers and must negotiate a passage between them.. ."71 
The media are important in New Zealand's democracy, but there is 
evidence of a perception that they are failing to perform in the post- 
reform era. Palmer explains that: 
... it is through the media the public learns of executive 
proposals and decisions, parliamentary activity, caucus 
behaviour, pressure groups views and policy debate generally. 
The channels of communication should be accurate, 
sufficiently detailed to communicate the necessary intelligence 
for a democratic society, and deep enough to promote public 
debate at a sufficiently high level to ensure that public debate 
influences policy outcomes. There is grave doubt these 
functions are being performed adequately.72 
He claims that the deficiencies in the media's performance add to New 
Zealand's constitutional difficulties. These deficiencies could be 
countered by: journalists returning to basics and separating news from 
comment; improving accuracy in reporting; a clearer focus or mission 
for the parliamentary press gallery; a fundamental re-think by news 
proprietors about their responsibilities in the area of political journalism; 
employment of better-qualified journalists on higher salaries, 
preservation of public radio news and current affairs; an educational TV 
channel without advertisements; and a pro-active government 
information policy.73 
Douglas, in his 1993 work, claims the media are the voice of 
conservatism. He also describes the government as the major source of 
daily news. As a consequence: 
Most journalists are willing to offend them only up to a certain 
point. Beyond that, independence of thought or analysis start 
to close off their own access to government information ... .most 
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political journalists operate more like Elizabethan courtiers 
than modern, independent news analysts. Like courtiers, they 
are happy to gossip, often maliciously, about politics and 
politicians, but only within the accepted limits of established 
political convention. Good quality thinking has very little to 
do with this process.74 
Apparently oblivious to the courtier's role, Ian Fraser, commenting from 
a journalist's perspective says that: 
...p oliticians and journalists are natural enemies and that the 
correct relationship between a broadcasting organisation that is 
doing its job properly and the government of the day should be 
one of steady friction punctuated by occasional bursts of 
machine gun fire.75 
Clerk of the House, David McGee, in an interview with the author 
supports the notion that in regard to the parliamentary press gallery, 
reporting standards are influenced by the economic pressures faced by the 
media: 
One of the reasons is the economics of particularly the 
newspaper industry, with newspapers closing down-Ik  
Christchurch Star, The Auckland Star. They're going out of 
existence at the same time the existing core of reporters based 
in Parliament are being cut back-they're being asked to take 
on more functions. Rather than being able to 
specialise.. .they've got to do it all. In some cases.. .they're kind 
of the Wellington correspondents of the various out of town 
newspapers rather than solely the Parliamentary 
correspondents.76 
McGee also suggests standards are influenced by the nature of the 
working relationships between ministers, press secretaries and press 
gallery reporters: 
There are interpersonal relationships among the media and 
the career structure now involves people being able to jump off 
from being a poacher to being a game keeper and vice versa. 
And that can only inhibit good and challenging reporting, 
certainly it wouldn't encourage people to go out of their way to 
Government communication in New Zealand: changing roles and conventions 
CHAPTER FOUR 
make enemies amongst ministers, who they may well want a 
job from in the future. It's kind of an indefinable influence 
that will rest with people who might be able to put ministers 
on the spot. But I think there's more of a fundamental 
problem than that, and that is a problem of ability .... They are 
much more interested in being able to take ministerial press 
statements to see what news is being made in the Beehive, 
rather than what news might be being made in the 
Parliamentary process.77 
The small scale of the New Zealand media was suggested by Mulgan, in 
1989, as hampering political coverage: "Hard-pressed journalists rush 
from one press briefing to another, with little time to investigate on their 
own initiative."78 He also suggested that politicians can intimidate the 
media. Working against the media's independence and hence their 
ability to make governments democratically accountable are: 
... factors, such as the intimacy of New Zealand political life, the 
close relations between politicians, journalists and editors, 
broadcasting's dependence on government for empowering 
legislation and finance, as well as the strictness of the rules of 
parliamentary privilege and the law of defamation.. .79 
Commenting on his time as Prime Minister, Palmer stated: 
I often thought I had spent more time dealing with the media 
than devising the policies. The media in New Zealand require 
constant feeding, instantaneous comment and government 
pronouncements on virtually everything80 
Palmer claimed that given the changes and economic pressures brought 
to bear on the media, news and current affairs: 
. . .are threatening to become info-tainment in which the trivial, 
the colourful and the personal count more than the policy, its 
consequences and the public interest. To succeed, politicians 
have to play this game-they become actors rather than 
decision-makers; poseurs rather than people of substance.81 
In her 1993 analysis of crime reporting, Judy McGregor, a 
communications academic and former newspaper editor, describes the 
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reformed 'New Zealand mediascape' as reflecting entertainment rather 
than information values: 
... the culture of journalism generally in this country has been 
altered both perceptibly and imperceptibly by the deregulation 
of the electronic media and by the global economic recession 
which has impacted on the print media.. . .It is further suggested 
that the lack of capital investment in journalism as opposed to 
investment in new broadcasting or print technologies, means 
that news that is easy for reporters to capture and gather is 
receiving priority in presentation and publication.82 
Political news issued from political press secretaries and department 
public relations officials can be classified as 'easy to gather' news and may 
be increasingly subject to less analysis as McGregor and other 
commentators suggest. 
Her preliminary study showed an increase in crime news, and McGregor 
suggests that if confirmed: 
. . .the trend is in response to increased news media competition, 
the movement towards infotainment, organisational 
constraints such as fewer newsroom resources, and the ease of 
capture of crime stories from accredited sources like the police 
and the courts.83 
McGregor's findings have significant implications for criminal justice 
policy-makers who rely largely on the media to communicate policy 
issues. 
Atkinson's television research from 1985-1992 shows a clear topic shift to 
more emotionally-coloured, victim-oriented portrayals of crime, 
accidents and natural disasters. Writing in 1994 he claims this leads to, 
"...higher ratings and less information about the more complex, and also 
more problematic aspects of public affairs."84 
Media participants at the Broadcasting Standards Authority conference in 
May 1994, responding to an allegation of lack of critical comment in 
reporting: 
... replied that the reason was economics-deep newsroom 
staffing cuts and journalists robbed of time for analysis. Others 
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identified the problem as high pay rates in the PR industry, 
which robbed journalism of its best people.85 
A question which remained unanswered by conference participants was 
whether deregulation and free choice removed responsible public 
information roles. Atkinson addresses this point in 1994 by linking the 
willingness and ability of citizens to engage in democratic participation, to 
the willingness and ability of the media to highlight political choices. He 
finds that current standards and genre are not conducive to this and calls 
for all media, especially television to, "...reaffirm public education as a 
central role."86 This represents an outdated perception of the news 
media's role, which is sometimes shared by the media themselves. An 
editorial in the Evenine Post discussing the importance of a free flow of 
information in a democracy is critical of the New Zealand experience 
which, it says: 
... is threaded with examples of the work of bullies-Ministers 
who set out to stop information becoming news, who have 
conspired to reshape information in a manner more palatable 
to them, or who sought to determine who should report 
news.87 
The article perpetuates the myth of the media as the 'fourth estate'. 
The Privacy Act 1993 exempted the media from its provisions. It is 
possible that given the contentious nature of much of the legislation 
relating to government information sharing (the 'big brother' scenario), 
that the media's co-operation in not pursuing a campaign of opposition 
to the legislation (which could easily have been sensationalist in 
character) was tacitly obtained by exempting them from the Act's 
provisions. Privacy undoubtedly remains an important public policy 
issue. If the public perceived the media to be overly-abusive in invading 
individual privacy, it may ultimately lead to a public, and hence 
government, backlash. This concern is probably most strongly felt in 
regard to victims of crime. In 1992, the outgoing Victims Task Force 
issued a comprehensive training kit for journalists which explained 
appropriate ways to report on victims of crime. Compliance with the kit's 
recommendations is at the media's discretion. 
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The media are aware that they have faced unique pressures in the past 
decade and that their role has changed as a consequence. There is general 
agreement as to what the types of pressures have been, but no consensus 
as to the media's role in New Zealand's democracy given its historical 
emphasis, the existence of the 'fourth estate' myth, and the strict 
commercial motives of increasingly competitive, yet under-resourced, 
media businesses. The issue of the media and public education is 
discussed in terms of market failure in Chapter Five. 
AGENCY PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNICATTONS ROLE 
Until the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 corporatised several 
government trading activities and the State Sector Act 1988 effectively 
departmentalised and de-unified the public sector, the traditional 
communications conventions outlined on page 59 largely dictated the 
parameters of government communications. Prior to the reforms, the 
Tourist and Publicity Department, first established in 1901, provided most 
government publicity, including promotional and public relations 
services to ministers. While this had begun to change in the 1970s, in- 
house communications services were relatively primitive throughout 
the early part of the 1980s and mainly focused on providing information 
leaflets and the like. In contrast, the 1990s has seen the vast majority of 
public and state sector agencies employ highly qualified communications 
professionals, often reporting directly to the chief executive, and engaged 
in a variety of public awareness, public information, public relations and 
marketing activities. 
The relatively recent nature of this growth in communications activity 
has meant that often communications staff have not had previous 
significant periods of employment within the state sector. As a 
consequence, the traditional communications conventions have been 
readily dispensed with, if they were known about at all. New 
communications practices post-state sector reforms have developed and 
are formally identified on pages 106-108. 
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In order to identify the conventions now practised, a survey was 
conducted amongst public sector and certain state sector communications 
managers (see Appendices One-Three). Their responses are grouped 
according to agency type as discussed on page 68 for core public sector 
agencies, and according to their legislative status for Crown entities, state- 
owned enterprises and Crown research institutes. 
The data summarised below omits any communications activity 
identified by only one respondent. This is because the number in each 
sample set is quite low, and to draw any conclusions from one return 
would not greatly illuminate the issue and may be a distraction. A full 
data set is included in Appendix Three. Percentages supplied should be 
treated with caution and not used for direct comparisons across agency 
types. Statistical analysis (Z scores) have been conducted to test whether 
there are any significant differences between some data groupings and the 
conclusions drawn from this analysis can be relied upon. See Appendix 
Four for all statistical analysis relating to the rest of this chapter. 
-Appropriate activities 
The survey respondents were asked to tick from a list, the 
communications activities their agency engaged in. Missing from the list 
were the usual range of internal communications activities. This 
omission was deliberate, because this thesis only studies government 
communication with the public (external audiences). In any event, only 
one state-owned enterprise noted under the 'other' category, that it 
undertook staff communications. If provided with the opportunity, 
probably all respondents would also have indicated this as one of their 
ranges of activity. In hindsight, the five options88 relating to 'policy 
proposals' should have been made clearer by inserting the words 
'government or agency's own' beforehand. The distinction between an 
agency's willingness to publicly align itself with an actual policy proposal 
prior to it becoming policy can still be made, but not any conclusions as to 
whether this relates to government policy proposals or the agency's own. 
The sixth option of consulting with interest groups for policy proposals is 
not included in this comment, because consultation implies that 
regardless of whether the proposal emanated from the agency or the 
government, the agency itself is not yet aligned to it (or cannot be seen to 
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be aligned to it), but is seeking public/ interest group input into the 
decision-making process. 
The term 'advocacy' has been purposefully left out of the list of activities 
and the term 'promote' substituted. This is because 'advocacy' implies 
something subjective and has been frowned upon within the literature, 
whereas 'promote' invokes the concept of 'support for' and 
'encouragement of', which may be viewed as no more than active agency 
enthusiasm for promoting administrative efficiency and the 
achievement of outputs. 




Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 85.71 
Explain government policy ...................................................................... 78.57 
Explain policy proposals ............................................................................ 64.29 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 64.29 
Explain agency's actions in the media .................................................... 64.29 
Client communication .............................................................................. 64.29 
Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements ........... 50 
Promote government policy .................................................................... 42.86 
Promote policy proposals .......................................................................... 35.71 
Provide public education services ........................................................... 35.71 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 28.57 
Promotion of agency in media ................................................................. 21.43 
Defence of agency in media ...................................................................... 14.29 
Defend government policy ....................................................................... 14.29 
There were 14 agencies represented in the above data. 
Nearly half of all policy agencies do engage in (and obviously consider it 
appropriate to do so) promotion of government policy, as distinct from 
explaining it, which 78.57% say they do. As well, consultation with the 
public features highly, whether for policy proposals that may affect them, 
or because the legislation tells the agencies they have to consult. It is 
possible that the high score for promoting policy proposals is linked into 
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this practice of public consultation, where explaining policy proposals is 
also an important activity. 
In order to test whether the identification of policy promotion was 
skewed by the possible existence of 'policy advocacy' agencies, those 
agencies described as such in the literature were isolated out to see if they 
scored any more highly in this area than others in the primarily policy 
category. Not all of the surveys from 'policy advocacy' agencies had been 
self-coded purely into the primarily policy agency type.89 
The only area agreed upon by all four 'policy advocacyf agencies listed 
under the primarily policy category was 'consultation of interest groups 
for policy proposals'. The four 'policy advocacy' agencies represented 
33.33% of the primarily policy agency respondents for this activity. There 
were five activities where three out of four 'policy advocacy' agencies 
indicated they engaged in an activity. These were: promote policy 
proposals; explain government policy; explain policy proposals; provide 
public education services; and front-up to the media if required. They 
represented 60%; 27.27% 33.33%; 6O0lO; and 33.33% of the respondents in 
each respective category. 
As the four 'policy advocacy' agencies represented 28.57% of all 
respondents in the primarily policy category, only those results which 
differed markedly from this percentage were tested, viz. explain 
government policy (60%) and provide public education services (60%). A 
statistical test (Z score) was carried out to see if there was any significant 
difference between three out of four 'policy advocacy' agencies and two 
out of ten core policy agencies in each of these categories. The test 
concluded there is no significant difference in the results (see Appendix 
Four, Calculation One). 
Defence of policy or of the agency itself is not generally considered an 
appropriate activity for policy agencies, and this reflects the reality that 
the core policy agencies are closest to the pre-state sector reform public 
sector conventions than any other existing agency type. 




Client communication .............................................................................. 92.31 
............................ Marketing of services . . 1 . 6 2  
Promotion of agency in the media .......................................................... 84.62 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 69.23 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 69.23 
Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 69.23 
Explain agency's actions in media ........................................................... 61.54 
Provide public education services ........................................................... 53.85 
Corporate positioning/ awareness advertising .................................... 53.85 
........... Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements 53.85 
Explain government policy ...................................................................... 53.85 
Marketing of product ................................................................................. 46.15 
Defence of agency in media ...................................................................... 46.15 
Promote government policy .................................................................... 38.46 
Explain policy proposals ............................................................................ 23.08 
Defend government policy ....................................................................... 15.38 
Promote policy proposals .......................................................................... 15.38 
Defend policy proposals ............................................................................. 15.38 
There were 13 agencies represented in the above data. 
The operational agencies are extremely client-focused, which is one of the 
great advantages of the state sector reforms with its focus on outputs 
necessitating a move away from an inward, self-serving culture. 
Marketing is again largely a phenomenon of the post-reform period, and 
is linked into client communication. The fact that agencies the literature 
would consider 'core', can fearlessly describe some of their 
communications activities as 'marketing', whether of service or product, 
is indicative of the great strides that have been made away from the 
passive information-provision culture. Operational agencies are 
behaving more like private sector businesses in terms of knowing their 
clients and utilising the fullest range of communications tools in order to 
ensure that government business is transacted smoothly and efficiently. 
Similarly: agency promotion; corporate positioning/ awareness 
advertising; consultation with interest groups; and explanation and 
promotion of government policy can all be linked into this greater client 
focus and higher public visibility. The operational agencies least reflect 
the pre-state sector reform conventions. 
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D CORE-MIXED OBJECTIVE 
Activity % 
Explain policy proposals ............................................................................ 85 
Explain government policy ...................................................................... 80 
Explain agency's actions in media ........................................................... 80 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 80 
Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 80 
Provide public education services ........................................................... 75 
Promotion of agency in the media .......................................................... 70 
Client communication .............................................................................. 70 
......... Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements.. 70 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 65 
Promote government policy .................................................................... 60 
Promote policy proposals .......................................................................... 60 
Marketing of services ................................................................................. 55 
Defence of agency in media ...................................................................... 55 
Defend policy proposals ............................................................................. 40 
Corporate positioning/ awareness advertising .................................... 35 
Defend government policy ....................................................................... 35 
Marketing of product ................................................................................. 20 
Lobby for specific policy proposals ........................................................... 10 
There were 20 agencies represented in the above data. 
The mixed objective agencies are those which create somewhat of a 
dilemma for both ministers and officials. On one hand they exhibit all 
the features of a policy agency, and on the other they must engage in 
client-focused activities in the same manner as operational agencies. 
This means that they must undertake the broadest range of 
communications activities of any agency type, which must require greater 
staff skill and resources. Explanation of policy proposals, government 
policy, and the agency's actions; consultation; the provision of public 
education services; marketing of services; client communication; and use 
of the media for self-promotion and defence, all feature highly. Similar 
results to that of the policy agencies are recorded for promotion of 
government policy and policy proposals. The mixed objective agencies 
cover almost every communications activity that at least 50% of the 
policy and operational agencies cover. 
Again, an attempt was made to isolate those agencies noted as 'policy 
advocacy' in the literature who self-coded themselves as mixed 
policy/operational (15% of those in the mixed objective category), and a 
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comparison made with the others in the mixed objective category for any 
results markedly different. As there were no results which were more 
than k5%, no statistical tests of significance were necessary. 
At least half of the mixed objective agencies also engage in defence of the 
agency in the media, which is similar to operational agencies. This 
emphasis on defence may reflect the high media interest in 
administrative action now that the convention of public service 
anonymity has altered. It may also reflect public confusion which 
surrounds the role of mixed objective agencies and the range of 
expectations various groups hold. The agencies themselves may be 
somewhat confused as to where defence of operations legitimately begins 
and ends, as more than a third noted they engaged in defence of their 
own or government's policy proposals, and defence of government 
policy. This may be semantics, as the appearance of defence may be given 
when in fact it is simply explanation, targeted to the appropriate 
audience, taking place. The agencies may perceive their activities to be in 
defence of policy, however neither policy nor operational agencies report 
engaging in similar activities and it is unlikely that such a convention 
could exist in isolation in the mixed objective type. There are 
undoubtedly many occasions when a mixed objective agency (or, for that 
matter, an operational agency) perceives the need to defend a particular 
policy or proposal in order to ensure cost or administrative efficiency in 
the achievement of outputs. The point communications managers 
should bear in mind, is that well designed and carefully controlled 
explanation can have the same effect as defence, but not the appearance. 
This does not require the removal of transparency, but for such agencies 
to carefully construct and manage any communications activity that may 
be perceived as defence. Timing and the level of expenditure are critical 
issues to consider in mounting any such explanatory campaign. 
P CORE-SUMMARY 
It is clear from the above data that mixed objective agencies undertake a 
far greater range of communications activities than any of the other two 
core agency types. Aggregating all the data together to obtain the main 
activities undertaken would not yield useful results, because the mixed 
Government communication in New Zealand: changing roles and conventions 9 0 
CHAPTER FOUR 
objective agencies' results clearly dominate the data. A pattern of 
differing perceptions has emerged from the data and lends support to the 
argument that different communications conventions do govern the 
different agency types. 
The survey did not find any conclusive evidence to support the existence 
of a 'policy advocacy' agency type. If a comprehensive list of all such types 
were available, then further statistical comparisons could be made using 
the survey data. Diagram I1 of the post-state sector reform model 
presented on page 67 is therefore preferred. 
Overall, the survey data suggests that the defence of policy argument can 
be laid to rest, where the majority of the core agencies do not actively 
engage in this. A perception that an agency is defending a policy may 
arise from time to time, given the clear focus of the core public sector in 
explaining and promoting policy, and the emphasis on consultation. 
While perception is as important as reality within the public sector, it is 
important that public sector agencies do not merely adopt a reactive mode 
and respond to the first public criticism by withdrawing from other 
legitimate communications activities. 
The survey data shows that for core agencies, the 'fine line' can be drawn 
between explanation and defence. It is important to differentiate between 
policy and actions. 
Where an actual policy is involved, regardless of agency type, ministers 
must defend it when it is subject to public or political criticism. This 
does not prohibit a public sector agency from taking the opportunity to 
explain the policy, as indeed it must, if requested. Explanation will 
only develop the appearance of defence if, for example, a public sector 
agency were to mount an expensive proactive (unsolicited) campaign 
of explanation at a time of intense policy criticism (this would not 
apply in cases of intense criticism of operational issues). Such a 
perception could undermine the perceived neutrality of the public 
sector. There are no barriers to a political campaign in defence of a 
policy being mounted by the government, but this could not actively 
involve officials or department funds, and is most likely to be 
conducted through use of ministerial press secretaries and the media. 
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Where a public sector agency itself is being criticised, then public 
defence is appropriate behaviour for an operational or mixed objective 
agency (provided the issue is an operational one). This does not 
restrict the ability of the minister to defend the agency, either in place 
of the agency, or in addition to it. In the case of policy agencies, the 
minister remains the appropriate voice of defence. This is because 
there are not likely to be any operational issues involved. 
Given the role of the chief executive as employer, any criticism of staff, 
regardless of public sector agency type, is defended by the chief 
executive. It would be inappropriate for the minister to become 
involved unless the matter were raised in the House where the 




Client communication .............................................................................. 90 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 80 
Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 70 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 70 
Marketing of services ................................................................................. 60 
Marketing of product ................................................................................. 60 
Provide public education services ........................................................... 60 
Explain government policy ...................................................................... 60 
Explain agency's actions in media ........................................................... 60 
Promotion of agency in the media .......................................................... 50 
Corporate positioning/ awareness advertising .................................... 50 
Explain policy proposals ............................................................................ 50 
Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements ........... 40 
Promote government policy .................................................................... 30 
Promote policy proposals .......................................................................... 30 
Lobby for specific policy proposals ........................................................... 20 
There were ten agencies represented in the above data. 
Interestingly, the range of activities undertaken by at least half of the 
Crown entities surveyed was very similar to that of the core operational 
agencies. This would indicate that similar conventions may apply to both 
groups, as well as a similarity in communications resourcing. The Crown 
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entities did perceive a limited role for themselves in promoting both 
government policy and policy proposals. 
Defence of the agency was expected in the results and its non-appearance 
may reflect the pre-state sector reform heritage of these Crown entities. 
There is no reason to doubt that long term, many of the Crown entities 
will come to consider self-defence a legitimate activity as core mixed 
objective (and to a certain extent operational) agencies and SOEs have 
done. It is certainly not the role of the minister to assume vicarious 
responsibility for these agencies in the post-state sector reform 
environment. 
D STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
Activity % 
Client communication .............................................................................. 92.86 
Corporate positioning/ awareness advertising .................................... 85.71 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 78.57 
Marketing of services ................................................................................. 71.43 
Promotion of agency in the media .......................................................... 71.43 
Explain agency's actions in media ........................................................... 71.43 
................................................................................. Marketing of product 64.29 
Defence of agency in media ...................................................................... 57.14 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 50 
Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 50 
Lobby for specific policy proposals ........................................................... 35.71 
Provide public education services ........................................................... 35.71 
........... Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements 21.42 
There were 14 agencies represented in the above data. 
The key difference between SOEs and other agencies is that policy does 
not feature, except in the sense of lobbying. These results are very reliable 
as out of a total of 15 possible SOEs, only one did not return the survey9O. 
Corporate positioning/ awareness advertising is considerably ahead of 
Crown entities, and no doubt reflects the greater commercial focus of 
SOEs. Working with the media also rates higher as a communications 
activity, with all four options undertaken by more than half of all SOEs. 
This may be a result of the initial high negativity in media coverage 
surrounding the corporatisation process and on-going scrutiny by the 
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media. Another possible explanation is the greater distance between 
ministers and SOEs than is perceived to exist for other agency types, 
necessitating greater public answerability through the media, as opposed 
to through Parliament itself. 
D CROWN RESEARCH INSTITUTES 
Activity % 
Marketing of services ............................................................................... 100 
Marketing of product ............................................................................... 100 
Corporate positioning/ awareness advertising .................................. 100 
Promotion of agency in the media ........................................................ 100 
Client communication ............................................................................ 100 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 83.33 
Provide public education services ........................................................... 66.67 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 66.67 
Explain agency's actions in media ........................................................... 50 
........... Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements 50 
Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 33.33 
Defence of agency in media ...................................................................... 33.33 
There were six agencies represented in the above data. 
Due to the low level of response from this category of agency, it is difficult 
to draw any conclusions. However the commercial focus is still obvious, 
as they share seven of the SOEs' top activities. In addition, providing 
public education services and consultation with interest groups for 
service proposals are activities shared by more than half of all Crown 
entities surveyed. The CRIs are still very much in their infancy and their 
focus on communications can be expected to develop further over time. 
Indications are that they will continue to follow the SOE conventions 
although as Crown entities, they would be expected to develop in the 
Crown entity model. 
A total of 68.83% of survey respondents supplied some form of data for 
the 1993/94 financial year. The range of responses varied quite 
considerably and the following data is supplied out of interest. It would 
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not be appropriate to draw any conclusions from the financial 
information as in many cases, the definition of communications was not 
qualified and may include word processing, telecommunications, postal, 
library and other peripheral activities, or may exclude overheads, staff 
costs, or one-off projects. The overwhelming majority were unable to 
isolate expenditure on media relations. While 66.22% (49 out of 74) of 
those who supplied information were either separately budgeted for 
communications or in their own output class, doubt exists as to whether 
all the agency's communications expenditure was aggregated or just the 
Communications Manager's budget supplied. In many cases respondents 
explained that communications expenditure was located as part of project 
budgets and was therefore not aggregated. One respondent said there was 
no expenditure on communications, despite having its own output class 
fundinggl. Three SOEs, one Crown entity and one CRI cited commercial 
sensitivity as the reason for not revealing all of the information 
requested. 
Perhaps the only conclusion that can be legitimately drawn from the 
survey returns is that the vast majority of actual communications 
expenditure is not recorded or able to be recorded. It is also not likely to 
be separated out into its component parts, such as internal or external 
communications, client communications, marketing etc. 
D CORE-POLICY 
Eight out of 14 (57.14%) supplied financial information; two did not offer 
any explanation as to why no information was supplied; two noted that 
communications expenditure was not identified and two suggested there 
was no spending at all, despite indicating how it was budgeted. In total: 
five could be described as separately budgeted; one in its own output 
class; and seven as mixed in with other agency budgets. 
Of those able to supply financial information, the percentage of total 
agency budget spent varied significantly between 0.2% and 7.2l0/0, with a 
mean total expenditure of $341,750, or an average of 2.73% of agency 
budget. Total communications expenditure ranged from $30,000 to 
$900,000 and total agency budgets varied from as little as $1.3 million to 
$46 million. 
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D CORE-OPERATIONAL 
Financial information was supplied by 69.23% of respondents (nine out of 
13); two did not offer any explanation as to why no information was 
supplied; one stated that there was no spending at all; and another noted 
difficulty in defining the costs and offered to discuss it. In total: nine were 
separately budgeted; two could be properly described as having its own 
output class; and three as mixed in with other agency budgets. 
Of those able to supply financial information, the percentage of total 
agency budget spent varied significantly between 0.06% and 12% (average 
2.26O/0), with a mean total expenditure of $693,444. In this grouping there 
was one agency with a budget of nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars 
and another as low as $1.5 million. Total communications expenditure 
varied between $15,000 and nearly $3 million. 
D CORE-MIXED OBJECTIVE 
Financial information was supplied by 16 out of 20 respondents (80%); 
one did not offer any explanation as to why no information was supplied; 
one was 'unable to answer' the question; one said information was not 
available, and one noted the response as 'N/At, despite indicating that 
communications was separately budgeted. In total: eight could be 
described as separately budgeted; two within its own output class; and 
eight as mixed in with other agency budgets. 
Of those able to supply financial information, the percentage of total 
agency budget spent varied significantly between 0.14% and 6% (average 
of 2.91%), with a mean total expenditure of $727,466. In this grouping 
there were three agencies with budgets of around half a billion dollars 
and another as low as $3.2 million. Total communications expenditure 
varied between $40,000 and nearly $3.4 million. 
D CORE-SUMMARY 
Of the 45 core agencies which indicated the way in which their budgets 
were allocated: just under half (48.49%) were separately budgeted; 11.11% 
were in their own output class (five in total); and 40% mixed in with 
other agency budgets. As could have been expected with a greater client 
focus, operational agencies and those with mixed objectives spend more, 
on average, than policy agencies. 
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D CROWN ENTITIES 
A total of 70% of respondents (seven out of ten) provided financial 
information; two did not offer any explanation as to why no information 
was supplied; and one declined to answer on the grounds of commercial 
sensitivity. In total: six could be described as separately budgeted; one 
within its own output class; and three as mixed in with other agency 
budgets. 
Of those able to supply financial information, the percentage of total 
agency budget spent varied significantly between 0.22% and 8.4% (average 
of 3.26%), with a mean total expenditure of $1,468,200. In this grouping 
total agency budgets varied from around $6 million to $1.5 billion. Total 
communications expenditure varied between $58,000 and $3.4 million. 
D STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
A total of 64.28% of respondents (nine out of 14) provided financial 
information; one was 'unable to answer' the question; one did not 
maintain a breakdown of costs in the manner set out; and three declined 
to answer on the grounds of commercial sensitivity. In total: ten could 
be described as separately budgeted; one within its own output class; and 
two as mixed in with other agency budgets. 
Of those able to supply financial information, the percentage of total 
agency budget spent varied significantly between 0.5% and 28%, with a 
mean total expenditure of $1,194,000. In this grouping total agency 
budgets, when supplied, varied from $2.5 million to just over a quarter of 
a billion dollars. Total communications expenditure varied from around 
$500,000 to $5.4 million. 
D CROWN RESEARCH INSTITUTES 
Four out of six (66.67%) respondents provided financial information. 
One stated that they 'can't answer' indicating that expenditure was both 
separately budgeted and mixed in with other agency budgets and a further 
provided no reason for not supplying the information. Four could be 
described as separately budgeted and two as mixed in with other agency 
budgets. 
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The percentage of total agency budget spent was unable to be calculated, 
and there was a mean total expenditure of $566,250. In this grouping total 
communications expenditure varied from $70,000 to $1.25 million. 
-Knowledge of legal parameters 
Question five in the survey was designed to ascertain briefly whether 
communications managers and their agencies had an overview of the 
legal parameters they operated within with regard to communications. 
The list presented was not exhaustive, but does cover the primary legal 
boundaries. In many cases specific legislation will have significant 
bearing on communications, such as the Resource Management Act 1991, 
the Companies Act 1993 and the Consumer Guarantees Act 1994 for 
example. 
Some respondents may have felt confused about the inclusion of judicial 
review (Judicature Act 1908), sub-judice provisions, and the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975. Judicial review can apply to communications 
activities by or on behalf of the Crown. According to McGee, "State 
enterprises, as public bodies.. . are, in principle, amenable to judicial 
review."92 
Any matter which is before the courts or within the expiry period prior to 
appeal is sub-judice and this is especially relevant when responding to 
media inquiries about an agency's activities, clients, staff etc. Agencies 
which are not aware of matters that are sub-judice risk contempt of court 
if they unwittingly communicate on such a matter. This could take the 
form of defending, promoting, criticising or even explaining some policy 
or action. 
Section 6 of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 is extremely broad and covers 
any adopted or proposed policy or practice carried out by or on behalf of 
the Crown. The Waitangi Tribunal can hear a claim that any such matter 
breaches the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. As consultation with 
interest groups features very highly for all agency types in their 
communications activities, it is important they understand the principles 
of the Treaty and reflect its spirit in such consultations and other 
communications, 
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All of the agencies surveyed were subject to the Ombudsmen Act 1975, 
the Official Information Act 1982 and the Privacy Act 1993. The relevance 
of the Cabinet Office and Audit Office guidelines for government 
advertising is debatable outside the core public sector and it is by no 
means certain whether they should be applied to those agencies outside 
the Public Finance Act 1989 (i.e. SOEs), or to those listed in the sixth 
schedule who do not receive public appropriations (the Crown entities 
and CRIs surveyed). See Chapter Five for a discussion on this. 
The survey question may have needed further explanation as one CRI 
and one Crown entity did not attempt to answer it at all. 
The survey responses are summarised in percentages (%) in Table I: 
P = core policy agencies 
0 = core operational agencies 
M = mixed objective agencies 
SOE = state-owned enterprises 
CE = Crown entities 
CRI = Crown research institutes 
Table I: Knowledge of legal param 
Relevance indicated 
Ombudsmen Act 1975 
Official Information Act 1982 
Audit/ Cabinet Office guidelines 
judicial review 
sub-judice provisions 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 





















This agency group, which is closest to the pre-state sector reform public 
sector, scored rather poorly in knowledge of the legal parameters. It had 
nearly the lowest appreciation in all categories amongst the three core 
groups, where it might have been expected that 100% for all factors would 
be recorded. 
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D CORE-OPERATIONAL 
This group's appreciation is surprisingly better than that of the core policy 
agencies, but only marginally so. Again, 100% might have been expected 
for all factors. 
D CORE-MIXED OBJECTIVE 
Overall, these agencies had a better appreciation of the public sector 
communications environment that any of the other two core agency 
groupings, although 100% might have been the expected result for all 
factors. 
D CORE-SUMMARY 
There is scope for improving the knowledge of these key 
communications practitioners who are often engaged in providing 
communications policy and strategic advice to senior management. This 
knowledge-gap may have come about as a result of the relatively recent 
growth in public sector communications activities and the likelihood that 
communications staff have limited previous public sector experience (at 
least not pre-state sector reform). The survey did not gather data on this 
point, so the reasoning remains speculative. 
D CROWN ENTITIES 
The appreciation of the legal environment is not dissimilar from the core 
public sector agencies. Interestingly, only half considered that the Cabinet 
and Audit Office guidelines applied. As these organisations are subject to 
the Public Finance Act 1989, it would be expected that the Guidelines 
would apply. Additionally, the relationship between these agencies and 
the relevant minister is much closer than, for example, SOEs. One 
Crown entity was unsure what the question meant and did not respond. 
D STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
Despite a very poor appreciation of the relevance of the Ombudsmen Act 
1975 to the communications environment, SOEs shared this (lack of) 
appreciation with other state sector agencies. Surprisingly, about a third 
considered that the Cabinet/ Audit Office guidelines applied to their 
operations, although it is not likely that they do in fact apply. SOEs are 
governed by their own legislation, producing statements of corporate 
intent and their relationship to the minister is very much arms-length. 
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The role of the Auditor-General is significantly limited in relation to 
these agencies. 
D CROWN RESEARCH INSTITUTES 
Given the low response rate to the survey it is difficult to establish a clear 
picture of the CRIs' knowledge in this area. Early indications are that it is 
not strong, and 100% on all factors might have been the expected 
response. 
-Attitudes to  official information request 
The initial survey was sent to 86 agencies requesting information to be 
provided under the Official Information Act 1982. Each survey was 
addressed to the attention of the Communications/ Marketing Manager 
and a self-addressed, pre-paid envelope was included. The covering 
letter, similarly addressed to the Communications/ Marketing Manager 
explained that it was all right not to answer all questions, but to simply 
indicate where they were unable to do so. 
The expectation was that all surveys would be returned, given the 
statutory responsibility of each of the agencies to comply with the Official 
Information Act 1982, although it was anticipated that varying degrees of 
information would be provided. The decision to request the information 
under the Act was made as a test of each agency's attitude towards 
supplying information under the Act, and also to facilitate a rate of return 
superior to most surveys. The nominated date for return of the survey 
was within the 21 working days allowed by the Act, and the expectation 
was that where an agency required a full 21 working days they would 
avail themselves of this. One month after the requested response date a 
reminder letter was sent to all 29 agencies who had not yet responded. 
A number of those who responded to this reminder letter, which 
formally requested their reasons under the Act for withholding 
information, claimed they had not received the original request, which 
had been dispatched personally by the author using NZ Post's 'Boxlink' 
system. These agencies may be evidence that either the Wellington 
postal system or their internal delivery systems do not work very well. 
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Some surveys were not received until two months after the original 
deadline, although the number of working days available over the Xmas- 
New Year season is limited. 
The response rate is summarised in Table 11: 
I = Number of surveys dispatched 
11 = Number of surveys initially returned 
III = Number returned after reminder letter sent 
IV = Number of surveys never returned 
Table 11: Survev resvonse rates 
.I L 
Agency type I 11 11 % 111 Total 
core-policy 14 9 60 5 14 
core-operational 15 10 66.67 3 13 
core-mixed objective 20 18 94.74 2 20 
Crown entities 13 6 46.15 4 
state-owned enterprises 15* 12 80 2 14 
Crown research institutes 91\ 2 22.22 4 6 
TOTAL 86 57 66.28 20 77 
* = includes Government Computing Service Limited which returned its iurvey completed 
prior to privatisation on 9/11/94, but does not include Radio New Zealand Limited 
(see footnote 90). 
* = does not include the New Zealand Institute for Social Research and Development 
Limited which was disestablished during the survey period. 
A Chi-square statistical test was conducted to determine whether there 
was any statistical difference between the final rate of return for the 
different groups (see Appendix Four, Calculation Two). For this purpose 
the core was aggregated together and compared with the other three 
groups. The test was unable to make any conclusive findings with regard 
to the difference in return rates between the groups. 
As well, the mean rate of return was calculated at 89.53O/0 and the 
individual results compared one by one against it. Crown entities and 
CRIs differed statistically from the population proportion of 89.53%, 
whereas the return rate from SOEs and core agencies did not (see 
Appendix Four, Calculation Three). 
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D CORE-POLICY 
While the initial rate of return for this group was not very high, the 
follow-up inquiry improved the response rate to 100%. There were no 
issues raised with regard to the Act by this group. 
D CORE-OPERATIONAL 
These agencies had a marginally higher initial response rate than policy 
agencies, and the final rate was slightly below at 86.67%. Two 
respondents took offence at the survey request and committed this to 
paper, both claiming never to have received the original request. One 
mentioned the 'rather terse' reminder letter93, and the second chastised 
the author for not bothering to find out her name and job title before 
sending either the initial letter or reminder. This second person, as well 
as providing insights into the futility of expecting high response rates 
from surveys, also dubbed the author's request, "...not only cheeky, but 
also a little dubious to demand a response under the Official Information 
Act for a student thesis."94 This possibly demonstrates a lack of working 
knowledge about the Act: the fact that correspondence does not have to 
be addressed to any particular official; that no reasons need to be 
provided as to why the information is being sought or what its intended 
end use is; or that student requests are in any way less actionable than 
those by any other member of the community, provided they meet the 
citizenship and other requirements of section 21. 
Those agencies which did not respond to either of the two requests were: 
New Zealand Customs; and New Zealand Immigration Service. 
D CORE-MIXED OBJECTIVE 
By far the most impressive result was that of core mixed objective 
agencies which responded promptly and with the highest initial result 
rate, reaching 100% after follow-up. This was also numerically the largest 
category. One agency (the only one out of all respondents) provided an 
interim reply which noted that the statutory response period provided a 
greater time period than the deadline requested.95 This fuller time period 
was used and the response arrived on 2 December, exactly 21 working 
days after the request was received. This agency operated a very 
formalised approach to responding to information requests citing the Act. 
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D CORE-SUMMARY 
The core agencies, as would be expected, responded well to the request for 
official information, and generally in a manner appropriate to the tone of 
the original request. Where information was difficult to provide or not 
available this was merely noted on the survey form. A number also took 
the opportunity to telephone the author to clarify the type of information 
which would be useful. 
D CROWN ENTITIES 
There were no major issues regarding Crown entities, which saw the 
second to lowest return rate. Those who did not respond to either request 
were: Education and Training Support Agency; Housing Corporation of 
New Zealand; and the Land Transport Safety Authority. 
D STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
Next to the core mixed objective agencies, SOEs defied the common 
perception that they find the Act too onerous.96 Their impressive and 
prompt rate of return was marred by only one SOE: Radio New Zealand 
Limited (see footnote 90). This result demonstrates how well-organised 
these agencies are in terms of working with the Act. In one case the 
Company Secretary and in another, the General Manager, responded to 
the survey personally. There were no issues raised by this group and it 
was unexpected that so few cited commercial sensitivity as a barrier to 
supplying information. 
D CROWN RESEARCH INSTITUTES 
A great disappointment was the result for this group, the lowest rate 
recorded. This is possibly a reflection of the relatively recent nature of 
their organisations, since the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research was disbanded on 30 June 1992. Those who did not return the 
survey despite the reminder letter were: New Zealand Forest Research 
Institute Ltd; Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Ltd; and New 
Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Ltd. 
One issue raised by telephone was to question when the author would 
make an 'official' request. Upon inquiry, the caller was under the illusion 
that the Act required an official form to be completed before the agency 
was compelled to supply any information. Once that matter was cleared 
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up, the author was promptly told that it was all commercially sensitive 
anyway and the information would not be supplied. Again this 
demonstrates a lack of a working knowledge of the Act and its application 
to communications issues.97 No formal notification of this decision was 
ever received. It is doubtful that commercial sensitivity would be upheld 
as a legitimate reason for withholding information in such a case as each 
request for official information should be individually assessed, and 
especially as the vast majority of state sector agencies surveyed were able 
to comply either fully or partially with the request. 
A second CRI also expressed that they were, "...more than a little 
surprised at the tone ..."98 of the reminder letter, ascribing the delay in 
response to a problem with internal mail delivery and the holiday 
season. Again this showed an unfamiliarity with the Act, as reasons for 
withholding the information were requested, that is to say, a reference to 
section 9 of the Act, not a demand for an explanation of their tardiness! 
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS CONVENTIONS: 
POST-STATE SECTOR REFORM 
The survey data and literature analysis have been invaluable in 
identifying likely conventions for government communications in the 
1990s and beyond. If such conventions were accepted by constitutional 
writers, then it would necessitate an alteration to the conventions of 
anonymity, ministerial responsibility and the role of officials in both 
policy advocacy and administrative defence; and, of course, an acceptance 
of the three different core public sector types. 
The classification, which distinguishes between the various ministerial 
roles, depending on agency type, and the different roles for different 
agency types based on what communications managers claim is current 
practice, is outlined overleaf: 
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Core Public Sector Agencies 
Ombudsmen Act 1975 Official Information Act 1982 Judicature Act 1908 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 Privacy Act 1993 sub-judice provisions 
Cabinet and Audit Office Guidelines for Government Advertising 
Policy 
Consultation with 
interest groups for 
agency's own or 
government policy 
















Available to the 
media to explain 
agency's actions not 
for protection of 
minister 
Defend employee 
issues but not 
agency's actions 




interest groups for 
agency's own or 
government policy, 
or service proposals, 















Available to the 
media to explain 
agency's actions not 
for protection of 
minister 
Self-promotion and 
selfdefence in media 
Defend employee 
issues and agency's 
actions 




interest groups for 
agency's own or 
government policy, 
or service proposals, 




















Available to the 
media to explain 
agency's actions not 
for protection of 
minister 
Self-promotion and 
selfdefence in media 
Defend employee 
issues and agency's 
actions 
Credit for achieving 
outputs 
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I Core Public Sector Agencies 1 1 ... when carrying out statutorily independent functions I 
Agency: Keep minister informed of decisions and actions prior to 
announcement/ implementation 
Defend agency's actions 
Minister: Responsibility determined by relevant statute 
Defence of agency's actions only if raised in the House 






and /or opposition 
policy or proposals 
Defend agency's 
actions but not for 
employee issues 












policy or proposals 
Optional to defend 
agency's actions but 
not for employee 
issues 












policy or proposals 
Optional to defend 
agency's actions but 
not for employee 
issues 
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Enlarged State Sector 
Ombudsmen Act 1975 Official Information Act 1982 Judicature Act 1908 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 Privacy Act 1993 sub-judice provisions 




Corporate positioning/ awareness 
advertising 
Consultation with interest groups 
for own agency's or government 
policy, or service proposals, and 
to meet legislative requirements 
Marketing services and products 
Self-promotion and self-defence in 
media 
Available to the media to explain 
agency's actions 
Provide public education services 
Lobby for specific policy 
proposals 
Credit for achievement of business 
objectives 
Cabinet and Audit Office I 
Guidelines for Government 
Advertising specific legislation I 
Crown entities (including 
Crown research institutes) 
Client communication 
Corporate positioning/ awareness 
advertising 
Consultation with interest groups 
for own agency's or government 
policy, or service proposals, and 
to meet legislative requirements 
Marketing services and products 
Self-promotion and self-defence in 
media 
Available to the media to explain 
agency's actions 
Provide public education sewices 
Explanation and transparent 
promotion of own agency's or 
government's policy proposals 
Explanation and transparent 
promotion of existing government 
policy 
Credit for achievement of outputs 
I Ministers 1 
Responsibility defined by statute 
Arms-length 
Answerable in Parliament 
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CHAPTER FlVE 
-Issues in New Zealand government communications 
A number of issues need to be addressed if the New Zealand democratic 
ideal of enhanced public participation and strong democracy is to be 
achieved. A well-informed public is the first step towards this. 
The public sector's role in communicating with the public has been 
confused by the existence of the traditional communications 
conventions, which rely on a perception of a homogeneous public sector 
and outdated notions of ministerial responsibility and public service 
anonymity. This has led to role confusion for some public sector 
agencies. Official guidelines for government advertising do not clearly 
define the boundaries for each agency type. 
Compounding this is the government's traditional reliance on the news 
media to communicate government policy to the public. Such a reliance 
is problematic, given the media's commercial objectives, the myth of the 
'fourth estate' and ensuing market failure. This reliance on the media 
has retarded the development of public awareness output classes, thereby 
reducing opportunities to engage in proactive public education 
campaigns. A public ill-informed of government policy is more likely to 
possess a lack of confidence in the bureaucracy. Perversely, public 
education programmes managed by officials are in danger of being 
perceived as political or biased in some way, when the current 
communications conventions are not publicly well known or 
understood. 
With the challenges of the 1990s appearing in the form of an MMP 
system for general elections, further changes to conventions are likely 
and the public's need for quality, impartial information will grow. 
These issues are discussed in more detail in this chapter, and some 
suggestions to address these are examined in Chapter Six. 
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CONFLICT BETWEEN NEW AND TRADITIONAL 
COMMUNICATIONS CONVENTIONS 
-Public sector agencies 
Agencies themselves find it difficult to determine what communications 
conventions there are and which apply to their operations. A 1992 
analysis by Treasury's Communications Director, Nikitin Sallee suggested 
that the constitutional status of each department placed constraints on 
their communications strategies. He did not detail what these constraints 
were, but did offer some suggestions as to the appropriate behaviour 
certain agency types might exhibit. Sallee did not label the agency types. 
However, from his descriptions they can be described as commercial, 
enforcement, operational, and policy agencies. These distinctions, with 
Sallee's descriptions attached are: commercial-those with paying 
customers the agency needs to attract, retain and inform such as the 
Reserve Bank and the Treasury's Debt Management Office; 
enforcement-those departments with a role in ensuring citizens comply 
with the law such as IRD (tax compliance) and the Police (road toll 
reduction); operational-agencies which must advise citizens of their 
entitlements such as the Department of Social Welfare; policy- 
conservative agencies with a role in assisting in informed public debate 
such as Treasury.1 
It is significant that although Sallee's analysis does not accord with the 
conventions presented in this thesis, there was at least some recognition 
that different agency types exist within the public sector and that different 
communications conventions will apply to each. Despite his analysis, 
Sallee continued to treat the public sector as a homogeneous whole as he 
described the 'appropriate role for public servants' in providing 
background to government policy decisions, but not advocacy, defence or 
criticism of government decisions.2 He stated that people were entitled to 
information under the Official Information Act 1982, and that in many 
cases additional background information or data should be supplied. He 
did not discuss the use of proactive strategies to provide public 
information and appeared to take a reactive communications stance with 
regard to his agency type. Sallee's perception of Treasury's role meant 
that it would knowingly allow misinformation to remain in the public 
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domain, because constitutional restrictions can require a 'steel chin'. The 
public's right to know or at least to have correct information placed in 
front of it was restricted by, " . . .the constitutional boundaries between 
what is proper territory for a public servant and what is the Minister's 
prerogative."3 He believed that 'giving in' and crossing the boundary 
(which was not defined), would lead to a long-term undermining of the 
department's credibility and the public service. While this may have 
been the case under the pre-state sector reform conventions and at the 
time of Sallee's presentation, it would be of greater benefit today to define 
the boundaries so that agencies, ministers and the public have clear 
perceptions as to what is and isn't appropriate behaviour. Accepting the 
conventions in Chapter Four would be a move in this direction. 
David Henry, while Chief Executive of the Inland Revenue Department 
(IRD), described the dilemma for public sector organisations spending 
money on glossy publications or image building. This: 
... can do much damage to that organisation's credibility. Yet a 
low budget, low key campaign may be perceived as bureaucratic 
bungling, the stifling of information dissemination and may 
not help voluntary compliance.. .4 
Despite Henry's description of IRD as a 'core' department, it is more 
fittingly described as a mixed objective core public sector agency which 
also has statutorily independent functions. Henry likened the 
communications needs to that of the private sector: "For example, we 
identify specific "customer groups" through market research, identify 
their needs and seek to meet them in the most appropriate way. The 
communication methods used are also similar."5 These methods 
include: direct mail; print, radio and television advertising; news 
releases and backgrounders for journalists. These methods apply most 
appropriately to the operational aspects of IRD. Henry states that in 
relation to IRD's statutory role, it was important that IRD explains the 
law, but does not just i fy it.6 Henry also outlined IRD's proactive 
approach to media relations and presented his view that it was important 
for senior management to be seen to be accountable to the public through 
the media.7 This view does not accord with the traditional principle of 
public service anonymity. In an agency with statutorily independent 
functions, it is essential that officials are seen to defend administrative 
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actions rather than a minister, or risk their independence being 
misconstrued. Only in matters of extreme seriousness, such as when 
public confidence in an entire institution is at risk, or the matter is raised 
in the House (for example the Hon. Winston Peters' 'wine-boxr charge of 
corruption against Henry), should ministers seek to defend the statutorily 
independent activities of an agency. Ministers should always protect the 
statutory independence itself. 
M i n i s t e r s  
Ministers are given little assistance in determining what is 
constitutionally proper in regard to the communications conducted 
within their portfolios. Post-state sector reforms, those in charge of core 
policy ministries have been able to rely, more or less, on the traditional 
communications conventions. Those in charge of mixed objective 
agencies, or core agencies with separate identifiable business units, will 
often face a dilemma which is not articulated. The Cabinet Office 
Manual, which outlines the parameters for ministerial behaviour, 
merely notes that the government has a responsibility to keep the public 
informed about important issues. It cites the use of the media or personal 
appearances at conferences and other gatherings to, ". ..explain and discuss 
government policies and plans."g There is no mention of other forms of 
public relations activity. Additionally, there is no body of theory in New 
Zealand which clearly and unambiguously groups each government 
agency under a specific 'type' with defined constitutionally-correct 
communications behaviour specified for each. 
Where an agency is statutorily independent, the legislation may provide 
a guide to the agency's proper role in respect of public information. Such 
legislative requirements can only apply to the operational nature of an 
agency's work, because policy advisory roles still fall within the 
traditional conventions. Some chief executives in meeting their 
performance contracts, need to engage in communications activities 
which make use of private-sector type active marketing techniques. This 
can involve 'positioning statements' such as "It's our job to be fair" (IRD), 
branding of products or services, and corporate logos. In recent times 
Ministers have had to take a largely hands-off approach to such activities 
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in much the same way that the marketing activities of SOEs are treated as 
not being the direct concern of the shareholding ministers. 
Some core public sector agencies have an internal rule that any 
discretionary advertising expenditure above a certain amount ($100,000 in 
the Department of Justice), must have ministerial approval, although 
there is no Cabinet directive requiring this. While such 'approval' is 
likely to be based on political considerations, the minister is often aware 
of the existence of other public sector advertising campaigns and may be 
able to facilitate co-ordination of resources. There is an argument that an 
astute chief executive, regardless of agency type, will inform the minister 
of any publicly-funded advertising campaign prior to commencement. 
While 'approval' as such is probably not required, it would be unwise of a 
chief executive not to heed and accommodate any specific ministerial 
concerns. 
The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet's Communications Unit, 
while not having any statutory responsibility or power, provides a 
communications co-ordination service. There is no suggestion that use 
of such a service will lead to politicization of any advertising, as an 
individual chief executive remains responsible for such outputs. Public 
sector communications managers could consider making greater use of 
this co-ordination service prior to commencement of any advertising 
campaigns, to ensure there are no obvious clashes with other public 
sector agencies, or to determine whether there is room for closer co- 
operation. 
GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS 
On 28 April 1989 the Audit Office, concerned at the lack of formal 
guidance on government advertising and publicity, issued its Suggested 
guidelines for a convention on vubliclv-funded overnment advertising 
and vublicitv. The guidelines were the result of complaints to the Audit 
Office following the 'Mrs Mop' tax commercials of 1988 and were 
developed in consultation with communications professionals and an 
analysis of overseas guidelines. The Audit Office considered it was 'in the 
general public interest'g to provide such guidelines, claiming they 
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applied, ". ..to the Government and its departments of State.. . [and]. ..may 
be applicable equally to other organisations in the public sector funded 
from the public purse."lo It can be argued that SOEs fall outside the 
definition of 'public sector', as well as perhaps Crown entities. A more 
useful definition of applicability would be 'those state sector agencies 
covered by the requirements of the Public Finance Act 1989'. Such a 
definition would allow Crown entities, which have a closer relationship 
with their ministers and the Audit Office than do SOEs, to be included 
with some degree of certainty. 
The guidelines were followed, on 20 November, by a Cabinet Office 
Circular11 which superseded those issued by the Audit Office. In practice 
however, public sector communications staff generally refer to both. 
Evan Voyce, long-time communications professional, commented in a 
presentation that, "...it is safer to adhere to the rules suggested by the 
adjudicator than the rules of a group likely to be the subject of 
adjudication."l2 
The Cabinet Office guidelines were briefer than the Audit Office's. Again, 
they purported to apply to the core public service, but were noted as being 
possibly a 'reference point' for other organisations which spend public 
funds on publicity. The onus is placed on ministers and departments 
themselves to be accountable. It is unlikely that such vague allusion to 
the state sector, coupled with no accountability mechanism, would 
encourage the enlarged state sector to unambiguously adopt the 
guidelines. Results from the survey support this. 
The Audit Office stated that governments have a right and a duty to 
provide accurate information to the public. It considered this to involve 
explaining policy, and informing the public about government services, 
and the public's legal rights and liabilities.13 The 'fine line' so commonly 
cited in communications conventions reappeared again, this time 
between explaining and informing. In an ordinary understanding of the 
words, explaining may involve accounting for, or providing comment 
on; whereas informing may be considered to be providing information 
without comment. What the precise nature of the Audit Office's 
definitions are remains unclear. What is not permissible is any activity 
which is designed to: promote, or has the effect of promoting, 
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government interests; or secure, or has the effect of attempting to secure, 
popular party-political support. This could create problems for public 
sector agencies today, if the nuance of 'designed to' is not picked up. If an 
unintentional or unpredicted side-effect of a well-designed and managed 
public information campaign is any of the above, this should not inhibit 
the public sector agency from engaging further in that activity. Political 
pressure would undoubtedly be brought to bear on any public education 
campaign whose unintended side-effect was the reverse of the above 
scenarios. This would pose a dilemma for the public sector's 
independence and may be alleviated by clearly recording the reasons for 
decisions taken. 
It is also a deficiency of the Audit Office guidelines that the full range of 
communications activities undertaken by the public sector is not noted, 
nor is the existence of agency types. It would be useful in such a 
document to explain the communications conventions it is based on. 
The small number of examples can serve to legitimate only those 
activities so named, and does not remove the confusion which the 
traditional conventions have created, regarding policy advocacy/ 
promotion and defence; and operational advocacy/ promotion and 
defence. 
The Cabinet Office goes further than the Audit Office in illustrating 
appropriate publicity objectives. These may be to: 
. . . inform the public of proposed/ new/ revised/ existing 
Government policies; inform the public of Government 
services available to them; advise the public of new/ revised/ 
existing entitlements or responsibilities; encourage the public 
to adopt certain kinds of social behaviour generally regarded as 
being in the public interest [eg road safety advertising] (italics 
mine)l4 
Explaining has been dropped as an activity, and the subtlety of meaning 
between inform and advise is unclear, but no doubt another 'fine line' is 
deemed to exist. 
The key criteria for a public education campaign, according to both the 
Audit Office and Cabinet Office, is to only include material which is: 
accurate, factual, truthful; fair, honest, impartial; legal, proper.15 The 
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Cabinet Office's definition of 'fair, honest, impartial', states this must be, 
"...in a manner free from partisan promotion of Government policy and 
political argument."l6 This implies that non-partisan promotion of 
government policy may be appropriate. 
In his analysis of the 1993 health reforms publicity, Atkinson contends 
that the Cabinet Office standards are 'less exacting' than those of the Audit 
Office. He finds that the Auditor-General at the time, Jeff Chapman, 
appeared to accept a lesser standard than that set by his predecessor, Brian 
Tyler. Atkinson claims that removal of the requirement for fully 
justifiable claims and balanced canvassing of pros and cons, is a triumph 
for 'thin democracy'. His justification for this stance is that Cabinet Office 
guidelines, "...allow communicators to treat voters as targets for 
persuasive messages-like consumers in a commercial market-rather 
than as fully-fledged citizens with a right to be educated in civic affairs."17 
However, Atkinson's analysis is emotive at this point, because 'voters' 
can technically never be a target of any publicly-funded advertising 
campaign, except through the Chief Electoral Office, Electoral 
Commission, or a properly constituted independent panel. No other 
public sector agency could legitimately target 'voters' under the Cabinet 
Office guidelines which state that advertising, "...should only be 
undertaken where there is an identified and justifiable information need 
by the intended recipients."lB 
Atkinson applies two theoretical models of the communication process 
to government communications in his health reforms analysis, as well as 
two models of democracy, 'thin' and 'strong' (see Chapter  TWO).^^ 
Associated with 'thin' democracy, where the public participate in the 
political process largely through elections, is the 'information-as-thing' 
model. This model relies on elites controlling information which is 
transmitted to the public who are passive 'receivers'. Essentially, the 
public are not involved in determining which messages are to be 
transmitted. 
Participatory ('strong') democracy is linked to the 'information-as- 
construction' model, whereby the audience can refashion the messages 
from elites. This requires messages to be targeted carefully to individual 
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audiences who have been consulted in some way in the development of 
the messages, because the public is resistant to elite messages which are 
perceived to manipulate outcomes. 
Using the health reforms as a case study, Atkinson concludes that it was 
'one-sidedly manipulative'.20 Atkinson's analysis is flawed in that it 
assumes that the primary goal of all government communications 
should be consultative, because he believes New Zealand should be a 
'strong' democracy. Despite the apparent New Zealand preference for this 
view (see Chapter Two), governments legitimately conduct a multitude 
of communications activities which do not require consultation at all, 
where a simple 'information-as-thing' model must apply. This is 
especially so in cases of explaining rights and responsibilities under the 
law, or where non-negotiable policy is to be explained. 
Atkinson appears to suggest that reassuring the public and correcting 
misinformation by providing details of existing policy through public 
education campaigns is not legitimate. He appears to confuse the role of 
the health reform campaign, which was largely to communicate the 
details and explain the context of an existing policy, with a desire for 
democratic consultative policy-making. If the aim of the health reform 
campaign was to consult with the public and to discover options for 
reform, then Atkinson's criticisms would be valid21. However, given 
that was not the aim of the campaign, he only serves to confuse the 
debate about appropriate communications activities for the public sector. 
His criteria were inappropriate for evaluating government 
communication of a policy which was not up for consultation (in itself a 
political decision). 
In his analysis, any unpopular policy is undemocratic and Atkinson 
objects to any public communication on it which is not consultative in 
nature. He assumes that in 'strong' democracies, governments consult 
with the public in order to change unpopular policies, not to correct 
misinformation or to educate the public on its details. Atkinson states: 
... democratic policy-making is not a matter of trying to sell a 
pre-established but unpopular policy by means of top-down 
trickery, but a matter of educating citizens up to a level where 
they are capable of having a genuine say in policy 
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formulation .... Health reform is such an obtrusive issue, and 
ideological beliefs so fundamental to it, that no amount of 
suave salesmanship could make it widely acceptable as long as 
the underlying ideological conflicts are left to fester 
unacknowledged. Many New Zealanders still do not feel they 
know where their government is going on health or why it is 
desirable to go there. More robustly democratic modes of 
communication may be needed to enlighten them.22 
Supporting the Atkinson view of New Zealand government 
communications is Maori lobbyist Tony Sinclair. In 1994, the National 
Government made an announcement detailing its non-negotiable policy 
on the amount of money it intends to use to settle historical Treaty of 
Waitangi claims, stating that: "The amount in the Envelope is a political 
decision which cannot be open for negotiation."23 The amount of money 
($1 billion) is known as the 'fiscal' or 'settlement envelope'. The costs 
which may be included within this envelope are open for public 
consultation.24 The Government engaged in a publicity campaign to 
ensure that Maori claimants and the general public (as taxpayers who 
would fund the 'fiscal envelope') were well-informed on the detail of 
both the non-negotiable aspects of the policy, as well as the other Treaty 
settlement policies which were open for submission. This approach was 
rejected by Mr Sinclair's group, because it perceived the government's 
role to be solely a consultative one and therefore the publicity campaign, 
designed in the 'information-as-thing' model, was inappropriate: 
And we've decided that the only way to get information out of 
these people and to draw them out is to use any forum we can 
in order to show that the power brokers are not consulting 
honestly-consulting fairly with the people.. . . We totally 
oppose their attempts to simply monopolise the medium for 
themselves-to simply programme and promote their desires 
and wishes.25 
On the same issue, Alliance leader Sandra Lee called for better 
information to be provided to iwi, "...so they can make an informed 
response themselves."26 This reveals the expectation that governments 
should provide information, but for the purpose of participatory policy- 
making. The Government scheduled a number of hui and other 
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meetings to discuss the negotiable Treaty settlement policies and to 
explain the non-negotiable aspects. 
The Maori Congress also supported the view that government 
expenditure of public education on the non-negotiable policy was 
inappropriate, and called for a matching sum of money to put Maori 
views.27 This reveals a perception that governments act as pressure 
groups when communicating the detail of non-negotiable policies and 
are possibly viewed with suspicion when communicating in a 
consultative manner. This could be partly due to the high political 
association with the communications campaign, although this is probably 
unavoidable since the Crown is the other Treaty partner. 
While there are undoubtedly many issues which governments 
determine as non-negotiable (such as economic policy), their legitimate 
right and duty to communicate such policy details is sometimes 
questioned by those who do not object to government communication 
per se, but to the non-negotiable nature of the policy being communicated 
and therefore to the style of communication selected. This can lead to an 
analysis such as that presented by Atkinson, which becomes critical of a 
legitimate communications programme and so confuses the issue. 
Commentators such as Atkinson operate in a vacuum with regard to 
assessment of government communications, partly because there are no 
clear guidelines covering each public sector agency type. Those that exist 
are too brief and provide ample room for commentators to make charges 
of propaganda and politicization with regard to legitimate public 
education activities. The greater transparency of the 1990s has led to 
some public confusion and ultimately political embarrassment, as 
governments are accused of 'public relations' to 'sell' their policies. Any 
public outrage at such expenditure is most likely linked to the 
controversial nature of many non-negotiable policies. The timing of 
such public education campaigns is critical and their management should 
come from and be seen to come from the bureaucracy, not the politicians. 
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MARKET FAILURE AND RELIANCE ON THE MEDIA 
There have been many calls over the years to regulate the media with 
commentators identifying a need for standards to be lifted. The urgency 
felt is indicative of the government's reliance on the media to achieve its 
communications goals. There is little discussion on the need for 
government to communicate with the public through channels other 
than the media. The argument is that the media must improve its 
standards, because the government's messages are not getting through to 
the people and, as a consequence, people are not well-informed or able to 
participate fully in the policy-making process, and so democracy cannot 
function well. Behind such arguments is a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the media's role, which is still perceived to be a 
'fourth estate' serving the people. In reality it is a number of competing 
businesses with commercial goals and objectives, regulated by ethics and 
standards authorities such as the Press Council and Broadcasting 
Standards Authority. In New Zealand there is no regulation for 
magazine journalism. 
Calls for the media to improve standards commonly reflect a viewpoint 
of extreme concern. For example JL Robson in 1976 stated: 
... we cannot ignore the grave challenge to the news media to 
lift their standards .... Too often the news media have been seen 
as major obstacles lying in the path of those influences which 
tend to lift the standard of our civilisation.28 
His later memoirs show that throughout his association with the 
Department of Justice, the media, with one exception, were the primary 
tool used for public education and were relied upon extensively to pursue 
policy issues.29 This reliance continued through until 1992 when the 
Corrections Group (as it was then) of the Department of Justice developed 
its first comprehensive public relations plan which required it to provide 
targeted public information through non-media avenues. 
The desire for the media to improve standards also commonly involves a 
demand for increased state control. Fiss, a United Kingdom media 
commentator, explains the arguments for increased state intervention in 
the media based on a theory of market failure: the state is needed to 
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perfect the market or to compensate for its deficiencies.30 He claims that 
the market constrains the presentation of matters of public interest and 
importance in two ways: by being especially responsive to the needs of 
the owners, advertisers, and those targeted by advertising; and making 
editorial and programming decisions based on profitability or allocative 
efficiency. Fiss claims: 
. ..there is no necessary, or even probabilistic, relationship 
between making a profit or allocating resources efficiently and 
supplying the electorate with the information they need to 
make free and intelligent choices about government policy, the 
structure of government, or the nature of society.31 
Fiss believes the role of the state is not to supplant or perfect the market, 
but to supplement it: "The state must put on the agenda issues that are 
systematically ignored and slighted and allow us to hear voices and 
viewpoints that would otherwise be silenced or muffled."32 
Market failure had been used as justification for New Zealand 
governments to supplement the media as early as 1935. Gregory, writing 
on broadcasting, quotes former Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage 
explaining broadcasting policy: 
In Savage's own words, 'The Government has a duty to the 
people not to keep them in the dark. What the newspapers 
neglect to do the broadcasting service will do. We have a far- 
reaching programme and we want the people to come with us 
everywhere. The Government is going to be the master of 
publicity'.33 
The 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy analysed the role of the 
market and concluded that in relation to both broadcasting and print 
media: 
... there is a major obstacle which prevents most areas of the 
media from behaving as a free market. It arises from the fact 
that the commercial media are primarily financed by 
advertising revenue. Not only does this prevent classic free 
market organisation, it also sharply limits, in predictable ways, 
diversity and choice.34 
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Market failure means that resources are not allocated efficiently according 
to consumers' preferences, because quantity of programming, as opposed 
to quality, is all that can be determined by consumers. 
Palmer, in his 1992 writings, investigates the role of the New Zealand 
media in relation to John Stuart Mill's theories. He claims that under 
Mill's theory, the media would have some responsibility to inform the 
public who wished to participate in government. This rejects the notion 
of a purely market-driven model for the media as an entertainment 
industry. Palmer suggests that it is not clear what conception the New 
Zealand media hold of their responsibilities and he makes a logical 
connection that: "If it is not the media's responsibility to provide the 
material to keep the public well-informed about their government, then 
it must be the responsibility of government itself."35 Palmer does not 
pursue this line of argument in any great depth, but does comment that 
reliance on the Official Information Act 1982 is not enough: 
Work, time and money have to go into gathering the 
information and seeking creative ways of making it available 
to those who may find it useful. The information policy of 
government needs to be pro-active, not one that simply lies in 
wait for users to apply for it.36 
Despite these comments, Palmer opts to continue the New Zealand 
tradition of exhorting the media to improve its standards, citing higher 
pay rates and educational standards for journalists, and a system of public 
broadcasting as prerequisites.37 
Palmer cites deregulation of radio and television, which has been taken 
'to extremes', as leading to a degradation of reporting standards.38 
Atkinson similarly claims deregulation of television has failed to deliver 
promised improvements, as the removal of state control led to, "...the 
replacement of one master by another: the state by the market."39 
Atkinson provides evidence that since deregulation, One Network News 
(the news programme received by most New Zealanders) has become 
increasingly 'morselised' (reduced to short components) and 
'depoliticised' (without serious discourse on public affairs). Atkinson 
claims the danger of morselisation is that brevity of 'sound bites' 
encourages viewers to make emotional rather than logical connections 
between simple assertions. Depoliticization has led to a change in 
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interviewing style where the sequence of questions and answers often 
bear no relationship to each other, are too fast-paced, and incapable of 
deepening the viewers' understanding of political events. 
In Atkinson's analysis, a sizeable portion of television audiences are 
unaware of what information is being excluded and are therefore unable 
to make fully informed democratic choices. If this analysis is correct, then 
it provides strong support for the argument that it is futile for the 
government to rely on the media to communicate public policy and that 
governments must take the initiative themselves in order to safeguard 
the quality of public participation. It is outside the scope of this thesis to 
discuss theories of media influence on agenda-setting, public opinion and 
public policy, but an analysis of the recent literature can be made by the 
reader.40 
Commenting in 1988 on Australia's Parliamentary Press Gallery, Lloyd 
claims that the lack of media coverage has been due to market forces, 
where news judgements label Parliament's activities dull and irrelevant, 
and where the media do not perceive a duty to report proceedings.41 
Clerk of the House, David McGee's comments on the standard of New 
Zealand Parliamentary reporting reflect a similar view.42 However, the 
key point made by McGee, which can be applied to government 
communications objectives in general, is that where there is market 
failure (i.e. the media fail to find government information newsworthy), 
rather than castigate the media, or attempt to control them through 
regulation, they should be supplemented. The payment, by the Clerk, to 
Radio New Zealand Limited to broadcast the proceedings of Parliament is 
at public expense, because it is a non-commercial undertaking (i.e. the 
potential audience is so limited that advertising revenue could not 
sustain the cost of providing the service). Additionally, a contract for 
Radio New Zealand Limited to produce a weekly 20 minute programme 
summarising the business conducted in the House, as well as daily five 
minute summaries, was entered into in 1994 for much the same reasons. 
McGee considered that it was in the public interest to broadcast the 
proceedings in summary form, at public expense, considering the market 
failed to provide the service. His motives were primarily to improve the 
attention paid to Parliament and to facilitate a consequent improvement 
in standards and increased regard for the institution: "My primary 
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objective is to try and improve the performance, not just the image, but 
the performance of the Parliamentary process. I believe in many ways 
that the performance would solve the image problem."43 
Government has not generally acknowledged its role in public education 
other than through effective use of the media. For example, in 1992 the 
Treasury listed in its Communications Handbook, in descending order of 
importance, its typical key audiences. These are: Finance and SOE 
ministers; other ministers (especially the Prime Minister); Parliament; 
other government departments; economic decision-makers (investors, 
borrowers, price-setters, etc); academics; interest groups; media, p~bl ic .4~ 
Despite Treasury's mission statement including the role, ". . .to contribute 
to public understanding of economic and financial matters in a manner 
consistent with the current constitutional conventionsn45, Treasury relies 
on communicating with the public through use of the news media. For 
example, discussing 'issues marketing plans' Sallee explained how a 
significant area of policy development requiring participation from 
various people would include marketing to the media at the appropriate 
time. Affected interest groups would also be targeted, however the 
general public is presumed to be communicated with via the media.46 
Another example from within a non-core statutorily independent agency 
is the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which appears to have inherited 
this reliance on the media. Described as 'stepping up' a public relations 
campaign to ,explain why wage earners should not seek compensation for 
an expected rise in the consumer price index, the Reserve Bank sent a 
brochure to politicians, businesses and news media.47 Despite it being 
Governor Dr Don Brash's objective to convince salary and wage earners 
not to seek compensation, the public relations campaign relied on the 
media to communicate this message to them. How successfully the 
media were able to do this is questionable. 
One notable example of government agencies moving away from this 
reliance is in the use of information technology. The Department of 
Internal Affairs is co-ordinating a project to provide a 24 hour single 
phone number for public inquiries to all government departments, as 
well as a public information kiosk network.48 A video-conferencing 
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facility will also allow for greater regional input into central government 
policy and law-making. 
PUBLIC AWARENESS OUTPUTS 
As shown in the survey results presented in Chapter Four, 
communications funding is not commonly budgeted in its own output 
class. This means that ministers are not directly 'purchasing' public 
awareness outputs from most core public service agencies. Indirectly, as 
part of policy advice or implementation outputs, there will be an 
expectation that public awareness education will be conducted. The 
problem that can arise by not specifically targeting public awareness 
outputs for each department, is that an unco-ordinated or piecemeal 
approach may be taken to external communications. Even where 
separate communications units may be established as support services for 
those who receive output class funding, the actual responsibility for 
devising communications plans and managing budgets can be widely 
dispersed throughout a core public sector agency. In cases where 
communications funding is undefined, ministers may be wary of their 
agency's expenditure in this area, especially if a coherent plan has not 
been prepared to cover the agency's entire operations. In these cases it is 
almost impossible to quantify total expenditure with any degree of 
accuracy, as demonstrated by the survey results. 
Because funding is not well co-ordinated within the core public sector 
agencies, comprehensive public education programmes are not always 
provided in a proactive sense, that is, they are often engaged in once an 
issue becomes apparent, in reaction to a media campaign for example. 
Public education output class funding for all public sector agency types 
would allow for client groups and the general public to be regularly 
surveyed to establish areas of concern or misunderstanding, and allow for 
effective educational programmes to be devised before crises arise. A lot 
of public sector communications work resembles 'fire fighting', because of 
an inability to know what issues are keenly felt by various sectors of the 
public, and what the level of knowledge is. Media monitoring is only 
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moderately useful, as this provides information generally after a topic has 
become an issue. 
For example, the Department of Justice has undertaken independent 
media analysis continuously since 1991. This was unable to predict, but 
could certainly quantify, the public concern and ignorance over parole 
provisions which erupted in January 1992 and did not die down until 
August, over the parole of Mr Mark Stephens. The issue produced 199 
items from metropolitan newspapers, nationwide radio and television 
coverage. The news that the inmate was eligible to apply for parole 
resulted in a media furore, which led to the Parole Board, a statutorily 
independent body, deciding to delay his hearing until the adverse affects 
of media attention had dissipated. The Department's Communications 
Unit recorded around 120 phone calls from the media on the issue. Other 
Department officials who were contacted by the media did not quantify 
the number of calls. 
The news media coverage initially reflected a poor public understanding 
of the principles behind the parole policy, the criteria for granting it, and 
the law changes that had already been made which completely denied 
parole for violent offenders (but which did not apply to Mr Stephens due 
to his sentencing occurring prior to the law change). Calls for tightening 
up on parole, providing a ministerial veto over parole and other 
draconian criminal justice measures were able to be finally put to rest as 
the media gradually started to report the facts. 
While the matter was seen as one of policy, it was considered appropriate 
by the Department to explain the policy clearly to the public. This may 
have been perceived as defence, but given the sheer number of media 
calls to the Department, it would have been entirely impractical for the 
minister to provide all the information. Besides, responsibilities under 
the Official Information Act 1982 dictated that the information requested 
by the media should be supplied. Promotion of the policy at that point 
would have been futile, but was able to be addressed once the issue had 
abated. The incident demonstrated the futility of relying on the media to 
solely communicate matters of public policy. The Department of Justice 
subsequently upgraded its communications plans and developed targeted 
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publications to the news media and pressure groups who were known to 
have a keen interest in criminal justice issues. 
The issue was somewhat complicated by the fact that the story was 
presented emotively. For example, in what was subsequently proven to 
be a hoax, a visiting 'top British psychiatrist' Dr Jim McPherson claimed 
that, "...rapist Mark Stephens is a dangerous latent schizophrenic who 
should never be freed."@ The Department suspected an orchestrated 
plan of misinformation5o, with individual members of the Police and the 
Police Association also taking on the role of pressure gr0ups.5~ 
The parole issue was not completely resolved and almost exactly a year 
later, starting in December 1992 and ending in March 1993, the issue of Mr 
Stephens' parole arose again. The 83 items which ensued, included that 
he had breached his parole and how the Department of Justice was able to 
manage it. As this was essentially now an operational issue, it was 
entirely appropriate for the Department to be seen to defend its actions in 
placing Mr Stephens with his whanau. Nearly 40 phone calls from the 
media were recorded by the Department's Communications Unit. A 
public speaking programme conducted by operational staff was 
subsequently developed by the Department to allow it to communicate 
directly with interest groups and the wider community about both policy 
and operational issues. 
Defined public awareness output class funding could have allowed for 
monitoring of public understanding of critical elements of criminal 
justice policy. This could have assisted in the early formulation of 
appropriately targeted communications to interested individuals and 
pressure groups. Then, when the inevitable happens and a reactive issue 
attains prominence, public sector agencies like the Department of Justice 
would find themselves operating with less of an information deficit to 
correct. The quality of news reporting may also be positively affected. It is 
arguable that administrative efficiency can be improved with a well 
informed public. Criminal justice has been notorious for its constant u- 
turns in policy-returning to policies and practices which previous 
experience and research have shown to be ineffective. Many times this 
has occurred because of an inability to communicate through the public 
emotion, relying on the media to do the communicating, and not being 
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able to respond in a coherent proactive manner to public information 
needs. 
The cost of proactive communications outputs should be measured 
against the benefit of greater understanding and acceptance of 
government policy as an outcome. As long ago as 1981, the Danks 
Committee commented that if improved, communications, "...enables 
Government to work more smoothly and effectively in the long run, a 
real gain in the efficient use of resources will be achieved."52 
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 
Confidence in the bureaucracy has often been tied into the public's level 
of confidence in government. The traditional model of public sector 
anonymity has provided little option but to accept, in times of intense 
dissatisfaction with governments, reduced public confidence in both its 
operational ability and policy advice functions (for example, Sallee's 'steel 
chin'53). Holmes and Martin, in 1981, link a breakdown in trust or faith 
in governments, to their failure to explain and deliver policy.54 
Palmer wrote an entire book based on the crisis he perceived in both the 
low performance of the constitutional system and the public attitude to 
it.55 He claimed, in 1992, that politicians, "...now are perilously close to 
levels of credibility which will cause the system to decay and collapse."56 
Jane Kelsey of the University of Auckland's Law Faculty, commented on 
the nature of New Zealand's crisis, commonly discussed during 1992 and 
1993: 
The term crisis was usually shorthand for the dramatic erosion 
of public confidence in representative electoral democracy and 
parliamentary politics, and the imposition of an 
uncompromisingly dogmatic liberal agenda.s7 
According to Colin James and Alan McRobie in their 1993 book: 
... over the past two decades public confidence in Parliament 
and politicians has declined significantly. In 1975 the Heylen 
Research Centre's Trust and Confidence Poll recorded 33% 
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public confidence in Parliament and politicians; by 1992.. .[it] 
had slumped to a meagre 4%. The National Business 
ReviewlInsight Respect List in March 1992 ranked politicians 
nineteenth out of 21-above insurance salesmen and car 
dealers but below tow truck drivers, estate agents and trade 
union officials .58 
In 1994 the Public Service Association (PSA) is reported to have agreed 
with State Services Commissioner, Don Hum, "...that there is a crisis of 
public confidence in the civil service."59 While the issue under 
discussion was the spending practices of the former Auditor-General, Jeff 
Chapman, the PSA's General Secretary linked the crisis in confidence to 
the state sector reforms of the 1980s which had resulted in senior civil 
servants abandoning their former standards of ethical behaviour. 
Atkinson found that research conducted by Network Communications 
during the health reforms campaign revealed a total lack of credibility in 
government and politics generally. This was considered to impact on 
government communications to such an extent that any form of 
communication promoting the reforms would backfire.60 
Tied up in this lack of public confidence, is a perception that politicization 
of the public sector has occurred. James and McRobie observed in their 
analysis of the state sector reforms that: 
The politicization of the service was more noticeable in 
ministers' offices .... Ministers' offices, once essentially 
components of a 'corps' that was part of the wider public 
service and shared its sense of national interest, came to 
resemble baronial retinues.61 
Martin explains that the potential conflicts between a minister and chief 
executive pre-state sector reforms, "...could be fudged behind the doctrine 
of ministerial responsibility and until 1982 the confidentiality of 
government business (and the absence of strong investigative media)."62 
He cites, as examples of the boundaries of politicization being tested, 
'vision documents' published by some government departments prior to 
the 1993 General Election, which purported to look towards the 
twentyfirst century. In such cases, ministers launched the documents 
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which were accompanied by extensive publicity campaigns. Other 
examples were: the Minister of Labour suggesting staff should protect 
and promote the Employment Contracts Act 1991; and the Treasury 
costing out the Opposition party's election promises.63 
Provided the publicity campaigns were not designed to promote 
government interests (Audit Office restrictions), then such public 
education can be legitimate64. The association of the minister with such 
promotion is likely to draw charges of politicization or the perception of 
it, and perhaps public sector agencies would be wiser to use the chief 
executive for publicity purposes. To avoid charges of politicization it is 
imperative that adequate documentation is maintained and made 
publicly available in order to demonstrate the output-based justification 
for it. The fact that the minister is still seen to be the appropriate front- 
person is probably an overhang from the traditional convention of public 
sector anonymity. Clearly such anonymity is incompatible with today's 
communications conventions and can open up a public sector agency to 
charges of politicization as these cases demonstrate. Additionally, 
Martin's objection to public servants promoting existing policy could be 
laid to rest if the current conventions were more clearly articulated by 
those within the public sector. This would legitimate proactive 
promotion by the core public sector, rather than waiting for ministerial 
directives which can obviously be misconstrued as politicization. 
One of the most disturbing examples of the government's apparent 
acceptance of the lack of public confidence in the bureaucracy is in its 
decision not to let the department with statutorily independent functions 
in managing elections, manage a public education campaign prior to the 
1992 and 1993 electoral referenda. While the composition and 
performance of each independent Electoral Referendum Panel is above 
reproach, the task of ensuring that the material presented to the public 
was impartial and unbiased should have been able to be carried out by the 
core public service. In each case the Panels were not statutory bodies and 
were not subject to the Official Information Act 1982 or the Ombudsmen 
Act 1975 and there was no requirement to report to Parliament. The fact 
that the Chief Ombudsman was selected to chair each Panel did ensure 
that they operated in a transparent fashion and voluntarily reported to 
Parliament. The precedent has been established that where unbiased and 
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impartial management is required, an independent body with no 
statutory obligations, and outside the core public sector should be created. 
Should such bodies be established for other major projects, there is no 
guarantee that senior state servants and private sector appointees of the 
calibre chosen to date, would be appointed. There is also no guarantee 
that they would seek to define the boundaries of their operations in a 
manner consistent with the public sector operating environment, such as 
operating in accordance with the Official Information Act 1982 and 
reporting to Parliament. 
The Minister of Justice's desire to distance the Government from the 
public education campaign, while an astute political move, did not serve 
to improve public confidence in the bureaucracy. If a statutory function 
had been created or entrusted to the Chief Electoral Officer (who routinely 
manages public education campaigns for each election), what grounds 
would there have been to expect anything other than an impartial and 
unbiased campaign? One possibility may be that despite the Chief 
Electoral Officer's statutory independence, as an employee of the 
Department of Justice the appearance of a close association with the 
Minister of Justice may have been likely to undermine public confidence 
in the process. As it was, the Department of Justice still had to provide 
administrative services to each Panel, formally approve all expenditure 
(given the requirements of the Public Finance Act 1989), and through the 
Chief Electoral Office conduct its usual 'how to vote' and 'voter 
motivation' public education campaign. 
Significantly, the 1993 Panel's report recommends that the Electoral 
Commission (which will eventually absorb the Chief Electoral Office), 
which was established with statutorily-defined public education 
responsibilities, should undertake further public education campaigns 
prior to the next General Election and prior to any citizens' initiated 
referendum.65 Unlike the independent panels, the Electoral Commission 
is subject to both the Ombudsmen Act 1975 and the Official Information 
Act 1982, as well as being listed as a Crown entity under the Public 
Finance Act 1989, so public accountability is assured. It is likely that the 
Audit and Cabinet Office advertising guidelines will apply. Perhaps the 
independent panel concept will not establish itself as a convention, 
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which would refocus attention on the role of the public service in 
meeting any statutorily-defined functions. 
Mulgan suggests that the public do not recognise the pluralism of values 
which exist in New Zealand society, and this makes it difficult to 
maintain public confidence. Negative public attitudes to negotiation and 
compromise are held, "...by those who cling to a homogeneous view of 
New Zealand society or by those who uncritically assume that the 
priorities of the financial markets are necessarily accepted by all New 
Zealanders ."66 He doubts whether MMP will bring greater public 
confidence in the political system. 
IMPACT OF MMP 
The dawn of a new electoral system will bring further changes to the 
public sector operating environment. Just as the new communications 
conventions outlined in Chapter Four are taking time to 'bed down', 
further changes are likely and will take some time to establish 
themselves in their rightful place. 
Martin suggests that under MMP, "...the location of power and 
responsibility within the executive government will become even more 
diffuse and the role of the public service will again require 
examination."67 He states that hung Parliaments will affect ministerial 
behaviour and, in turn, behaviour of officials. Because collective 
ministerial responsibility may be expected to be fragile in coalition 
governments, officials may find it difficult to reconcile their duty to their 
minister with their duty to the government. Martin suggests this brings 
with it risks of politicization.68 
Boston considers that the question of public sector accountability will be 
affected by MMP as, "...the idea of departmental chief executives directly 
serving more than one cabinet minister fits uncomfortably with the 
principles of accountability underpinning the State Sector Act."@ If the 
new communications conventions are allowed to operate to their fullest 
potential, with appropriate checks and balances, the public accountability 
of officials will be assured as they shake off the cloak of anonymity and 
are seen to be responsible for those outputs they have contracted to 
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provide. If public awareness were one of those outputs, then the public 
can be legitimately educated about existing and proposed public policy in 
a non-politicized fashion. Ministers, rather than competing as front- 
persons for each public sector agency, will have to concentrate on 
answerability in Parliament. 
Mulgan's analysis of the effects of MMP involve a consideration of public 
participation, accountability, and public confidence.70 Describing political 
culture prior to 1984, Mulgan notes three general views of the state- 
active, fair, and accessible. He claims the active state operated with a high 
degree of confidence and trust, something that the reforms of the later 
1980s removed. He cites the high level of support for MMP in the 1992 
indicative electoral referendum as suggesting, " . . .that New Zealand is 
facing a significant lack of confidence in its democratic institutions and a 
major crisis of political legitimacy."71 
Mulgan comments that under the FPP system, public opinion was 
garnered from opinion polling, and persuading the public through mass 
marketing that non-negotiable policies were 'worthy' of approval.72 He 
does not suggest how, or if, this may alter under MMP. 
Public participation is likely to be enhanced under MMP, according to 
Mulgan, although greater public debate is not likely to restore public trust. 
The process of negotiation and the glare of publicity in a transparent 
system should offer more opportunity for public opinion and widening 
of the concept of the public interest. Mulgan is of the view that the FPP 
system of elections allowed too much power to sectional interests and not 
to the public interest as a whole.73 
Despite his concerns regarding public confidence, Mulgan does see MMP 
offering some prospect for increasing confidence in the democratic 
legitimacy of Parliament (as opposed to increased confidence in its 
operations). He suggests that the fairness of MMP in representing all 
parties above the 5% threshold and the potential for a better gender 
balance, are factors in this.74 
Mulgan suggests that under MMP, media scrutiny of politicians may be 
higher than at present, as the potential for disagreements among 
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coalition partners will significantly alter the style and substance of 
parliamentary debate.75 
Negative attitudes to politics could potentially increase, as a result of 
publicised conflict between coalition partners76, or perversely, because of 
the greater transparency in decision-making. Mulgan claims that: 
"Unless there is a general recognition that political manceuvring and the 
striking of deals are a legitimate and proper part of politics, the greater 
transparency.. .may lead to increased disillusionment with politi~s."7~ 
Such a 'general recognition' is achievable through an appropriate public 
education campaign, which is something the Electoral Commission will 
no doubt address. 
Under MMP public sector communications will have to be clear in their 
message content to avoid the charge of politicization, which will no 
doubt be made from time to time. The difficulties arise where more than 
one minister is reported to, and where they represent more than one 
political party as may occur under coalition governments. In such cases, 
it is vital that the old convention of using the minister as the public 
relations front-person be dispensed with, and that chief executives 
become more active in their public accountability. 
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New Zealanders consider themselves a democratic nation with an 
emphasis on the normative notion of strong democracy. This is more of 
an ideal, rather than a reflection of the vast amount of public policy 
which is made in a more representative (or 'thin') democratic manner. It 
would be fair to say that both forms of democracy co-exist. This leads to 
an expectation that governments will communicate with the public 
either directly, through the media or via interest groups in order to 
encourage increased public participation, or simply to enhance public 
understanding of particular policies. The form of this communication is 
determined by the government's policy stance, viz. whether it is a non- 
negotiable policy to be communicated (such as the amount of the 'fiscal 
envelope'), or a policy open to discussion and community input (core 
health services debate). 
Changes in the state sector during the 1980s have impacted markedly on 
the conventions governing public sector communications. The role of 
different agency types, the minister, and the media have all changed, 
along with the public's expectations of greater transparency. Not 
unsurprisingly, confusion has developed as to what is an appropriate 
expenditure of taxpayers' funds and the literature has taken some time to 
catch-up with the post-state sector reform environment. 
This thesis concludes that the conventions governing public service and 
state sector communications need to be continuously assessed, redefined 
and communicated to those responsible for managing and advising on 
government communications. Defining the conventions is no easy task 
and should be open for debate with wide input from state sector 
communications practitioners. The conventions presented in Chapter 
Four are a starting point which purport to reflect the current state sector 
environment. Changes imminent under MMP are likely to alter the role 
of the official and public expectations will also require changes to the 
conventions to develop. It is also imperative that commentators on 
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communications matters, so often influential in public debate, are 
provided with clear and unambiguous messages about the role of 
government communications. 
Ultimately there needs to be public acceptance that governments have the 
legitimate right to use state sector agencies to explain and promote  
existing or proposed government policy. Timing of such promotion is 
critical if it is not to be seen as defence of policy (not undertaken at a time 
of intense public criticism for example). The fact that a policy may be 
non-negotiable does not reduce the legitimacy of the communications in 
any way. When state sector agencies do engage in proactive 
communications, the reliance on the media to communicate public 
policy is reduced and hence criticism of its ability to do so can be avoided. 
Adequate output class funding of each agency needs to be provided so 
that public awareness is transparently recognised as a goal of government. 
The main problem will be in obtaining public acceptance that such public 
awareness is not politicized, nor the conventions abused. Public servants 
need to be seen to be managing communications, as opposed to the high 
profile that ministers continue to take. 
While there may be no great risk to the business of government in 
continuing with muddled conventions and mixed messages, the public 
surely deserve better. If the New Zealand ideal of enhanced public 
participation is to be achieved, and a reliance on the media to 
communicate matters of substance abandoned, government 
communications need to be better funded and better managed and the 
public need some assurances that appropriate, unambiguous guidelines 
are being followed. Without such assurances, suspicion of 'glossy' 
publications, and high profile television campaigns for example, may 
continue to work against administrative efficiency in the achievement of 
outputs. 
PROPOSAL 
In order to facilitate a clear expression of the conventions, a 
comprehensive guide should be prepared and regularly updated. This 
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guide should contain specific detail with regard to agency types, 
ministerial responsibilities and appropriate communications activities, 
clearly outlining the conventions. As well, it should contain guidelines 
relevant to each agency type's responsibilities under the Public Finance 
Act 1989, and how to account for various communications activities. 
Any relevant Cabinet decisions for the time being in force should be 
explained. Most importantly, the legal parameters within which state 
sector communications take place should form part of the guide. The 
guide should be especially valuable to those communications managers 
with limited previous state sector experience, and for chief executives 
who may wish for some reassurance as to their appropriate 
communications role. 
Prior to the development of such a guide, the views of communications 
managers should be sought to determine whether it would be of use, or 
whether it should contain other information besides or in place of that 
outlined above. This could be achieved via a survey, focus group 
discussion, 'Network' meetingl, formal seminar (such as the 1992 NZIPA 
conference), or co-opted working group with representatives of each 
agency type. 
The first step would be determining who would be responsible for co- 
ordinating this. A leadership role within the state sector is held by the 
SSC, who are obviously a key player in the articulation of any guidelines 
or conventions. The Audit Office has a similar interest with regard to 
accountability for public funds, and the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet's Communications Unit has an interest in co-ordinating 
public sector communications. In terms of assisting in the development 
of public awareness output class funding for all public sector agencies, the 
Treasury would have a role. These key players would be the obvious 
group to set about articulating the communications conventions, and 
assisting the public sector to achieve greater cost and administrative 
efficiency in effecting public policy. The challenge is theirs. 
The proposal outlined above presents an opportunity for those central 
agencies to show leadership in the public sector. There has been some 
concern for some time amongst senior public servants of the 
'departmentalism' which has occurred post-state sector reforms and a fear 
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of 'politicization'. Reassessing communications conventions so they 
reflect reality will provide a golden opportunity to find the 
commonalities and to understand the differences, that exist. 
Transparency is vital to government communications, if they are to be 
perceived as appropriate expenditure of taxpayers' funds, unbiased and 
apolitical. 
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Core agencies - 49 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Audit Office 
Ministry of Civil Defence 
Ministry of Commerce 
Department of Conservation 
Ministry of Consumer Affairs 
Crown Law Office 
Ministry of Cultural Affairs 
New Zealand Customs 
Ministry of Defence 
Ministry of Education 
Education Review Office 
Ministry for the Environment 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Ministry of Forestry 
Government Superannuation Fund Department 
Ministry of Health 
Ministry of Housing 
Inland Revenue Department 
Department of Internal Affairs 
Department of Justice 
Department of Labour 
New Zealand Employment Service 
New Zealand Immigration Service 
Industrial Relations Service 
Community Employment Group 
Occupational Safety and Health Service 
Ministry of Maori Development (Te Puni Kokiri) 
National Library of New Zealand 
Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs 
- 
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New Zealand Police 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Public Trust Office 
Ministry of Research, Science and Technology 
Serious Fraud Office 
Department of Social Welfare 
New Zealand Income Support Service 
New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service 
New Zealand Community Funding Agency 
Social Policy Agency 
State Services Commission 
Statistics New Zealand 
Department of Survey and Land Information 
Ministry of Tourism 
Ministry of Transport 
Treasury 
Valuation New Zealand 
Ministry of Women's Affairs 
Ministry of Youth Affairs 
Crown entities - 13 
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation 
The Careers Service 
Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand 
Early Childhood Development Unit 
Education and Training Support Agency 
Public Health Commission 
Housing Corporation of New Zealand 
Housing New Zealand Limited 
Land Transport Safety Authority 
Learning Media Limited 
New Zealand Qualifications Authority 
Foundation for Research, Science and Technology 
Special Education Service Board 
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State-Owned Enterprises - 15 
Airways Corporation of New Zealand Limited 
Coal Corporation of New Zealand Limited 
Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Limited 
Trans Power New Zealand Limited 
Forestry Corporation of New Zealand Ltd 
Government Computing Service Limited (since sold) 
Government Property Services Limited 
Land Corporation Limited 
Meteorological Service of New Zealand Limited 
New Zealand Post Limited 
Radio New Zealand Limited 
Television New Zealand Limited 
Timberlands West Coast Limited 
Vehicle Testing New Zealand Limited 
Works and Development Services Corporation (NZ) Limited 
Crown Research Institutes - 9 
New Zealand Institute for Crop and Food Research Ltd 
Institute of Environmental Science and Research Ltd 
New Zealand Forest Research Institute Ltd 
Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Ltd 
Horticulture and Food Research Institute of New Zealand Ltd 
Industrial Research Ltd 
Landcare Research New Zealand Ltd 
New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Ltd 
National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Ltd 
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-Survey methodology 
The criteria for selection was those organisations which: currently form 
the core public service (i.e. listed in the first schedule to the State Sector 
Act 1988, as well as the Police Department's civilian staff under section 44 
2 (d)); and those organisations whose key functions were part of the core 
public service pre-1987 and are still in public ownership and subject to the 
Official Information Act 1982 (State-Owned Enterprises, Crown Research 
Institutes, Crown entities). 
This does not include other organisations which may be covered by the 
Official Information Act 1982, but which did not form part of the core 
public service (i.e. producer boards, statutory authorities, regional health 
authorities, educational institutions, publicly-owned companies). 
Where a public service department has been split into separate business 
operations with distinct identities, these were separately surveyed, as well 
as where a smaller ministry was located within a larger one. 
Each survey was marked, both on the envelope and the letter inside, 
Attention: Communications/ Marketing Manager. The letters were 
enclosed with the survey form and a self-addressed, pre-paid envelope 
was also included. The survey forms were colour-coded so that they 
could be easily categorised upon receipt. 
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-Original letter 
244 Buckley Road 
Southgate 
WELLINGTON 2 
2 November 1994 
Dear Communications/ Marketing Manager 
Like you, I am a communications professional working within the public 
sector. The Department of Justice, where I work as Senior 
Communications Advisor, has sponsored me to complete a Master of 
Public Policy degree. 
For my thesis, I'm interested in how the public sector is currently 
approaching its various communications responsibilities. I would greatly 
appreciate your help in developing a picture of how the various types of 
public sector agencies manage this task. All that's required is your help in 
completing the attached survey. Don't worry if you can't answer all the 
questions, just indicate where you are unable to do this. 
If you're interested in receiving a summary of the data (once it's 
aggregated) then just tick the box on the survey. 
Thanks for your help -I know how busy you must be, and I really 
appreciate the time you have given. 
The survey information is requested in terms of the Official Information 
Act 1982. If you would like more information, please contact me on (04) 
4721 000 x 8526, or (04) 3838 499. 
Yours sincerely 
JUDITH URLICH 
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R e m i n d e r  letter 
244 Buckley Road 
Southgate 
WELLINGTON 2 
23 December 1994 
Dear Communications/ Marketing Manager 
On 2 November I sent you a survey which I have not yet received back. 
As I had requested the information under the Official Information Act 
1982, I would appreciate your reasons for withholding the information. 
You may be interested to know that the majority of organisations 
surveyed were able to return theirs within 21 working days either fully or 
partially completed. 
For your information I have included another copy of the letter and 
survey, which I trust you may still find time to complete. 
Yours sincerely 
JUDITH URLICH 
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Communicationsl Marketing Managers' Survey 
Public sector agency .................................................................. 
....................................................................................... Address 
.................................................. C o r n s /  Marketing Manager 
Phone ( ) ................................................................................. 
0 Yes, I'd like a copy of the aggregate data sent to me. 
Return by 24 November 1994 to: 
Judith Urlich 
244 Buckley Road 
Southgate 
WELLINGTON 2 
1. Which communications activities does your agency engage in? 
promote political party policy 
defend political party policy 
explain political party policy 
attack political party policy 
promote government policy 
defend government policy 
explain government policy 
attack government policy 
promote policy proposals 
defend policy proposals 
explain policy proposals 
attack policy proposals 
lobby for specific policy 
proposals 
provide public education services 
0 marketing of services 
0 marketing of product 
0 corporate positioning/ awareness 
advertising 
0 promotion of agency in media 
0 defence of agency in media 
0 explain agency's actions in media 
0 front-up to the media if required 
0 client communication 
0 consultation of interest groups for 
service proposals 
0 consultation of interest groups for 
policy proposals 
0 consultation of interest groups for 
legislative requirements 
0 other (state) .................................. 
How would you describe your agency? 
mixed operational/ policy 0 primarily policy 0 primarily operational 
State-Owned Enterprise 0 Crownentity 0 other (state) ............................... 
In the 1993194 financial year, how much 
money was spent by your agency (please 
include all overheads and staff costs) on: 
4. Is communications/ marketing 
spending: 
0 separately budgeted 
- 
General communications/ marketing (a) 0 in its own output class 
Media relations 
- (b) 
TOTAL communications spending (a+b) (c) 0 mixed in with other agency 
TOTAL agency budget (Vote) - (d) budgets 
% spent on co&nu&cations ( c 4  xlOO) 
5. Do the following apply to your agency's communications? 
0 Ombudsmen Act 1975 0 judicial review 
0 Official Information Act 1982 0 sub-judice provisions 
0 Audit Office/ Cabinet Office guidelines 0 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 
for government advertising (1989) 0 Privacy Act 1993 
-Survey results 
Question 1 . 
D CORE-POLICY 
Activity % 
Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 85.71 
Explain government policy ...................................................................... 78.57 
Explain policy proposals ............................................................................ 64.29 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 64.29 
Explain agency's actions in the media .................................................... 64.29 
Client communication .............................................................................. 64.29 
Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements ........... 50 
Promote government policy .................................................................... 42.86 
Promote policy proposals .......................................................................... 35.71 
Provide public education services ........................................................... 35.71 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 28.57 
Promotion of agency in media ................................................................. 21.43 
Defence of agency in media ...................................................................... 14.29 
Defend government policy ....................................................................... 14.29 
Promote political party policy .................................................................... 7.14 
Explain political party policy ...................................................................... 7.14 
Defend policy proposals ............................................................................... 7.14 
Attack policy proposals ................................................................................ 7.14 
Lobby for specific policy proposals ............................................................. 7.14 
Marketing of services ................................................................................... 7.14 
Marketing of product ................................................................................... 7.14 
Assist other agencies in communications delivery .............................. 7.14 
There were 14 agencies represented in the above data . 




Client communication .............................................................................. 92.31 
Marketing of services ................................................................................. 84.62 
Promotion of agency in the media .......................................................... 84.62 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 69.23 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 69.23 
Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 69.23 
Explain agency's actions in media ........................................................... 6 . 5 4  
Provide public education services ........................................................... 53.85 
Corporate positioning/ awareness advertising .................................... 53.85 
Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements ........... 53.85 
Explain government policy ...................................................................... 53.85 
Marketing of product ................................................................................. 46.15 
Defence of agency in media ...................................................................... 46.15 
Promote government policy .................................................................... 38.46 
Explain policy proposals ............................................................................ 23.08 
Defend government policy ....................................................................... 15.38 
Promote policy proposals .......................................................................... 15.38 
Defend policy proposals ............................................................................. 15.38 
Issue factual information ............................................................................ 7.69 
There were 13 agencies represented in the above data . 
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D CORE-MIXED OBJECTIVE 
Activity % 
Explain policy proposals ............................................................................ 85 
Explain government policy ...................................................................... 80 
Explain agency's actions in media ........................................................... 80 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 80 
Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 80 
Provide public education services ........................................................... 75 
Promotion of agency in the media .......................................................... 70 
.............................................................................. Client communication 70 
Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements ........... 70 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 65 
Promote government policy .................................................................... 60 
Promote policy proposals .......................................................................... 60 
Marketing of services ................................................................................. 55 
Defence of agency in media ...................................................................... 55 
Defend policy proposals ............................................................................. 40 
Corporate positioning/ awareness advertising .................................... 35 
Defend government policy ....................................................................... 35 
Marketing of product ................................................................................. 20 
Lobby for specific policy proposals ........................................................... 10 
Relationship management ......................................................................... 5 
Publications .................................................................................................... 5 
.............................................................................................................. Library 5 
Overseas visitors ........................................................................................... 5 
Advise on policy issues ............................................................................... 5 
There were 20 agencies represented in the above data . 
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D CROWN ENTITIES 
Activity % 
Client communication .............................................................................. 90 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 80 
Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 70 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 70 
Marketing of services ................................................................................. 60 
Marketing of product ................................................................................. 60 
Provide public education services ........................................................... 60 
Explain government policy ...................................................................... 60 
Explain agency's actions in media ........................................................... 60 
Promotion of agency in the media .......................................................... 50 
Corporate positioning/ awareness advertising .................................... 50 
Explain policy proposals ............................................................................ 50 
Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements ........... 40 
Promote government policy .................................................................... 30 
Promote policy proposals .......................................................................... 30 
Lobby for specific policy proposals ........................................................... 20 
Defend government policy ....................................................................... 10 
Defend policy proposals ............................................................................. 10 
Defence of agency in media ...................................................................... 10 
There were ten agencies represented in the above data . 
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D STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
Activity % 
Client communication .............................................................................. 92.86 
Corporate positioning/ awareness advertising .................................... 85.71 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 78.57 
................................................................................. Marketing of services 71.43 
Promotion of agency in the media .......................................................... 7 . 4 3  
Explain agency's actions in media ........................................................... 71.43 
Marketing of product ................................................................................. 64.29 
Defence of agency in media ...................................................................... 57.14 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 50 
Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 50 
Lobby for specific policy proposals ........................................................... 35.71 
Provide public education services ........................................................... 35.71 
Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements ........... 21.42 
Promote government policy ...................................................................... 7.14 
Explain government policy ........................................................................ 7.14 
Standards legislation and lobbying ........................................................... 7.14 
Implement government policy ................................................................. 7.14 
Sponsorship ................................................................................................... 7.14 
. . Staff communications .................................................................................. 7.14 
There were 14 agencies represented in the above data . 
D CROWN RESEARCH INSTITUTES 
Activity % 
Marketing of services ............................................................................... 100 
Marketing of product ............................................................................... 100 
Corporate positioning/ awareness advertising .................................. 100 
Promotion of agency in the media ........................................................ 100 
Client communication ............................................................................ 100 
Front-up to the media if required ........................................................... 83.33 
Provide public education services ........................................................... 66.67 
Consultation of interest groups for service proposals ........................ 66.67 
Explain agency's actions in media ........................................................... 50 
........... Consultation of interest groups for legislative requirements 50 
Consultation of interest groups for policy proposals .......................... 33.33 
Defence of agency in media ...................................................................... 33.33 
Lobby for specific policy proposals ........................................................... 16.67 
Environmental research ........................................................................... 16.67 
Publications for purchasers ....................................................................... 16.67 
There were six agencies represented in the above data . 




Auditor-General Prime Minister & Cabinet 
Women's Affairs Social Policy Agency 
Foreign Affairs & Trade Environment 
Tourism Policy Group Youth Affairs 
Transport Health 
Cultural Affairs State Services Commission 
Research Science & Technology Maori Development 
(Minis try) 
D CORE-OPERATIONAL 
Community Employment Group NZ Community Funding Agency 
Statistics NZ Public Trust Office 
NZ Income Support Service Valuation NZ 
Education Review Office Serious Fraud Office 
Crown Law Office NZ Children & Young Persons 
NZ Police Service 
Survey & Land Information National Library 




Govt Superannuation Fund 
Social Welfare 
NZ Employment Service 
Inland Revenue 
Industrial Relations Service 
Housing (Ministry) 
Conservation 
Pacific Island Affairs 
Civil Defence 
Occupational Safety & Health 
Forestry 
Justice 









TOTAL spent on communications 
% spent on communications 
D CORE-OPERATIONAL 
TOTAL spent on communications 
% spent on communications 
D CORE-MIXED OBJECTIVE 
TOTAL spent on communications 
% spent on communications 
D CROWN ENTITIES 
TOTAL spent on communications 
% spent on communications 
D STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
TOTAL spent on communications 
'10 spent on communications 
D CROWN RESEARCH INSTITUTES 
TOTAL spent on communications 2,265,000 - 4 = $566,250 
'10 spent on communications 
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D SUMMARY 








































Relevance indicated I P I o I M I S O E  
Ombudsmen Act 1975 
Official Information Act 1982 
Audit/ Cabinet Office guidelines 
judicial review 
sub-judice provisions 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 

























Is there any statistical difference between three out of four 'policy 
advocacy' agencies, and two out of ten other 'primarily policy' agencies? 
Test for two sample proportions: 
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H$ (null hypothesis): That at the 95% confidence level, there is no 
significant difference between the results recorded by three out of four 
'policy advocacy' agencies, and two out of ten other 'primarily policy' 
agencies. 
If the Z score is 5 1.96, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
As the Z score of 1.94 is I 1.96, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 




Core CEs SOEs CRIs TOTAL 
Returned 47 (44) 10 (12) 14 (13) 6 (8) 77 
TOTAL 49 13 15 9 86 
Key: 
Core = primarily policy, primarily operational and mixed objective 
public sector agencies 
CEs = Crown entities 
SOEs = state-owned enterprises 
CRIs = Crown research institutes 
Expected values are in parentheses, showing what values would be 
expected if null hypothesis were upheld. 
H$ (null hypothesis): That at the 95% confidence level, there is no 
significant difference between the number of surveys returned by each 
state sector agency type. 
To test the actual variance: ~2~~~~~~~ = C(0-El2 
E 
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The critical value for 95% distribution of variations expected if there was 
no other effect going on, other than sampling, is found using degrees of 
freedom: 
(data rows - 1) x (data columns - 1) = (2 - 1) x (4 - 1) = 1 x 3 = 3 
It would be unwise to draw any interpretation from these results as the 
variation (11.4147) is not greatly out of range from 7.81. The existence of 
several cells with data less than 5 in them can serve to distort the results. 
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Calculation three 
Is the survey return rate for each agency type different from the 
population proportion (89.53%)? 
H @  (null hypothesis): That at the 95% confidence level, there is no 
significant difference between the population proportion and each 
sample proportion. 
If the Z score is I 1.96, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Core agencies 
As the Z score of 1.9364 is I 1.96, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Crown entities 
As the Z score of 6.1515 is 2 1.96, the null hypothesis can be rejected. The 
difference is statistically significant. 
Government communication in New Zealand: changing roles and conventions 175 
APPENDIX FOUR 
State-owned enterprises 
As the Z score of 1.1515 is I 1.96, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Crown research institutes 
As the Z score of 6.9273 is 2 1.96, the null hypothesis can be rejected. The 
difference is statistically significant. 
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